Studies presented to the
International Commission
for the History of Representative
and Parliamentary Institutions

L

Études présentées à la
Commission Internationale
pour l'histoire des
Assemblées d'États

COUNCIL, KING AND ESTATES IN SWEDEN 1713 — 1714

by

CARL LENNART LUNDQUIST

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL
Stockholm — Sweden

1975

COUNCIL, KING AND ESTATES IN SWEDEN 1713—1714

AKADEMISK AVHANDLING
som med tillstånd av humanistiska
fakultetens historisk-filosofiska sektion
vid Stockholms universitet för vinnande av
doktorsexamen framlägges till
offentlig granskning på hörsal 8, Fiskartorpsvägen 160 D
lördagen den 15 mars 1975 kl. 10

av

CARL LENNART LUNDQUIST
fil. kand.

STOCKHOLM 1975

COUNCIL, KING AND ESTATES IN SWEDEN 1713—1714

UNIV.
LEIDEN
BIBL.

Studies presented to the
International Commission
for the History of Representative
and Parliamentary Institutions

L

Études présentées à la
Commission Internationale
pour l'histoire des
Assemblées d'États

COUNCIL, KING AND ESTATES IN SWEDEN 1713 — 1714

by

CARL LENNART LUNDQUIST

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL
Stockholm — Sweden

© 1975 Carl Lennart Lundquist/Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm

All rights reserved

ISBN 91—22 00005—4

Printed in Sweden by

Norrtälje 1975
Norrtelje Tidnings Boktryckeri AB

Table of Contents

Abbreviations VII
Preface IX
Introduction 1
The Course of Events 1
Previous Research 2
The Problem 5
The Sources 6

Chapter I. The Council's Indecision Regarding the Convening of the Riksdag 11
Horn's first efforts towards convening the Estates 11
The Council and the Financing of the War 17
Peter Feif's mission 23

Chapter II. The Political Propaganda during the Summer of 1713.. 27
The Diplomatic Background 27
Eric Roland's Mission in England 30
The English Message 34
The Origin of the Propaganda 41
The Purpose of the Propaganda 47
Roland's Verbal Message 51
The Effect of the Propaganda 53

Chapter III. Swedish Peace Feelers 60
England's attitude toward Sweden, March—July 1713 60
Charles XII's attitude toward the Problem of Peace 71
Rumors regarding Vellingk's Authority 74
The Council's Authorization of Vellingk 85

Chapter IV. Conflict between the Council and the Estates regarding matters of taxation, 1713—1714 94
Controversy concerning Taxation of Assets of the Savings Bank .. 94
Negotiation of the Extraordinary Tax of 1714 105

Chapter V. Opposition from the Estates over the Problem of Obtaining Peace 118
Continued Offers for Mediation 118
The Estates' Decision to Write to the King 120
The Estates' Declaration of January 22, 1714 128
The Indecision of the Peace Proponents 135

Chapter VI. The Question of the Regency, 1713—1714 143
Disagreements over the Question of Succession 143
The Estates' Proposal: February 25, 1714 155
Horn's Threat of Censure 158
The Council decides to Negotiate Peace 167
Disbandment 171

Chapter VII. The Theory of Conspiracy 174
Critique of the Sources 174
The Alliance Project 182

Chapter VIII. Review of the Work of the Riksdag 185
Excursus. "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates" 189
Summary 196
Some explanatory notes 201
Bibliography 203
Index 213

Abbreviations

AAE = Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères
AN = Archives Nationales
Bg P = Borgarståndets riksdagsprotokoll, i. e. the Burghers'minutes 1713—1714
BM = British Museum
HH = Historiska Handlingar
HSH = Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia
KFÅ = Karolinska förbundets årsbok
KrA = Krigsarkivet
Letters and Corr. = (Bolingbroke, H. St John) Letters and Correspondence
LSB = Linköpings Stifts- och Landsbibliotek
LUÅ, NF = Lunds universitets årsskrift, Ny följd
MRA, NF = Meddelanden från Riksarkivet, Ny följd
N. S. = New style
PRO = Public Record Office
Pr P = Prästeståndets riksdagsprotokoll, i. e. the Clergy's minutes 1713—1714
RA = Riksarkivet
RAP = Ridderskapets och adelns protokoll, i. e. the Nobility's minutes 1713—1714
Rb = Riksbankens arkiv
SBL = Svenskt biografiskt lexikon
sm = (daler) silvermynt
SP = State papers
SU prot. = Sekreta utskottets protokoll, i. e. the Secret Committe's minutes 1713—1714

Preface

The present dissertation has been written within the context of a research project entitled "The Development of a Party System; Parties, Parliamentary Practice and Parliamentary Ideas in Sweden, 1680—1772" under the auspices of the Department of History at the University of Stockholm. I would like to thank the head of this project and my teacher over the years, Professor Sven Ulric Palme, for his inspiring guidance, incisive criticism and personal consideration, as well as the assistant project head, Docent Ingemar Carlsson, for fruitful discussions about political propaganda and for detailed analyses of the pamphlet literature. Docent Göran B. Nilsson, who substituted for Professor Palme during the autumn of 1973, has submitted a couple of my chapters to his constructive and stimulating criticism. In addition, the other members of the project have contributed valuable points of view, which have enriched this dissertation in many ways.

My employer, the Swedish National Archives, has generously granted me leaves of absence, without which this book would not have been ready for publication at this time. Thanks are also due the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions for its gracious assistance.

Carol Adamson, M. A., has translated the present work from the original Swedish.

Täby, December 1974

Carl Lennart Lundquist

Introduction

THE COURSE OF EVENTS

During the spring and summer of 1713, the governing Council in Stockholm received a steady stream of bad news. News of the *Kalabalik* at Bender awakened concern and uneasiness, while rumors began to circulate that Charles XII either had died or had been imprisoned by the Turks. Stenbock, who had been besieged in the fortress of Tönningen in Holstein since February, capitulated in May, thereby surrendering Sweden's last army on the Continent. The Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp was occupied by allied troops, and Russian armies had invaded Finland, occupied Helsinki and driven the Swedish troops back from the coastal regions. By May fear was widespread in Stockholm that the Russians would attempt an invasion across the Åland Sea.

With the depressing news from abroad, the uncertainty about the King's fate, the steadily deteriorating state of affairs at home with the fear of a Russian invasion, the mood of discontent which had been widespread even earlier was now intensified — nourished principally by verbal agitation and by anonymous pamphlets which were passed from hand to hand. Urgent demands were voiced for peace and for the Estates to empower either Princess Ulrika Eleonora or the Council to enter into negotiations with the Allies. Since the King had forbidden the Council to enter into any negotiations on its own, fulfillment of such popular demands independent of or directly against his orders would constitute an act of rebellion. Therefore the Estates, long dominated by the absolute monarchy, were to provide Swedish negotiators with a legitimacy that they were not able to obtain from the King. The situation was further complicated by the fear that news of the death of Charles XII might arrive at any moment. The conflict between the King's sister, Princess Ulrika Eleonora, and his nephew, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, over the succession became acute. The principal question was who would assume power at the death of Charles XII, if such an announcement were to come at a time when the succession issue was still unsettled and when the Council, supported by full powers provided by the assembled Estates, was the supreme executive organ with unquestioned legitimacy. There was a chance that the Council-aristocracy would demand a change of the constitution as the price for recognizing the succession of one of the candidates to the throne.

In November, 1713, the Council decided to give Princess Ulrika Eleonora a seat in its chambers and to convene the *Riksdag*. The Princess and the Council then empowered Mauritz Vellingk, the Governor General of Bremen-Verden, to initiate negotiations for peace. Both moves, the convocation of a *Riksdag* and the empowering of a Swedish peace negotiator, were clearly in conflict with Charles XII's orders. The Council tried to justify its moves by emphasizing to the King the serious military situation, the shortage of money, the widespread discontent at home and the fact that he himself had authorized Vellingk to conclude an agreement on a cease fire; a cease fire which according to the Council could only be reached through peace negotiations. When the Estates finally assembled in Stockholm they voiced such energetic demands to participate in the peace negotiations that the Council felt it must inform them that Charles XII himself planned to enter into such talks. When the Estates argued all too stubbornly that Princess Ulrika Eleonora should be proclaimed regent during the King's absence, the Council countered them in a similar manner by informing them that the King had prohibited the summoning of a *Riksdag* — a message which the Council had in fact received much earlier. In each of these cases, the Council was able to regain superiority over the Estates only by employing the authority of the King. After the announcement of the King's prohibition of the *Riksdag*, the sessions were discontinued without any formal adjournment or conclusion and the delegates simply returned to their homes.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The sources which have been preserved provide somewhat divergent versions of the course of events and historians who have studied this period have reached somewhat different conclusions as a result of their varying attitudes towards the sources. Two points have been debated intensively: first, what will be referred to as the *theory of conspiracy* and, second, the problem of the composition of the opposition within the Estates, its goals and its constitutional program.

The *theory of conspiracy* has received its principal support from the French Resident J. de Campredon's dispatches from Stockholm during 1713. Campredon accused the leading member of the Council, Chancery President Arvid Horn, of purposely arousing fear and discontent in the kingdom in hopes of provoking petitions demanding the convocation of a *Riksdag* that would be induced to give the Council increased powers during the King's absence. According to this theory, Horn attempted to take advantage of the prevailing situation in order to increase his own power and to prepare the

ground for his assumed leadership should the sceptre pass from Charles XII in the near future. Campredon's accusations are partially supported by general hints and insinuations in anonymous pamphlets, in traces of verbal agitation which have been recorded, and by an oral tradition which eventually developed. These accusations were alternately aimed at the Council as a whole, and at Horn and his father-in-law, Councillor of the Realm, Field Marshal Nils Gyllenstierna.

Under the circumstances it is not at all surprising that the official records — the Council's minutes and directives — provide the historian with the picture that the Council itself wished to put forth. This material contradicts the sources upon which the *theory of conspiracy* is based, but the official version has been accepted by R. M. Bowallius, C. G. Malmström and S. Grauers. None of them questioned the reliability of the official sources, granting Grauers was conscious of the fact that the Council's minutes could be a questionable source that omits much of what was uttered during the Council's deliberations.[1] Bowallius accepted the official version as presented in the minutes and in the Council's correspondence with the King. He attributed the Council's convocation of the *Riksdag* solely to Sweden's perilous military situation and to widespread discontent among the people; the Council had not acted with "any intention antagonistic towards the King, but had been forced by most urgent necessity."[2] In line with his general high regard for official sources, Malmström also accepted the Council's version.[3] Grauers also seems to share this view since he wrote of the Council's "mood of dull resignation and the desperate activity with which measures that could in fact be interpreted by the uninitiated as trespassing on the King's prerogatives were seriously discussed."[4] Grauers claimed that in providing Vellingk with full powers, Horn had hoped to anticipate a move by the Estates, whose desire for peace was easy to imagine. By doing so he hoped to prevent them from "throwing themselves into adventures".[5] That Horn did not carry out the plans which were attributed to him, even at a juncture when he had only to lift a finger to achieve his supposed goal, was enough to convince Grauers that he had never entertained such plans.[6]

---

[1] S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn* I (Göteborg 1920) pp. XI—XII.
[2] R. M. Bowallius, *Berättelse om Riksdagen i Stockholm 1713—1714 (Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrån år 1796 XXII,* Stockholm 1847), p. 229 f.
[3] C. G. Malmström, *Sveriges politiska historia från konung Karl XII:s död till statshvälfningen 1772* I (Stockholm 1893), p. 14 ff.
[4] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag till oppositionens historia under Karl XII* (K.F.Å. 1921), p. 212.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 222 f.

A. Fryxell accepted the validity of Campredon's claims and adopted them as his own without explanation and without criticism.[7] N. Tengberg demonstrated the same tendency and wrote that "the Council, claiming to be unable to maintain the Realm by itself, employed every possible means to awaken a longing for peace, a *Riksdag* and perhaps even a change in the form of government".[8] E. Hjärne was more cautious, though he did not reject the *theory of conspiracy*. He left the question open, noting that Campredon's reports "seem to throw a strange light upon the real motivation for the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714 and upon the role which the Council played. Nothing is proven, but suspicions are aroused".[9]

J. Rosén presented a third interpretation: by using circumstantial evidence he was able to show that it is probable that part of the political agitation in the form of anonymous pamphlets was directed by the Council itself with the intention of persuading the nation — weary of war and desirous for peace — to conform to the Council's political pursuits. In doing so Rosén confirmed Campredon's accusation that the Council attempted to provoke the Estates to authorize it to negotiate a peace settlement independent of the King. However, Rosén emphasized that the Council might have used such an authorization by the Estates to convince the King to initiate peace talks himself.[10]

K. J. Hartman conjectured that during 1713—1714 the Council in fact was secretly cooperating with Charles XII, who needed and provoked domestic factionalism for reasons of foreign policy.[11] Hartman was not able to support his thesis with any concrete evidence and therefore it must be judged as nothing more than a bold guess.

When it comes to the question of the constitutional program and the true motives of the opposition within the Estates, E. G. Geijer and R. M. Bowallius represent an older school which based its interpretation on oral traditions dating from the Age of Liberty. Some observers have chosen to see the first preparations for the Form of Government of 1719 being drafted in the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714, while others have chosen to see these preparations originating some years later. According to these sources, the instigators behind the Form of Government of 1719 were to be found

---

[7] A. Fryxell, *Berättelser ur svenska historien* XXV (Stockholm 1857), pp. 157 ff.
[8] N. Tengberg, *Om Frihetstiden* (Stockholm 1867), p. 28.
[9] E. Hjärne, *Från Vasatiden till Frihetstiden* (Stockholm 1929), p. 112 f.
[10] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet om fredsmedling 1713* (LUÅ NF I:43, 1946), pp. 75 ff.
[11] K. J. Hartman, *Karl XII och hessarna* (Acta Academiae Aboensis Humaniora X:1, Åbo 1935), pp. 18 ff.

within the opposition circles with which Horn may have had contacts.[12] Both Geijer and Bowallius seem to have identified this group, at least partially, with the opposition in the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714. Geijer wrote that the basic ideas behind the Form of Government of 1719 were set out in 1714 and that Horn "planned to gain a position of power for the Council similar to that which it had during the Middle Ages".[13] Bowallius mentioned a party with traditions dating to the reign of Charles XI, which gained more and more influence due to the force of circumstances. "The party's principal goal was to abolish absolutism, though it did not yet dare to express this goal openly". He counted Horn among the sympathizers of this party and explained the fact that Horn worked against the group by stating that he did not yet consider the time ripe for action.[14] Grauers, on the other hand, presented an entirely different interpretation: he claimed that the opposition within the Estates had very little in common with those who overthrew the absolute monarchy. The group in the Estates which promoted the idea of proclaiming Ulrika Eleonora regent had, according to Grauers, dynastic, not constitutional interests. Among other things, he argued that the very idea of recognizing an absolute regent before there was any need to do so, would have been "rather foolish".[15] Grauers claimed that this group was much more concerned with the administration of the kingdom than with its constitution[16] and that, in addition, those who were at odds with the Council or who feared a revival of aristocratic rule centered in the Council made common cause with this group.[17] Hjärne adopted a more cautious and less rigid position toward this question and attempted to find tendencies and threads in the opposition's arguments which might have foreshadowed the Form of Government of 1719.[18]

THE PROBLEM

The *theory of conspiracy* will be reconsidered. The same questions earlier historians posed will be asked again, but this time in the light of material hitherto disregarded, and sources never used before in this connection.

---

[12] The most recent study of the preparations for the Constitution of 1719 is in L. Thanner, *Revolutionen i Sverige efter Karl XII:s död* (Uppsala 1953), Chapter 2.
[13] E. G. Geijer, *Teckning af Sveriges tillstånd och af de förnämsta handlande personerna under tiden från konung Carl XII:s död och till konung Gustaf III:s anträde af regeringen (Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrån år 1796 XVIII,* Stockholm 1838), p. 50 f.
[14] R. M. Bowallius, *op. cit.,* p. 260 f.
[15] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag,* p. 226.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 230.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 226.
[18] E. Hjärne, *op. cit.,* Chapter III.

The *Riksdag's* position regarding the Council will be examined, and the question posed: Were the Estates tempted to fill the political vacuum that resulted from the weakness of the executive power — due to the long absence of the absolute monarch — and the division of the Council and its dependence on the Estates to legitimize its actions to the King, foreign states and its own constituency? Or were the Estates summoned to act only to serve the policy of the Council in its peace program and in its relationship to the King? Parliamentary procedure, tendencies to build parties, and the methods employed by such groups will be examined. The form and content of the work of the *Riksdag,* rather than its constitutional and ideological ties, will therefore be emphasized in the dissertation.

The ambition to answer all these questions necessitates a description of parallel events; thus, the presentation will not follow strict chronological order, but a topical one. This means that some elements in the course of events will be dealt with in several different perspectives within the text.

THE SOURCES

The sources on which this thesis is based are noted in the bibliography. Several of the sources are worth an introductory comment, partly to explain the complications arising from the use of one of the dominant sources, and partly to review new and hitherto unused material.

One of the most important groups of sources for the study of the domestic crisis of 1713—1714 is comprised in the minutes taken in the Council, the separate estates, and the *Riksdag* committees. Its use is limited by problems and complications growing out of a stringent critique of its reliability. Portions have already been severely criticized. Thanner has compared the original notes, the finished draft and the final copy of the Council's minutes for six months of 1718—1719, and revealed tendentious omissions, faulty transcriptions, misunderstandings and contradictions. In a polemic against Malmström's favorable evaluations of the official sources he pointed out the danger of basing an entire thesis on minutes without first subjecting them to severe criticism, and asserted that statements recorded in private notes ought not to be disregarded simply because they do not appear in the minutes.[19] It has also been pointed out that one ought to be familiar with the custom of reasoning *pro et contra* when reading the Council's minutes. The argument presented does not necessarily represent the speaker's own

[19] L. Thanner, *op. cit.,* pp. 2 ff, 9.

point of view, but might have been cast out as a radical and incisive theme for debate.[20]

Another element must be reckoned with — consideration for the King. Grauers, in his biography of Arvid Bernhard Horn, wrote of "the natural cautiousness which made the gentlemen on the Council muzzle themselves, for now and then, Charles XII requisitioned the minutes for the discussion of controversial matters". In his thesis, which includes the Spring of 1713, he noticed that it became increasingly common that the secretary in charge of keeping the minutes was asked to leave during the discussion of controversial issues.[21] There is no reason to question Grauer's reminder of the Council's consideration for the King. But it must be asked if this consideration might have had a more serious background and implied fear of the possibility of punishment for breach of responsibility.

What was recorded in the minutes — and what was left unrecorded — must be viewed against the background of the limitations placed on freedom of speech by Charles XI's approbation of the Estates' *Kassationsakt* of 1689. At the command of Charles XI, the Council's minutes were examined by the Secret Committee to find improper statements concerning the King's authority. This resulted in the Kassationsakt, by which all statements which questioned the King's authority and integrity or which evidenced impingement on the King's power were struck. G. Hasselberg has shown that Charles XI's approbation of the *Kassationsakt* tended to sharpen the criticism of such statements so that they could be judged as evidence of criminal activity. Furthermore, when it was worked over in the Royal Chancery, the approbation was freed from the framework of the offending minutes. Thus, the act came to be directed against all statements which challenged the King's authority and privilege. The third point in the King's approbation of March 15, 1689, contained a warning for the future: "He who now or in the future utters such mad ideas or gives such a speech would, according to the Estates, be considered disloyal to the King and averse to the Fatherland. In addition to this opinion of the Estates, the King specifically added in the approbation that persons guilty of such statements would have committed the crime *laesae majestatis*."[22] The royal approbation granted at the same time pardon, on the condition that the King reserved the right for himself and his successors to intervene against those pardoned

---

[20] L. Thanner, *op. cit.*, p. 2, p. 354, note 4. E. Hjärne: *Konungens och rådets omröstning*, unpublished manuscript, E. Hjärne's papers (uncataloged), UUB.
[21] S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn* I, p. XI.
[22] Cited direct from G. Hasselberg, *De karolinska kassationsakterna*, p. 197. See also pages 196 ff, 223 ff.

and their heirs, if they in any way disregarded their loyal duties as subjects.[23]

Charles XI's approbation of the 1689 *Kassationsakt* contained this warning for the future: he who spoke or acted against the King could be branded disloyal and guilty of lese majesty. These events were fairly recent, and they must have been clearly remembered by those who had reached middle-age or passed it. When reading minutes and other official documents this must be kept in mind. It would be impossible to maintain that this would not have influenced or directly shaped the views recorded in the minutes.

The official documents have been complemented and occasionally compared with private sources. The most important of these private sources is the diary kept by a teacher from Linköping, A. Wibiörnsson. The only other historian who has used it to discuss the 1713—1714 *Riksdag* is Malmström. It will be seen that this diary reveals interesting discrepancies when compared with the record in the minutes of the *Riksdag*. Malmström seems not to have noticed these. He might have seen them, but in accordance with his favorable evaluation of official sources and corresponding suspicion of private ones, he quietly discarded Wibiörnsson's information. He was satisfied with quoting Wibiörnsson on a few points when the minutes provided no information.

The Swedish attempts to establish conditions for a cease fire and, in the larger perspective peace, play an important role in this thesis. Some of the chapters concentrate on diplomacy. The reports from foreign diplomats in Stockholm to their respective governments and corresponding reports from Swedish ministers abroad have been complemented with English diplomatic correspondence between Whitehall and the English ministers in Utrecht and The Hague. These have not been taken into consideration in earlier Swedish studies on this topic, though they illuminate the policies of the Swedish Council. The foreign Residents' dispatches from Stockholm are — although they must be read critically — useful for understanding the situation within the realm in 1713—1714, especially regarding conditions which cannot be expected to be recorded in official, or in any great degree in private Swedish sources. The reports and instructions of the English, Dutch and French Residents have been useful. Here it should be noted that earlier Swedish scholars have had to use copies of the French Resident's dispatches which were made by A. Fryxell, *(Samlingar till Sveriges historia,* D329:8:3 KB) and Malmström (C. G. Malmströms avskriftssamling, I, RA, published in

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia under åren 1713—1720, Uppsala, 1854). The original documents have been used as a basis for this thesis. Since the copies were censored before Fryxell and Malmström were allowed to take them out of the French Foreign Office, earlier Swedish scholars had to use these altered texts. The text of the original supplements the copies in several important respects; among other things, the attitudes of the French Resident and his attempt to influence Swedish policy are clearer.

Chapter I The Council's Indecision regarding The Convening of the Riksdag

HORN'S FIRST EFFORTS TOWARD CONVENING THE ESTATES

Under the strain of reverses in the Great Northern war and the financial difficulties, a committee meeting with representatives of all the estates of the *Riksdag* met in Stockholm in 1710, at Horn's initiative. The measure was taken without consulting Charles XII. The Council was anxious to avoid decisions that could annoy the King, and the Estates' business was purposely limited to the questions that were directed to them. The proposition's request to provide information on where funds to cover the gaps in the budget would be obtained, had not resulted in a new grant. Instead, the Estates referred to the possibilities the Crown had to borrow money. But the committee, in spite of the fact that the secret proposition did not mention foreign policy, presented demands for peace negotiations, beginning with Denmark.[1]

The Council's decision to take the initiative for a meeting of the Estates' representatives displeased Charles XII. The King made clear in a letter to the Council on February 3, 1711, that he considered

> "the calling of the Estates . . . unnecessary. I would rather remind myself that your previous report stated that the last of the Estates' meetings served no other purpose than to reveal their state of destitution."[2]

By the spring of 1713, this letter represented the King's latest attitude regarding the summoning of the Estates. It would be repeated and scrutinized time and again during the Council's discussions that year, and different opinions were ventured as to whether or not the King had positively forbidden a new *Riksdag*.

When in the spring of 1713, the Council took up the question of reconvening the Estates, the basis for their action was a difference of opinion with the Estates' Bank. This institution, which was directed by the Estates, carried out a banking business, accepted deposits from the public and

---

[1] J. Rosén, *Svensk historia* I, pp. 706 f. More detailed accounts of the committee meeting are found in C. G. Malmström, *Ständernas utskottsmöte 1710* (HT 1887) and S. Grauers, *Några bidrag till oppositionens historia under Karl XII* (KFÅ 1921).
[2] Charles XII to the Council, February 3, 1711. Published in HH 7.

loaned money to the state and private concerns. Its executive body was a committee made up of a Board of Governors and Commissioners. The Board of Governors exercised control over the Bank, provided the Commissioners with counsel and instructions, and presented to each *Riksdag* an account of its administration and of the Bank's status. The Bank was protected by generous royal privileges and by the Estates' guarantee of deposited funds. During the Great Northern war the Bank, due to greatly increased deposits, could grant the crown large loans. However, there was a change after the military catastrophe of 1709.

In order to stop the public's large withdrawals, the Bank, after it received news of the Battle at Poltava, discontinued its loans to the Crown. However, during 1711—1712, the Bank had three times given in to Council pressures and provided the Crown with new advances. These were not formal loans, but so-called anticipations, i.e., credit in the form that the Bank made advance payments in exchange for the Crown's short term *alienation* of the same amount of its income, plus interest on some of its trust estate. Repayment would take place within two to six months. From January 1, 1713, the Bank received the right to take payment from the copper interest. But the Crown could not complete its repayment and the Bank had to do without a portion of the copper interest so that the court and the guard could be maintained. The interest on the Crown's older loans could no longer be paid in full.[3]

On May 30, 1713, the periodically discussed question of recalling the Estates was nearer realization. During the meeting in Council that day the Councillors stepped out for a time for a private discussion in the Chancery president's office. When they returned, Horn reported what had taken place so "that that which their Excellencies themselves thought and discussed could be recorded in the Minutes". Horn pointed out that the Council, on previous occasions, discussed the possibility of convening the Estates "for its greater security and to avoid responsibility in the future". Horn continued by saying that funds no longer existed to cover the Crown's expenses, and that the Bank's Board of Governors could no longer advance funds to the Crown without the Estates' approval and agreement. The *Riksdag*, should therefore, be convened to decide whether or not the Bank's excuse was "reasonable and true". Tessin pointed out that after Stenbock's ransom was scraped together, so little would be left over that it could scarcely maintain the army for one month, much less supply the fortresses and the fleet. Horn moved that the Estates be summoned. He regretted that

[3] S. Brisman, *Den Palmstruchska banken och riksens ständers bank under den karolinska tiden (Sveriges riksbank 1668—1918*, I), p. 222.

there was no time to ask the King's permission and await his answer, but everything must be directed toward preserving "the Realm for His Majesty". But before this was done he wanted to obtain the opinions of Councillors H. Wachtmeister and G. Cronhielm, who were in Karlskrona. A letter to the King regarding the measures taken and a summon to the Estates would be provisionally drafted until their opinions arrived. After a report from Tessin was read (in which he repeated Horn's arguments); the Councillors declared their agreement with Horn, and Chancery Councillor Leijonstedt was ordered to draft the letters to the King and the Estates.[4]

Absent at the May 30 meeting were, in addition to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm, J. Reenstierna, C. Gyllenstierna and H. Falkenberg. During the next few days Secretary Sahlin called on Falkenberg and Reenstierna, showed them the minutes, and obtained their written, supportive votes.[5] On June 2, Tessin reported to the Council C. Gyllenstierna's approval and his ballot was included with the next days minutes.[6]

At the moment when the unanimity of the Councillors in Stockholm seemed total, Frölich defected. During the June 2 meeting, he suddenly stood up and categorically rejected the proposal he had approved. According to him, before the Estates could assemble it would be too late; the problem was to obtain money at once, and the King had shown alternatives to that end. To Horn's objections he replied that "money should be taken where it is found" and promised to submit a written proposal. Horn's reaction was heated; everyone knew the seriousness of the situation. Not even increasing the levy by several percent would suffice. It would be barbarous to do something the King had not ordered and do little else than plunder the King's subjects.[7] Frölich insisted, and he submitted a memorandum at the meeting the next day, which prescribed that on June 20, a four percent contribution would be levied — payable in cash or goods — that employees go without half of their salaries, and that those who owned "real estate and chattels" would be forced to mortgage them. Frölich's far-reaching proposal won no support, but a secretary was sent to Reenstierna to give him the report. Reenstierna replied that he wished the proposal was as "practical as it is speculative", but as director of the office of contributions, he knew that it was insufficient, since real estate was already being offered as payment of levied contributions, and that the memorandum was based on

---

[4] *Rådsprotokoll,* May 30, 1713. Copies of Tessin's report appended to the *rådsprotokoll,* May 30, 1713, volumes 108 b and 112.
[5] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 2 and 3, 1713.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*

certain presuppositions which were incorrect or unsubstantiated. Frölich asserted that "the rich and propertied could obtain funds", which provoked Tessin to ask "Count Frölich to name them". The proposal was rejected.

Then letters to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm were dispatched to solicit their opinions. To the letters were appended excerpts from the minutes of May 30, and, at Frölich's demand, his memorandum. On June 7, the letter sent to Cronhielm reached him in Karlskrona.[8] It would be a while before the Council received an answer.

Meanwhile, the Council began to prepare for the convocation of the *Riksdag,* taking measures to insure that the Estates' activities could be steered in the most suitable direction. On June 6, it was decided that this time, unlike in 1710, when only a committee meeting was held, the Estates would be summoned *in corpore* — at the previous meeting it was noticed that the representatives, when faced with a proposal, always wanted to first solicit opinions from their districts.[9] On June 13, the summons was drafted, and it was thought that the *Riksdag* could convene in five weeks. Only the date had to be decided. Letters to County governors and bishops were prepared. Reenstierna remarked that the County governments ought to warn the estates not to cause any difficulty — there was too little time. If there were any problems they could "be politely rejected".[10]

Everything was ready and waiting in anticipation of Wachtmeister's and Cronhielm's replies. Knowledge of what was happening seems to have spread — at least to the foreign Residents. On June 17 (N.S.), Campredon, the French Resident, was able to report the rumor of a summons of the *Riksdag,* and on June 29 (N.S.), he knew enough to report that Wachtmeister and Cronhielm had not yet given the Council an answer regarding the *Riksdag* planned for August. Jackson, the English Resident, wrote on July 2, that preparations for the planned assembly of the Estates had not yet been completed.[11]

On June 16, the Council received Wachtmeister's reply. It was dated June 10, and was read to the Council by secretary Ehrenstrahl. It was completely negative — the King was displeased with the previous meeting, and since he had already forbidden another, they would not sin again without punishment — *non licet impune bis peccare.* Wachtmeister dissociated himself from the declared motive, that the Estates must decide

---

[8] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 3, 1713. *Cronhielmska samlingen,* E 3441, RA. The appended excerpts from the minutes are not preserved with the letter.
[9] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 6, 1713.
[10] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 13, 1713.
[11] Campredon to Torcy, June 17, 29 (N.S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 2, 1713.

whether or not the Bank's Board of Governors refusal to supply more advances was resonable. He feared that the Governors had real and legitimate reasons for their refusal. The convening of a *Riksdag* for this purpose was unnecessary, since the Estates' deputies for banking problems quietly and according to statute could be summoned immediately by the directors of the *Riddarhus,* the Archbishop, the Uppsala Consistory and the Stockholm Magistrate, and without delay could inform the Council of the Bank's status. If the question was put to the Estates *in corpore,* the Bank's difficulties would be publicized and its credit damaged. Since the Council had the authority to declare and direct what was needed for the defense of the realm, Wachtmeister suggested that the Council levy an extra contribution for the coming year on the wages and earnings of servants and artisans, and if that were not enough, levy a contribution of one percent on taxable wealth, and against this borrow money.[12] After the reading, Reenstierna wondered incredulously who would advance money against such securities. Horn stated that Cronhielm could be asked — meanwhile, they ought to follow their plans and draft a letter to the King with all the reasons for the Council to summon the Estates.[13]

On June 20, the Council received Cronhielm's answer of June 10.[14] He counseled to wait with the summons of the *Riksdag* until more certain and detailed information about the King's health had arrived; the King had previously told the Council that he would not allow such meeting. Remembering what had happened in 1710, Cronhielm had "good reason to fear damaging and dangerous repercussions". Regarding the Bank's Board of Governors' refusal to supply more advances without the approval of the Estates, he, like Wachtmeister, referred to the possibility of calling in the Bank deputies, which could be done without summoning the Estates. Finally Cronhielm emphasized that the Royal Councillors were not accountable for their actions before anyone except God and the King.[15]

According to the minutes, June 20 was the turning point. Horn stated that the purpose was good and sensible with regard to the King and Fatherland, but because three of the Councillors opposed the proposal, it would be rejected. No one objected except Falkenberg, who wondered if, in this

---

12 *Rådsprotokoll,* June 16, 1713. Wachtmeister's letter is reported in the minutes, but was subsequently struck. The original (defective) in F 469, UUB. For Wachtmeister's opinion see also S. Grauers, *Ätten Wachtmeister genom seklerna,* II (Stockholm 1946), p. 280.
13 *Rådsprotokoll,* June 16, 1713.
14 *Rådsprotokoll,* June 20, 1713.
15 Cronhielm to the Council, June 10, 1713, *Rådets handl. och brev,* 65, RA. The draft in *Riksdagsacta 1713—1714:1,* R 4877, RA.

case, *pluritas votorum* ought to be applied. His question went unanswered.[16] Whether the lack of unanimity regarding the decision to summon the *Riksdag* was the real reason for its rejection remains uncertain. The reason could have been the news published on June 16, in the official newspaper *Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tidender,* that the Sublime Porte had decided to give Charles XII "complete satisfaction" and not to reach any peace agreement with Russia without fulfilling the Swedish demands. The same source reported that Charles XII's retinue had received orders to be prepared to move.[17] The earlier decisiveness could have been exchanged for uncertainty and confusion when the news appeared that the King's situation had perhaps improved, and that he even prepared to return home.

A perusal of the Council's minutes suggests that they very likely do not contain very much discussion regarding the summoning of the *Riksdag* which took place during June, 1713. The question of convening the Estates in the absence of the absolute monarch and without his approval must have been a very delicate one for the Councillors, whose recollections of the King's reactions to the 1710 committee meeting were fresh. The changing, conflicting and uncertain reports about the King's activities in Turkey must have been unsettling and confusing, while at the same time the state's finances required immediate and radical measures — necessary also for the preservation of the Council's weakening authority and confidence. On June 29, (N.S.), Campredon bore witness to "un extreme embaras dans le conseil"[18] and Jackson knew enough to report on July 2, that the Council was "more divided than ever on the subject of convoking that assembly"[19] and that several of the Councillors who had been enthusiastic had changed their minds after more positive news about the King had arrived.[20] Little of this anguish and division appears in the minutes. When the decision was made on May 30, it was done with general consent and without much discussion, and when it was inhibited three weeks later it was also through general consent and without any real discussion. An analysis, however, must be based on the discussion of an issue, the problem of financing the war.

---

[16] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 20, 1713.
[17] *Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tidender 1713:24, Af den 16 juni 1713.*
[18] Campredon to Torcy, June 29 (N. S.), 1713.
[19] Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 2, 1713.
[20] Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 2, 1713. *Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tidender* reported on June 23 that the Sultan decided to give Charles XII an escort of 30 000 Janissaries for his journey home, and on June 30 that the Turkish Military would "seriously take the field". In June, 1713, the Treaty of Adrianople was concluded between Turkey and Russia. See also A. Stille, *Karl XII och Porten 1709—1714,* published in *Karl XII. Till 200-årsdagen av hans död* (Stockholm 1918).

THE COUNCIL AND THE FINANCING OF THE WAR

The desperate situation the Council faced was based on acute financial difficulties — lack of money. All of their problems — ransoming Stenbock's army from Danish captivity, the defense of Finland and the German provinces, supplying the fleet, the necessity of building a new army because of a threatened Russian invasion from the East — required a great deal of additional cash. In order to hope to be able to deal with the threatening military debacle, the Council had to find ways to obtain this new capital. Two possible methods of financing were discussed: increased contribution, and advances from the Bank in exchange for allotments from specific trusts.

The collection of the contributions, a proportional tax on property, had gone especially slowly, and in April, an additional tax of 1 % of taxable property was levied. Those liable for taxation seem to have had great difficulty in converting the taxed portions of their real estate to cash. There was such a severe shortage of ready cash, that the *kontributionsränteri* — the body that administrated the contribution — was urged to accept payment in real estate. Most of the revenue was already requisitioned and what was left could not cover the growing demand.[21] Fears that additional contributions would lead to domestic unrest were voiced in the Council and by a foreign observer.[22]

The May 30 pleas of Horn and Tessin referred to the Bank's refusal to allow the Crown more credit as the decisive factor that would force the Council to summon the Estates, and as the only directly stated matter of business on which the *Riksdag* had to decide. This refusal had the following background.

On May 5, the Council requested from the Bank's Board of Governors an advance of 200,000 daler sm, against the security of the income of certain Crown trusts.[23] In a letter of May 16, the Board of Governors stated that the Bank did not have any capital, and that it, by the King's sanction and guarantee and the regulations of the Estates, was prevented from risking the public's deposits. It also asserted that the Crown had shown itself to be a defaulting debtor by not repaying its advances and interests at the agreed time.[24] The Council insisted and offered to anticipate the remaining portion of the Great Harbour Toll which was not already mortgaged in the Bank.[25] The Board of Governors refused, and explained that if the Council in any

---

[21] J. E. Almquist, *Om Kontributionsränteriet*, (KFÅ 1917), pp. 148 ff.
[22] *Rådsprotokoll*, June 3, 1713. Campredon to Torcy, June 29 (N.S.), 1713.
[23] *Rådet* to *bankofullmäktige*, May 5, 1713, *Senatens registratur (Leijonstedts kontrasignering)*.
[24] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t*, May 16, 1713.
[25] *Rådet* to *bankofullmäktige*, May 20, 1713, *Senatens registratur*.

case would formally resolve to force the Bank to advance funds, they wished to be freed from all future responsibility and all consequences of such a measure. The Board of Governors asked if, in such a case the *kontributionsränteri,* "to save appearances and the Bank's credit", could cover the Crown's obligations for the amount in question. The debt could then be repaid by a new levy of one percent.[26]

The bankers apparently feared that confidence in its credit would be damaged if it became known that the Crown had been granted additional advances. The Bank's Board of Governors were summoned to the Council and submitted to a personal working-over, but they held to their refusal and explained that they could not grant the advance without the Estates authorisation, unless the Council specifically ordered them.[27] The Board of Governors was told that if they did not immediately give a positive answer, the Crown intended to conclude an agreement with some merchants who were prepared to advance funds against payment from the income of the Great Harbour Toll, which would be taken from the Bank.[28] On May 28, the Board of Governors finally gave in and promised to make the funds available.[29] Thus, on June 1, the *kontributionsränteriet's* guarantee of 200,000 daler sm for six months at six percent interest was issued to the Bank. The Bank's advance would be repaid with "the ransom that the *Rotarne* and *Rusthållarne* according to the Council's decision will pay for the captives in Denmark" and, if that was insufficient, the Bank in its turn would receive satisfaction via the Great Harbour Toll and one fourth of the contribution the Council would levy.[30] Thus, the Council finally obtained the needed credit.

On May 30, Horn expressly stated that convocation of the *Riksdag* was necessary, in order to determine for the Estates whether the Bank's Board of Governors refusal to grant the Crown more credit was defensible or not. Thus, the measure would be a stage in a series of negotiations and a means of bearing the discussions on to a higher level. When the Bank finally granted the desired credit, the argument for calling the *Riksdag* disintegrated. Consequently, Horn could have been expected to recall his proposal.

[26] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* May 21, 1713.
[27] *Rådsprotokoll,* May 21, 23, 1713. W. Ahlström, *Arvid Horn och Karl XII 1710—1713* (Lund 1959), p. 168.
[28] This was reported by the chairman at the Board of Governor's meeting on June 3 *(Sekreta bankprotokoll,* June 3, 1713). Horn, Tessin and Reenstierna had privately attempted to convince the Board of Governors *(Rådsprotokoll,* May 23, *sekreta bankoprotokoll,* May 28, 1713).
[29] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t* May 28, 1713.
[30] *Kontributionsränteriets registratur,* June 1, 1713. The Council's confirmation in *Senatens registratur,* June 2, 1713.

He did not. The Bank's advances were passed over in silence. The Board of Governors' final concession of May 28, bears the notation "presented June 2, 1713". The Council's minutes lack notice that the document was actually presented that day.[31] Letters to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm, dated June 2, were sent to find out what they thought of the Board of Governors' refusal, and the planned *Riksdag*.[32] It is obvious that Horn wanted to use the Board of Governors' refusal, even after they had conceded.

The minutes for May 30, were offered the absent Councillors as a basis for their decision. On those grounds H. Falkenberg and J. Reenstierna submitted their supporting votes on June 2, and excerpts of the minutes were enclosed in the letters to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm.[33] Against this background it is interesting to note that the minutes in question were subject to changes and additions, all of which aimed to protect the Council more and strengthen the necessity of its actions.

Of the original text, not very much was left untouched. Several pages are crossed out and a new version was written in the margin. Some examples can be given. One addition refers to the people's demand: "N. T. (N. Tessin): one hears that the people in town say why are the Estates not assembled in such trying times as now". Horn's announcement of the convocation of the Estates was much more comprehensive and embellished in the revised version. In the original text Horn simply warned about the troublesome lack of money for supplying the fleet; in the addition it says that the main fleet could not sail without the promised funds and that the *kontributionsränteri* declared itself unable to provide the sum in question.[34] The third step was to cross out the entire revised version, replacing it on May 22, with a similar final text, which could possibly be interpreted in this way: in the face of the risk of a future royal examination of the minutes, the impression that the decision was made a week earlier, when negotiations with the Bank's Board of Governors were still deadlocked, was aimed at. In the Council's letters to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm and in the appended excerpts from the minutes, the date of the meeting is not given.[35] The final copy was put with the drafts after they were numbered 65a to 65i. It is also possible that it was recorded for May 22, due to carelessness, since the end of the portion to which it has been added as continuation says:

---

31 *Rådsprotokoll,* June 2, 1713.
32 *Cronhielmska samlingen* E 3441. The Council's letter to Cronhielm dated June 2. According to *Rådsprotokoll,* June 3, sent that day (June 3) at the earliest.
33 *Rådsprotokoll,* June 2, 1713.
34 *Rådsprotokoll,* May 30, 1713. The minutes for this period are only in draft form.
35 *Cronhielmska samlingen* E 3441. The excerpts from the minutes are attached to the draft of Cronhielm's reply, *Riksdagsacta* R 4877, RA.

"their Excellencies left the Council and went to Count Horn's office, and while their Excellencies gathered there Royal Councillor, Count Horn appeared". This portion is similar to the original introduction in the text of hte draft which was not included in the final copy.[35]

Whether the Board of Governors' final consent was the reason for Frölich's about face on June 2, is impossible to conjecture. His objections were that there was too little time to wait for the *Riksdag* to assemble, and that the financial problems could be settled by means already prescribed by the King. The lack of cash obviously remained very troublesome. The continued discussion between Horn and Frölich touched upon that question and suggestions for solutions were pared down to two mutually exclusive alternatives: higher taxes or new loans.[37] If one assumes that Horn really made his demand for a convocation of the *Riksdag* purely for reasons concerning the state's finances, this implies that he, in such a case, wanted to prevent a repetition of the difficulties raised by the Bank's Board of Governors during the May negotiations. In the insistent demand for the summoning of the *Riksdag* and rejection of a higher contribution, should lie the demand for more loans. Frölich, on the other hand, asserted that taxes be raised. "The rich and propertied" could obtain funds. Furthermore, merchants could make deliveries in kind from their stock instead of paying with cash.[38] Wachtmeister's suggestion to decide now to levy a contribution for 1714, was more realistic. Against the security of the income from such a levy, the expected rise in the following year's state revenue would be discounted. The difficulty in such a case whether one went to the Bank or to the public, would be to reverse the wide spread lack of confidence in the Crown as debtor.

These methods of financing cannot be seen isolated from one another. Bank deposits were divided into two separate accounts — the exchange bank's which was an interest-free current account and the savings-bank's which was an interest accruing account with limited right of withdrawal. The exchange bank's assets must, according to the bank statutes, always be available to the depositors and could not be used for other purpose. Since 1709, the savings-bank had not redeemed deposits and savings certificates were in practice transformed into insolvent certificates of deposit with fixed interest.[39] Unfortunately, the Bank was forced to use the exchange assets

[36] *Rådsprotokoll,* May 22, 1713. S. Grauers observed the situation: "According to the *rådsprotokoll,* May 22 (final copy) the question was up that day. The draft is dated May 30" *(Ätten Wachtmeister* II, p. 280).
[37] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 2, 1713. Henceforth, "loan" will be also used to mean anticipations, since they functioned in practice as short term loans.
[38] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 3, 1713.
[39] S. Brisman, *op. cit.,* p. 218.

in order to pay the interest on the savings certificates when the Crown failed to meet its interest payments, and to provide anticipations for the Crown.[40] This crisis of solvency for the Bank, which jeopardized new credit to the Crown, was thus mainly caused by the Crown itself. It must have been feared that the very rumor of new advances to the Crown would cause the exchange bank's creditors to make a run on the Bank to rescue their deposits. The Bank's difficulties in granting new credits were thus caused by the dearth of liquid assets, by the Bank's responsibility to demand adequate guarantees, and finally, by the fear that the Board of Governors' going beyond the limits of the Bank statutes would come to light via too many withdrawals from the exchange bank. For its part, the Crown had already used up all available mortgagable property and discounted the income from new contributions and permanent trusts. State income was no longer sufficient to even repay the advances and interest in the bank. In order to offer new mortgages in a negotiation for loans, the Crown had to levy new taxes that would provide more income than the Bank would advance, since the state's interest payments would also rise. Continued financing by loans would be the same as to further discount future income. The alternatives discussed in Council — higher taxes versus new loans — were illusory. Loans — the most expensive alternative for the Crown — meant higher taxes or another form of added income for the Crown.

It is not known if Horn knew about the state of the Bank's solvency, but he must have been conscious of the impossibility of getting any form of credit from the Bank without guarantees. His behaviour must be judged according to this condition. Horn and Tessin, in a curious manner, passed over the central issue, and in general terms asserted that the Estates be convened in order to "deliberate" and "take council" with them. Horn demanded that the Estates decide if the Bank's excuse was "reasonable and true", thereby, suggesting that the Bank's directors would be more reasonable and willing than the Board of Governors. This seems unrealistic. The Council would not find itself in a better position to deal with the Estates than it had with the Board of Governors. Quite the opposite. Against the background of domestic dissatisfaction and the wide spread resistance to taxation, with some localities on the verge of revolt, it could be expected that the Estates would use the opportunity and instead attempt to widen the negotations to include more than the issue of financing the war, and put the entire new, impopular method of taxation in question. This proved to be case when the Estates at last met. The Council already had the

---

[40] S. Brisman, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

necessary power to, if necessary, raise the extraordinary tax (contributions and extra taken taxes). To appeal to the Estates was the same as without compelling reasons making itself dependent upon that assembly.

Another interpretation could be, that Horn could have suspected irregularities in the Board of Governors' administration of the Bank's affairs. But he passed over in silence Cronhielm's and Wachtmeister's proposal to summon the Estates deputies for the Bank. These deputies had the same competence to examine the Bank's affairs as a banking committee named by the assembled *Riksdag*. If the purpose was to investigate whether the Bank's refusal to allow the Crown new credit was due to embezzlement or incompetent administration by the Board of Governors, a summon to the Estates would have been unnecessary. It would have sufficed to summon the bank deputation. It would also have been much quicker.

The four percent contribution that Frölich suggested, which could have given the Council a basis to negotiate new loans, was rejected by Horn in an emotional and theatrical polemic, foreign to his usual reserved and cool behaviour. Frölich's plan was "little more than to plunder the King's subjects, it would be barbarous to do what the King had not ordered", "I shall give all I have to serve the King, but I would be barbarous if I voted away the livelihood of his subjects".[41] The necessity of levying new taxes in order to obtain credit from the Bank was clearly demonstrated during the negotiations with the Board of Governors in May. When the decision to summon the *Riksdag* was subsequently inhibited, Horn apparently quickly overcame his moral considerations. On July 1, he participated in the decision to levy a new war tax to be collected in cash with a specific amount for every social class.[42] There is reason to doubt that Horn really wanted the *Riksdag* purely for reasons of state finance or to have the administration of the Bank's Board of Governors investigated.

The evidence against Horn forms a pattern: Horn, aided by Tessin, used the Bank's Board of Governors' refusal to provide the Crown new advances to facilitate the decision to summon a *Riksdag*. He tried to convince absent Councillors to this view by referring them to the Board of Governors' refu-

---

[41] *Rådsprotokoll,* June 2, 1713.

[42] Horn's initiative for the levying of a new war tax "as all things concerning which one deliberates are futile and cannot be effected without cash" in *rådsprotokoll,* June 26. Decision in *rådsprotokoll,* July 1. See also Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 2, 1713, J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.,* p. 150. An isolated piece of information that money was sought outside of Sweden is in Campredon, who reported June 17 (N.S.), that Horn and Reenstierna asked for subsidies from France, asserting that the realm would otherwise fall to the enemy. Since French subsidies would have involved some kind of counter-demand and therefore negotiations, they could scarcely fill the immediate need for money.

sal when it was no longer in effect. Frölich's and Wachtmeister's counter-proposals were aimed at relieving the crisis Horn tried to use. Horn maintained a negative attitude toward raising taxes only during the time he worked for the convocation of the *Riksdag*. When Horn's proposal was subsequently killed and the dearth of cash could no longer be used for political purposes, new taxes were levied without delay. When the demand for convocation of the *Riksdag* was next voiced, the lack of cash was no longer the weighty argument.

PETER FEIF'S MISSION

During the Council's discussions and ballots the principle of absolute monarchy as a form of government was not questioned. Nevertheless, there is a line of demarcation between Wachtmeister and Cronhielm on one side, and the Council's leadership in Stockholm on the other, regarding the alternatives for action which they faced. Horn and Tessin asserted that what was planned would not at all infringe on the sovereignty of the King and that Charles XII did not "positively" forbid a new *Riksdag*. Cronhielm maintained that the Council already had the authority to act without having to submit to the authority of the Estates — that it was responsible only to God and the King.[43] The same rejection of the thought of responsibility to the Estates is intrinsic in Wachtmeister's statement, though only to the extent that he takes up the question of responsibility to the King without mentioning the Estates.[44] Against the background of the events and rumors during the spring, it can be asked whether the Councillors in Karlskrona tried to influence the course of events via direct contacts with the King.

In March, 1713, the Council, according to the King's new orders, was relieved of the duties connected with the supply of the fleet and transport of troops to Pomerania. These duties were assigned instead to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm. This disavowal badly injured the Council's reputation and authority and, within this body, gave rise to much dissatisfaction, which was mainly demonstrated by Horn. The Council's communication with Wachtmeister and Cronhielm in Karlskrona was marred by irritation and constant conflict.[45] The new directive made Wachtmeister and Cronhielm responsible directly to the King. On a few occasions Campredon insinuated that the conflict was not due just to purely technical problems

[43] Cronhielm to *rådet*, June 10, 1713, *Rådets handl. och brev*, 65, RA.
[44] F 469, UUB. — Cronhielm's and Wachtmeister's answers are both dated June 10, and Wachtmeister states in his opinion that he received the Council's letter with its appendices via Cronhielm. It is possible that they consulted on the answer they would give.
[45] S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn*, I, pp. 286 ff.

of working together and differences in personality and temperament. He writes about Wachtmeister's views as *"apparement differentes de ceux qui gouvernent ici la chancellerie"*,[46] and of *"la division que le Roy de Suède a lui même etablie parmiz les Sénateurs"*,[47] without specifying wheter or not this conflict was provoked.

On July 6, 1713, Count Stromberg pronounced in Council that:

"there is a rumor circulating, that Captain Feif, who just left Karlskrona for His Majesty's headquarters, carries letters to the King from evil intentioned persons that assert that their Excellencies the Councillors intend to convene the Estates for the purpose of deposing the King from his throne".[48]

On May 20, the Admiralty informed the Council that Captain Peter Feif, the younger brother of State Secretary Casten Feif, would arrive in Karlskrona with the King's order to obtain information on the condition of the fleet. The Council was told that if they had any messages for the King, they could send them with Feif when he returned to Turkey.[49] The Council used the opportunity that was offered to allow Feif to serve as its courier, and sent two letters dated May 12 and May 26 with him.[50] In addition, Feif took a long report with him to Turkey from the Admiralty and a private letter from Cronhielm. All these documents are marked "arrived Timurtash August 10, 1713", though the date on the Admiralty's letter is partially obscured.[51]

August 11, the day after the above mentioned letters reached Timurtash, is the date of the letter in which the King forbade the convening of the Estates, since it was "from one or another place reported that in Sweden it was under consideration to summon the Estates to assembly".[52] It seems very likely that this letter was written on the basis of the information that had reached the King via Feif.

The question is, who gave Feif the information? There are two possibilities. One is that Feif repeated the fantastic rumors and gossip that cir-

---

[46] Campredon to Torcy, June 29 (N. S.), 1713.
[47] Campredon to Torcy, August 1 (N.S.), 1713.
[48] *Rådsprotokoll,* July 6, 1713.
[49] *Amiralitetskollegium* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* May 20, 1713.
[50] *Rådets brev till konungen 1713,* RA. In the introduction to the May 26 letter: "... since Captain Feif has just arrived from Your Majesty's headquarters and intends to return immediately, we have made use of his services".
[51] *Ibid. Amiralitetskollegium* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* June 15, 1713, *Skrivelser till konungen, Karl XII:s tid. Ser. 1 B—C.* According to von Kochen Feif arrived in Timurtasch on August 9 together with Governor General Meijerfelt's secretary Löwenheim *(von Kochens dagbok,* August 9, 1713). Published in *Karolinska krigares dagböcker jämte andra samtida skrifter,* IV (Lund 1908).
[52] *Konungens brev till rådet 1713,* RA. Published in HH 11, pp. 213 ff. Bowallius, *op. cit.,* p. 257, mistakenly reports that the letter was written in May, 1713.

culated and multiplied in the uneasy and heated atmosphere. If Feif reported all of these and the King had taken them seriously, his report would surely have provided topics for many letters to the Council. The other possibility is that Feif received the information from a reliable and well-informed source — this thought leads directly to Wachtmeister and Cronhielm.

From May 19—June 15, Feif probably remained in Karlskrona.[53] During that period, Wachtmeister and Cronhielm were informed of the Council's preliminary decision to summon the *Riksdag*. Both raised strong objections. In addition, Cronhielm sent a private letter to the King with Feif, in which he persuasively argued that the King's return to the realm was "so urgently needed, otherwise I fear terrible occurrences".[54] It is unknown what Cronhielm meant by that — the summoning of the *Riksdag*, the possibility that the Council had something more radical in mind, or maybe something quite different. A few letters, written in a different context some months later, provide a clue. On August 8, C. G. von Friesendorf, the Swedish minister in Berlin, reported by letter to Vellingk that Cronhielm, in a letter of June 20/30, informed him of the pending *Riksdag, "avec des remarques significatives"*.[55] A few days later, he took up the subject again and reported that Cronhielm had written to him "circumspectly, though not specifically about the pending *Riksdag* and other irregularities at home".[56] Probably von Friesendorf found out in the same way that *"le cap. Feiff doit avoir apporté des avis, comment il y avait a craindre en Suède des révolutions étranges"*.[57]

The picture begins to clear. Cronhielm's letter of warning to the King on June 15, is worded in very general terms. It was most likely complemented with a verbal message delivered by Feif, which possibly warned Charles XII for ongoing intrigues and in any case for an impending revolution. It even seems possible that these fears were tied by Cronhielm — and therefore, also by Peter Feif in his verbal message — to the coming assembly of the Estates.

Thus, it is not surprising that the King dictated a letter to the Council the day after he received the message, forbidding it to convene the Estates and ordering it to dissolve the *Riksdag* if it had already assembled when the letter arrived. The King's reaction was unusual, since he ordinarily

---

53 *Amiraliteskollegium* to *Kungl. Maj:t*, May 20 and June 15, 1713.
54 Cronhielm to Charles XII, June 15, 1713, *Skrivelser till konungen*, Karl XII:s tid, Ser. I B—C, RA.
55 von Friesendorf to Vellingk, August 8, 1713, E 5985, RA.
56 von Friesendorf to Vellingk, August 12, 1713, E 5985, RA.
57 von Friesendorf to von Müllern, Oct. 3, 1713, Borussica 52, RA.

allowed letters and messages to remain unanswered for a time, or let them lie without taking action.

Still no far-reaching conclusions ought to be drawn. Doubtlessly Cronhielm judged that, given the situation, he must warn Charles XII. It is not known how accurate he believed his information to be, whether his warning was based on his own suspicions, or other's assertions and insinuations, or if he had firsthand knowledge of any plots or plans for revolution.

On this connection another question comes to mind. During the May 30 Council meeting, it was decided to inform the King of plans to convene the *Riksdag*. Yet, the opportunity to use Peter Feif to carry a letter containing this information to the King was not used, in spite of the fact that the Council knew that he was in Karlskrona just at that time. When the letter to the King was finally sent it was antedated.[58] It might be asked if the intention was to inform the King so late that any prohibition he issued would arrive too late.

[58] The Council's letter to the King reporting the summoning of the *Riksdag* was dated June 26, 1713 (HH 11:2, p. 186 ff.). The Council's minutes from July 14 clarify that the letter had not yet been dispatched *(rådsprotokoll*, July 14, 1713).

Chapter II The Political Propaganda

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND

The desperate situation in which the Council found itself in the spring of 1713, was not only, or even primarily, due to the state of the realm's finances. The possibility of obtaining subsidies abroad was precluded by Sweden's diplomatic isolation and the government's limited ability to negotiate. The kingdom's domestic resources were nearly depleted, and further possibilities for obtaining credit were severely reduced. Any funds that could be raised could scarcely do more than postpone the approaching debacle. The Council's minutes clearly reveal that the Councillors understood that the only possibility for salvation was to make peace with one or more of their enemies, or at least to conclude a cease-fire agreement. The likely-hood of gaining such a reprieve was the topic of repeated discussion during 1713. That this subject was discussed so often is not surprsing at a time when the news was dominated by reports of the *Kalabalik* in Bender and the King's captivity in Turkey. The possibility that one day, perhaps soon, the King would not need to be reckoned with as a source of power must have been taken into consideration. The background and conditions of the Council's possibility, on its own, to initiate peace negotiations can be sketched, briefly, in the following manner.

The peace discussions of 1713, originated in 1709, when the Danes attacked Sweden. After that, Sweden asked the Maritime Powers to intervene against Denmark, on the basis of their alliance with Sweden and their guarantees according to the terms of the Peace of Traventhal. Denmark tried to avoid giving England and the Dutch Republic reason to intervene, by keeping the war out of Sweden's German provinces, and allowing Holstein-Gottorp to remain neutral. In addition, when the war broke out, neither Denmark nor Saxony had called home their troops, who were fighting with the Maritime Powers against France. Thus, two of the strongest reasons for the Maritime Powers' resistance to the Danish attack on Sweden were neutralized.[1]

After the guarantees were promulgated, the Russians took Sweden's Baltic Provinces, gaining control of shipping from the provincial ports. Thus, Tsar Peter could retaliate effectively against English and Dutch trade in the Baltic, as well as, Archangel if the Maritime Powers intervened in Sweden's

[1] J. Rosén, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia,* II:1 (Stockholm 1952), p. 116 ff.

favor. Imports from Russia were essential for the Maritime Powers' provisionary supplies, and they enabled them to wage war on the high seas, and could not be risked. On the other hand, it was in their own interest to try to limit Russia's expansion, since Russian control of the Baltic could adversely affect their trade. Therefore, the Maritime Powers, especially England, wanted peace negotiations to begin before Russian expansion had gone too far. As mediators in the conflict, they could also protect their own trade interests in the area. Therefore, they sent repeated offers of mediation to the warring parties.[2]

The Maritime Powers' first reply to the Swedish demands was the Neutrality Act, or Hague Convention of March 20, 1710, wherein the German provinces, belonging to Denmark or Sweden, would be guaranteed neutrality, thereby preventing a war within the Empire that could hinder the allies' war effort against France. For Sweden, the Convention meant that its German provinces would be protected against attack. But it also meant that no Swedish campaign against Denmark or Poland could be launched from them, and that the Swedish army in Pomerania would be doomed to idleness. In connection with the Hague Convention, it was suggested that those troops be assigned to the allies to fight against France. The Swedish Council welcomed the Hague Convention, as it would lessen their worries over the defence of the German provinces and possibly be the beginning of final peace negotiations, which were implied at that time. The Council supported the Convention and instructed the Swedish ministers to the European courts accordingly. Charles XII rejected the Convention, disavowed the Council and countermanded the Swedish diplomats' orders.[3]

Thus, the conflict between Charles XII and the Council in Stockholm was revealed to the world. Under pressure from the loss of the Baltic provinces and Russia's advances in Finland and occupation of the German provinces, Arvid Horn and the Council saw their only salvation in winning the support of the Maritime Powers, and through their mediation, rescue what could be saved.[4] The Hague Convention included on the other hand, a direct obstacle to Charles XII's more offensive policies, which included a plan for a Swedish army based in Pomerania to invade Poland, while at the same time, Turkey attacked Russia, and the King led his troops against Poland from the South. The schism resulted in the King recalling in 1711, the Council's freedom to conduct foreign policy, and ordered the Swedish diplomats to obey only orders from himself.[5]

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 129 f.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 127 f.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 127.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 127 f.

The framework in which the Council could operate in the peace question in 1713, was determined by the instructions Charles XII gave them in connection with projected peace negotiations in 1711, with Denmark. On January 10, 1711, the King authorized the Council "to negotiate and conclude with the King of Denmark peace, that is respectable for Us and good for Our kingdom".[6] On February 3, 1711, he prescribed the amount of freedom to negotiate that he would allow the Council. He hoped that the Councillors would not

> "think that they could buy an infamous peace by giving up some provinces. We shall never agree to it, no matter what the circumstances are, and no one else who will be called a true patriot may support such a policy, now, or in the future. He instead should counsel to do or die, rather than to allow any part of the kingdom or its provinces to be diminished... We have just now sent you the authority to conclude peace with Denmark, but we do not intend to allow you to give up anything if such a thing should come up for negotiation."

At the same time, he expressed his irritation over what he thought were defeatist attitudes in the Council, and asserted that he needed no lengthy descriptions of "the miserable conditions at home in Sweden", and that a favourable peace could not be reached "via plaintive expostulations".[7]

The King, thus, clarified that he definitely intended to refuse to accept any agreement that was not based on at least the return to *status quo ante bellum*. By absolutely forbidding all agreements that could reflect the changed balance of power in the North, he had made a peace agreement with Denmark impossible.

On March 9, 1711, the King also instructed Mauritz Vellingk, the Governor-General of Bremen-Verden, to begin peace negotiations with Denmark, on the same terms as the Council, but independent of its efforts. This he did, referring to the necessity to avoid lengthy correspondence and keep the discussions secret, but in reality, most likely on the ground of his lack of trust in the Council.[8] With the same orders that were given to the Council, Vellingk was unable, just as the Council, to carry on constructive negotiations.

In the years after 1711, the situation regarding peace remained unchanged. The Maritime Powers offered new opportunities for mediation, while they refused to intervene in the Northern war. The Council felt itself compelled to refuse all offers of mediation because of the King's order. But the Council,

---

[6] Charles XII to the Council, January 10, 1711. Printed in HH 7, p. 32 f, The warrant has not been found.
[7] Charles XII to the Council, February 3, 1711. Printed in HH 7, p. 39 ff.
[8] Charles XII to Vellingk, March 9, 1711, *M Vellingks samling*, E 5977, RA.

through its acceptance of the Hague Convention of 1710 — which Charles XII had rejected — had revealed to the world that its attitude was more flexible, and inclined toward peace, than the King's.

ERIC ROLAND'S MISSION IN ENGLAND

In 1712, Vellingk presented a proposal to buy English help in the Northern war by promising favors for the English Baltic trade at the expense of the Dutch. The proposal was motivated by, among other things, the Dutch, who seemed to have already recognized the Tsar's possession of the conquered Baltic ports, and tried to gain favorable trading terms from him.[9] On September 14, 1712, the King sanctioned Vellingk's plan and gave him authority to negotiate. Vellingk then wrote to C. Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister in London, on January 15, 1713, and asked him to "as if by chance present and probe" English interest for the project.[10] According to Rosén, Vellingk sent Colonel Magnus Julius De la Gardie to Stockholm with instructions in this regard. De la Gardie reportedly conferred in Stockholm with certain Councillors about Vellingk's project; the entire Council apparently was not to be let in on the matter.[11]

Officially, De la Gardie's errand did not concern the project. On March 3, 1713, he appeared in Council with an aide-mémoire from Vellingk, which reported the serious situation of the Swedish army in Holstein: Stenbock was besieged with seven to eight thousand men in Tönningen by a force of forty to fifty thousand Russian, Danish and Saxon troops. If relief were not sent within two months, Stenbock and his army would be lost. De la Gardie added that the Danes had equipped ten ships to hinder any relief by sea. Nils Gyllenstierna read his own written memorandum, which proposed that Stenbock be relieved by an army made up of units from the realm and troops from Pomerania, and the garrisons in Stralsund, Stettin and Wismar. Furthermore, a special envoy would be sent to England to procure the help of an English squadron, that could cover the troop transport at sea.[12]

Nils Gyllenstierna's proposal of a mission to England was prompted by an English promise dating from the preceding year, that a squadron of

---

[9] S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn*, I, p. 236 f.
[10] Vellingk to Gyllenborg, January 15, 1713, Anglica 222.
[11] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet om fredsmedling* 1713 (LUÅ NF I:43, 6, Lund 1946), p. 34. Rosén's information is derived from what the English Resident in Stockholm, R. Jackson, heard and reported to his government on March 10. W. Ahlström, *Arvid Horn och Karl XII 1710—1713*, p. 130, argues that the true mission was the official one: to hurry relief to Stenbock.
[12] *Rådsprotokoll*, March 3, 1713. *Nicodemus Tessin d.y.:s memorial och anteckningar för åren 1702—1713, Historiskt arkiv 5* (Uppsala 1955) p. 61.

eighteen or nineteen ships would be sent to the Sound.[13] Hope of English assistance, seemed to the Swedes, to have substance. Chancery Councillor Leijonstedt reported that the English Resident visited him and remarked that it was "very likely that a squadron will appear in the Sound".[14] Before his journey, De la Gardie had received similar reports from Amsterdam.[15]

The transport of troops had to be co-ordinated with the movements of the promised English squadron. In Stockholm, little information was available regarding English plans for the naval expedition, and if they might represent a change in England's attitude. The uncertainty was aggravated when a parcel of letters from Gyllenborg, a short time before, had to be cast overboard,[16] and when Gyllenborg, according to earlier reports, was forced to wait five or six weeks for an interview with Bolingbroke.[17] If, instead, De la Gardie was sent as special envoy to London with the rank of Major General, it was believed that he would likely be granted an immediate interview and could return to Stockholm with a definite answer.[18]

However, De la Gardie's mission was delayed. On March 7, the Council received the King's new orders regarding transport. The decision was, therefore, postponed until G. Cronhielm, who was now in charge of transport and directly responsible to the King, arrived in Stockholm.[19]

The projected mission would be altered because of the intervention of R. Jackson, the English Resident in Stockholm. He knew of De la Gardie's planned mission and asked secretary Ehrenstrahl for more information about its purpose. Ehrenstrahl reported what he knew, and Jackson replied that Gyllenborg was so well accredited in London that he could very well do everything himself, and that De la Gardie could travel without diplomatic credentials.[20] Tessin pondered that "since the Resident had said this ... would it be advisable to send De la Gardie", and several councillors agreed with him. Instead, they decided, at Horn's suggestion, "to avoid embarrasment", to send Eric Roland, Magnus Stenbock's former war secretary, as a courier to Gyllenborg with instructions for him to see Bolingbroke concerning the promised support from the English navy.[21] Thus, the special mission was cancelled.

On March 16, instructions for Roland, and a letter to Gyllenborg were

---

13 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 3, 1713.
14 *Ibid.*
15 *Nicodemus Tessin d.y.:s memorial,* p. 62.
16 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 16, 1713. *N. Tessin d.y.:s memorial,* p. 62.
17 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 13, 1713.
18 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 13, 1713. *N. Tessin d.y.:s memorial,* p. 62.
19 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 7 and 13, 1713.
20 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 16, 1713.
21 *Ibid.*

drafted, in which Gyllenborg was ordered to appeal to Bolingbroke to send an English squadron, as soon as possible, to protect the troop transport, and after reporting the increasing benefits the Dutch were enjoying in the Russian trade, suggest that "much greater and more secure benefits" could be granted English trade in the Baltic ports, if the promised help materialized.[22]

Jackson sent a message to London with the same ship that carried Roland. In his message he reported a conversation he had with Horn, who asserted that Sweden was on the verge of ruin. At the same time, he expressed his conviction that England would not remain spectator to the spectacle of Sweden's destruction, if she understood the real situation. It was for this reason, that the Council decided to send De la Gardie to England to report the situation and request immediate help. Horn, on behalf of the Council, appealed to Jackson to report the situation to his government as he actually perceived it. Jackson affirmed the truth of Horn's report in his letter, and added that domestic strife was in the offing, if the unsettling news from Bender were confirmed. Several days later Horn summoned Jackson to inform him that De la Gardie was prevented from travelling, for private reasons, and that instead, Roland would be sent with instructions for Gyllenborg.[23] The procedure of having Jackson to report the critical situation has been interpreted by Rosén as follows: the report would appear more believable in London, if England's own representative in Sweden was responsible for it. At the same time, Horn would avoid his earlier mistake of risking the King's reprimand for presenting the kingdom's "desperate condition" at a foreign court.[24]

According to his instructions, Roland first travelled to Utrecht, where he on April 27, met the chief of the English delagation to the peace congress, the former resident in Stockholm John Robinson, and delivered a message from Horn. Robinson entrusted him with a letter to the English state secretary, H. St. John, viscount Bolingbroke and Roland continued on to

---

[22] *Senatens registratur,* March 16, 1713.
[23] Jackson to Bolingbroke, April 4, 1713.
[24] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 36 f. W. Ahlström, *Arvid Horn och Karl XII 1710—1713* (p. 163 f.), also noticed the differences between the content of the official Swedish appeal to London and Jackson's report to his government. In the instructions to Gyllenborg, the Swedish officials wanted him to create the impression of their owan military strength which would make English help worthwhile. This was the official report which had to be drafted according to the official motive for the mission and which would be seen by Charles XII. Jackson's message, which was the result of Horn's initiative, describes the realm's total helplessness. Ahlström, as well, does not doubt that it was Jackson's view of Sweden's ability to wage war that Horn wished to communicate to the English statesman.

London,[25] where he arrived at the beginning of May and delivered Robinson's letter to Bolingbroke and the Council's instruction to Gyllenborg.[26] Gyllenborg wrote to Bolingbroke at once, and asked for an audience in view of the message he just received.[27] Despite repeated reminders, Gyllenborg was made to curb his growing impatience for two weeks, until he could speak with Bolingbroke.[28]

Roland described Bolingbroke's attitude thus:

"Ce ministre paroit faire le sourde quand on lui parle de nos interets, avec toute la peine du monde en peut on tirer quelque réponse. En l'attendant te tems s'écoule . . ."[29]

This description must be viewed against the political background. Policy regarding Sweden was at that time being discussed within the English government and the first policy change was evidenced in March, when an aide-mémoire drafted by Whithworth, the former English minister in Russia, was presented. According to this England was not bound by treaty to help Sweden. This was communicated on March 24, to Gyllenborg.[30] On April 11, (N. S.) the English delegates in Utrecht signed a peace treaty with France, an agreement which meant England's final confirmation — she had given up the leadership of the war effort against Louis XIV, and had lost her continental allies. Because she feared the Dutch would use the situation to alter the Baltic trade in their own favor, England dared not intervene on her own in the Northern conflict, only in co-operation with the Dutch Republic, who evidenced no interest in the matter.[31] Immediately after concluding peace with France, England took another step and presented to the congress in Utrecht, a proposal for general peace, wherein the states who were still at war, would be compelled to adhere.[32] English policy regarding Sweden during this period will be described in detail in another chapter. In this context, the above information is sufficient.

When Gyllenborg was finally granted an audience with Bolingbroke the

---

[25] X 370, UUB. — Robinson had been English Resident in Sweden and was known in London as a spokesman for Swedish interests (J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 22, note 36). See also Vellingk to von Müllern, June 17, 1713: "Ie seul anglois qui soit bien instruit et il est outre cela bien intentionné". For Robinson, see *Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 1937—38), p. 23 ff.

[26] Gyllenborg to Horn, May 7, to Bolingbroke, May 10, 1713, Anglica 212.

[27] Gyllenborg to Bolingbroke, May 8, 1713, Anglica 212.

[28] Gyllenborg to Bolingbroke, May 8, 10, 14, 1713, Anglica 212.
Gyllenborg to *Kungl. Maj:t,* May 19, 22, 1713, Anglica 212.

[29] Roland to Palmquist, May 15, 1713, Hollandica 331.

[30] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 24, 1713.

[31] J. F. Chance, *England and Sweden in the time of William III and Queen Anne (Engl. Hist. Review* 1901), pp. 702 ff.

[32] Strafford to Bolingbroke, April 29, 1713, SP 84/246, PRO. See also F. F. Carlson, *Om fredsunderhandlingarna. Åren 1709—1718* (Stockholm 1857), p. 44.

arrival of the news of Stenbock's capitulation at Tönningen, and the revision of England's Northern policy, made Sweden's situation worse. Bolingbroke proceeded directly to the question of peace negotiations, and asserted that the Queen considered Sweden's willingness to enter such negotiations a condition for obtaining English help. To that end, Sweden would have to send a negotiator with unlimited authority to the Dutch Republic or to Hamburg, Bremen or Lübeck. At the same time, England intended to apply pressure to the allied powers, reminding them that the Queen might be forced to fulfill her guarantees to Sweden, if they refused to negotiate. In that respect, England would attempt to co-operate with France and the Dutch Republic. Gyllenborg had to content himself with that answer. Roland hurriedly returned to Stockholm with this news and a letter from Bolingbroke to Jackson.[33]

THE ENGLISH MESSAGE

On July 12, Roland returned to Stockholm. He reported to Horn the next day at his country home Ådö.[34] He gave a report of his mission at the Council meeting on July 14, and was told to return to Horn at Ådö to tell him how he completed his mission. He promised to do this and left the meeting.[35] On July 16, the Councillors were told that Jackson had "important business" to report, so it decided to summon their absent colleagues to Stockholm.[36]

Horn arrived in Stockholm from Ådö on the morning of July 20, and had a private conference with Jackson later that day.[37] The next morning he had another conversation with the English Resident, and then he summoned the other Councillors from their meeting for a private discussion. He reported the message that Jackson had just verbally communicated on behalf of the Queen.[38] This message must have agreed with the contents of the May 30 instructions, that Bolingbroke prepared for Jackson and which Roland had carried from London. The instructions present the details of the demand for a Swedish initiative to begin peace negotiations, which Bolingbroke presented in his conversation with Gyllenborg, and which were an absolute condition for English aid.[39]

---

[33] Gyllenborg to *Kungl. Maj:t*, May, 19, 22, 26, to the Council June 15, 1713, Anglica 212.
[34] X 370, UUB.
[35] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 14, 1713.
[36] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 16, 1713.
[37] Jackson to Bolingbroke, Juliy 21, 1713. Published in Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, pp. 79 ff.
[38] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 21, 1713.
[39] Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713. Published in *British diplomatic instructions*, I, Sweden 1689—1727, p. 57 ff.

The Councillors discussed the English message during the following days. All were agreed on the necessity of peace, but the central problem was whether negotations could begin without the King's approval and authority. If they had any wishes or plans in this regard they were of course, not recorded in the Council's minutes.

Instead, the minutes report suspicions that the peace proposal was meant to cause "outrage in the Turkish court" against the King, and questions of why Jackson had not submitted the proposal in writing. Tessin found it curious that the Residents from France and the Dutch Republic, whose help was promised if the Council gave a positive reply, had not made "the slightest overture" in the matter. The King's letters of January 10 and February 3, 1711, were examined, and it was found that they left no room for independent action. After the ballot, England's Resident was given a negative, verbal reply on July 23, which referred to the King's order.[40]

Jackson, in a dispatch to Bolingbroke on July 21, provided a slightly different interpretation of the attitudes of Horn and the other Councillors than the one found in the minutes.[41] The picture of total loyalty and obedience to the King, which the minutes provide, is revealed in another light. Jackson reported that he, while waiting for Horn to return from Ådö, and the offer of mediation to be treated in Council, visited the Councillors who were in Stockholm to find out their views. He reported that they were grateful for England's offer, but that they must follow the King's order, whatever the consequences, "rather than run the danger of being made the victims of his rage". Jackson also referred to his July 20 conversation with Horn, who on that occasion told him confidentially that co-operation in a peace proposal would surely cost the Councillors their heads, if the King were to return. Therefore, the only solution, according to Horn, was that the Maritime Powers dictate a peace to the warring parties in the North according to the proposal presented in Utrecht. When Jackson asked what terms the Swedes could accept, since complete restitution was out of the question, Horn referred the question to the judgement of Sweden's "friends" — it did not depend on the Swedes' own decision. In summary he stated that he thought that most of the Councillors had the same opinion and added the appeal: "I dare never own one word of all I have said wherefore... you must manage it as if it had never been spoke".

Against the background of these events, J. Rosén in *"Det engelska anbudet om fredsmedling 1713"* takes up the accusations levelled by the

---

40 *Rådsprotokoll,* July 22, 23, 1713.
41 Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 1713. Published in J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* pp. 79 ff.

French Resident in Stockholm J. de Campredon, that Horn and the Council, in their own political interests, clandestinely stirred up domestic discontent in order to elicit popular public demands for a *Riksdag* and peace negotiations. Rosén assumes that on July 21, Jackson delivered a direct English offer to mediate peace between Sweden and her adversaries. He asserted that English plans to force the warring parties to make peace and their offer of mediation was specifically meant to intervene in Sweden's domestic situation. English diplomatic interests would concur with Horn's domestic aspirations in the case of mediation. The offer of mediation would, in "the form in which it was presented by Jackson",[42] and through Roland's cooperation, have appeared in the form that Horn desired when Roland was dispatched.[43] Propaganda that presented demands for a *Riksdag* and peace negotiations based on the English offer of mediation, appeared so quickly and so well informed, that it denied "any other interpretation than that it was centrally organized from the capital".[44] The propaganda reportedly "from the beginning was appreciated and used" by Horn.[45] The propaganda would then be referred to by Horn as public demands — a means to defend and authorize to the King the Council's convening of the Estates. When the *Riksdag* assembled, it would be provoked into making a spontaneous demand for peace to the King. The Estates' authorization of the Council to begin peace negotitons would then be another means to pressure the King and a guarantee of power if it should come to the point "when the Council must act according to or against Charles XII's will".[46]

There is reason to test Rosén's thesis against a more thorough examination of the sources. His argument is built around the English offer to mediate peace, which is discussed in the verbal propaganda and in the pamphlets. Such an offer is not mentioned in Bolingbroke's instructions to Jackson on May 30, which, on July 21, were the basis for the verbal offer the English Resident made to Horn. But Rosén suggests that Jackson informed him of something else, and that this complementary message reached him via Roland. He reports that "Roland had with him Queen Anne's offer to mediate", that "the offer of mediation was not written" and that Roland "brought with him verbal messages".[47] Here it is necessary to examine the possibilities Roland had to bring with him such a verbal message, and whether it is possible to reconstruct the character of the offer to mediate.

---

[42] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 77.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Furthermore, Rosén suggests the possibility that Roland, apart from his mission to take the verbal message to Sweden, also worked in Horn's interest. "Thus that the offer was presented to the Council in the form it was".[48] In this connection, Rosén refers to the draft of a pamphlet, which was found with Roland's papers. Judging from the context it dates from the late autumn of 1713, and supports Horn's policies.[49] Roland would thus have been Horn's confident.

Roland's efforts in Horn's cause during the autumn do not necessarily mean that he was Horn's man during the spring. But other circumstances could indicate a secret agreement between them: Roland, when he reported the result of his mission in England to the Council on July 14, at least according to the minutes, did not reveal that he had spoken to Horn the day before. On the contrary, he declared himself, without any comment, willing to obey orders to travel to Ådö to report to the chancery president. A confidential relationship between Horn and Roland seems to be indicated, even if it cannot be proved. But, it could, in any case, scarcely support the interpretation that Roland had with him an English offer of mediation.

Rosén asserts that Roland verbally forwarded an offer of mediation from Bolingbroke to Jackson, who would in his turn, forward it to the Council. He has no solid basis for his assertion; it is a guess that cannot be confirmed. During July, 1713, a series of rumors circulated in Stockholm that England had offered to mediate peace. Since no such offer was mentioned in Bolingbroke's instructions, Rosén concluded that the offer must have been transmitted verbally by Roland. The inconsistencies of the propaganda and the instructions were harmonized.

What possibilities had Roland to transmit a verbal message from Bolingbroke to the Council? There is no evidence that he did that. Roland had no audience with Bolingbroke. If he forwarded an offer of mediation, it must have gone through Gyllenborg. When in a letter Gyllenborg reported the result of Roland's mission in London, he wrote that he brought with him a letter for Jackson "in which this Court's resolutions are said to be explained in detail".[50] Had Gyllenborg also received a verbal message to forward via Roland, it is likely he would have referred to it in his letter. Roland himself records no verbal message in his travel diary. Bolingbroke's instructions mention nothing about it, and there is no such information in Jackson's dispatches.[51] This means that there is neither a mention, nor a

---

48 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 62 f. The draft in *Rolandianska handskrifter*, volume 6, LSB.
50 Gyllenborg to the Council, June 15, 1713, Anglica 212.
51 X 370, UUB. Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713. Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 28, 1713, published in J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, pp. 79 ff.

hint of an English offer of mediation, or, of a verbal message from London to Stockholm in any of the sources in which one would expect to find them. This is decisive. It seems impossible that Jackson would rely on a message which Roland, a Swedish courier, had given him with the information that it came from the Court of St. James, when at the same time, his written instructions did not advise him of it.

It so happened that Jackson, after Roland arrived with the written instructions, presented his official business verbally, and only to Horn. Jackson's behaviour gave rise to doubts and suspicions within the Council — Tessin found it "curious" and Fersen stated that it was "strange that Jackson wants a written answer but had not come with a written report".[52] It seems as if Jackson's procedure strayed from the diplomatic routine, but he only followed the instructions he received from London. That too, does not support the pamphlets regarding an actual offer of mediation. Least of all does it support the possibility that Jackson co-operated in Horn's manoeuvers, in that "the English offer of mediation, in the form in which it was presented by Jackson", would have been directly connected with "the domestic situation in Sweden".[53] Such a connection is found, however, in Horn's reference to what Jackson told him on behalf of his government. According to Horn, Jackson said that it

> "had been heard in England that a diet would be summoned here, through which he wished that the Councillors could be authorized by the Estates to negotiate peace, since they have no authority from the King to do it".[54]

When in the autumn, after Ulrika Eleonora took a seat in Council, Horn reported the English offer, he summarized it in the following manner: "Then last summer the Queen of England proposed peace and desired a meeting of the Estates, and Roland was sent on this matter".[55]

It ought to be emphasized, that only Horn bears witness that these desires were expressed by the English. They do not appear in Bolingbroke's or Jackson's papers.

How was the English message formulated as it was expressed in the instructions for Jackson? Is it possible to glean from its text an offer to mediate peace between Sweden and her adversaries? The essence of Jackson's instructions was expressed as follows:

---

[52] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 22, 1713. During the autumn Jackson repeated his procedure and delivered a verbal proposal on a matter. In this connection, Reenstierna observed: "... it appears that he has no orders to make these verbal concoctions" *(rådsprotokoll*, September 30, 1713).
[53] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 77.
[54] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 22, 1713.
[55] *Rådsprotokoll*, November 6, 1713.

"The Queen expected they should declare themselves ready and willing to treat, that they should make this offer either directly or thro her Majesty to their enemys, and that they should name Hambourg, Bremen, Lubuc or some or two other commodious places to open a congress at; this step being made by Sweden the northern allys could not, and her Majesty would declare she expected they should not, refuse to begin a treaty".

When such negotiations were under way, the Queen would

"be of opinion, as I suppose the rest of their common friends would be also, to begin by agreeing a suspension of arms, leaving things on all sides in their present posture till by a treaty of peace they should be finally determined".

Furthermore, it was emphasized

"how necessary it was that the Swedish ministers, who shall be appointed to treat, should be furnished with absolute full powers, unclogged with those preliminary conditions contained in the powers given to Count de Vellingk".

That the Swedes were to open direct negotiation with the enemy states, was the Queen's condition — it was "the price at which they are to expect assistance". In other case,

"let them suppose the worst can happen and then let them freely tell us, what should be done for their preservation by driving the king to rescue his kingdome in spite of himself".

To this end, Bolingbroke urged the Resident to try to find out and inform him what peace terms the Swedes could be expected to accept.[56]

Thus, the essence of the offer was a specific demand that Sweden begin peace negotiations with her enemies coupled with a promise to pressure the allies to bring them to the negotiating table. The participation England promised was the forwarding of Swedish peace feelers to her enemies and a promise — once the contact was established — to co-operate for the conclusion of an armistice on the basis of the *status quo*. That was quite different from a promise to serve as mediator during peace negotiations. The instructions bear witness to an English desire to stabilize the current battle lines before the balance of power in the Baltic was altered too much against Sweden, and thereby, to the detriment of England's interests. In the extension of this concrete, current wish there surely existed an English interest in co-operating with the drafting of terms during the negotiation of peace — once it was under way. Jackson's order to sound out the Coun-

---

[56] Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713. Published in *British diplomatic instructions*, I, Sweden 1689—1727, pp. 57 ff.

cil concerning the terms that the Swedes could accept indicates that this was the case. But that lay far in the future. The important point in this regard is that England did not present an offer to serve as mediator during pending negotiation of peace terms.

The instructions must be viewed against the background of the situation in which they originated. Bolingbroke saw the possibility that the Dutch Republic and France would join England to support Sweden, if the Swedes gave a positive response, but he had not insured himself of co-operation from those states. Thus, on May 29, after his conversation with Gyllenborg, he wrote to the Duke of Shrewsbury, the English ambassador in Versailles, and asked him to see to it that the French ministers talked with minister Cronström

"to the same effect as I spoke to the Count Gyllenborg; in order to let the Swedes perceive, that setting a negociation on foot, is a step, which all their friends judge necessary, and concur in expecting from them".

He also instructed the English ambassadors in Utrecht to get the Dutch to join England

"without which, it will be a question of great nicety on many accounts, how the Queen ought in prudence to proceed, in respect to this northern quarrel".

Bolingbroke expressed doubt that the French and Dutch would co-operate, and pointed out that the Duch were always "on the watch to make advantage of any break between us and the Czar". He also expressed the suspicion that the French were "willing rather to protract than to assist in ending the disputes of the Northern Princes".[57]

A condition for English intervention in favour of Sweden — later on resulting in mediation during the pending negotiations — was that it was done in co-operation with France and, above all, the Dutch Republic. English fears that the Dutch — if England intervened single-handedly in the conflict — would use the occasion to gain favours from the Russians in the Baltic trade at England's expense, have been touched on before. When Bolingbroke drew up the instructions he received no promise of Dutch co-operation and expressed doubt that such a promise could be obtained. If the promise was not made, it was uncertain how the English government would proceed. It is most reasonable to interprete the English offer as a first attempt — without binding itself — to make the Swedes

[57] Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, May 29, 1713. Published in *Letters and Correspondence*, IV, pp. 118 ff.

themselves take the first step toward peace negotiations. At the same time, England tried to win time to gain the co-operation of France and the Dutch Republic, which was a condition for England's intervention. To the observation that the instructions contained no English offer of mediation can be added the comment that England was not yet ready to make an offer of that kind.

Bolingbroke's May 30 instructions do not contain an English offer to mediate peace. Neither do they contain a statement that the Queen expressed the wish that the Estates meet and authorize the Council to negotiate peace.

Since there is good reason to believe that no verbal offer complemented the instructions, it follows that this information was probably fabricated in Sweden.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROPAGANDA

Earlier research led to the conclusion that:

"when the English offer of mediation arrived in Stockholm it incited intense activity at the end of July and the beginning of August, which made its mark in, among other things, political pamphlets ... with its point of departure in the very uncertain offer of mediation, an intense propaganda campaign was initiated for a *Riksdag*, which would make the decision regarding peace negotiations".[58]

News of the English offer spread quickly in Stockholm. Tessin said in Council on July 22, that it was "curious, that Jackson keeps this matter secret, while it is discussed all over town, so that it appears that the English have purposely spread the news". Nils Gyllenstierna remarked the same day: "... it is being said all over town that our Realm and Empire will be ruined if we do not accept Jackson's proposal".[59] The offer's publicity is illustrated also in that the Council discussed whether the answer to Jackson's proposal ought to be "announced in the newspaper".[60]

This evidence of a spreading of rumors in Stockholm could be put together with the information in Campredon's report. He, in his dispatches, suggested that the rumors were spread by the Council for its own ends:

"on songe serieusement à convoquer les Estats à la sollicitation des peuples qu'on exicte a cela de tous costes á la ville, campagne sous prétexte d'accepter les propositions de paix qu'on a rendus publiques".[61]

---

58 J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 47.
59 *Rådsprotokoll*, July 22, 1713.
60 *Rådsprotokoll*, July 31, 1713.
61 Campredon to Torcy, August 19 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/125. See also Campredon's despatches of August 12 and 23, 1713.

Campredon paints a picture of a propaganda campaign organized by the Council, which demanded the convening of a *Riksdag* with reference to the English offer and on the grounds that the Council lacked authority to initiate peace negotiations on its own. The rumor-mongering and the verbal propaganda to which Campredon testifies, played directly into the hands of the Council, as they facilitated its, or at least Horn's wishes. Thus, the propaganda was based on the purported English offer of mediation.

Previous research has found reason to agree with Campredon. The crucial point has been expressed thus: "The chronology invalidates any other interpretation than it (the propaganda) was centrally organised from the capital".[62] The above mentioned statement in the Council of July 22, a political pamphlet and a petition from the Peasantry of Södermanland, have all been referred to in this connection.

The pamphlet appeared in July and was the first of the series of political tracts that began to circulate during the summer and fall. Judging from its contents, this first one can be dated to July — it mentions "the five remaining months of this year". The tract is titled "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates to the Estates of the Nobility, Clergy and Burghers that live in Stockholm, the King's Residential City".[63] The contents of the pamphlet can be divided into three parts: first suggestions for measures to support the realm's leadership; administration and defence; then a number of projects to aid the defence of Finland; and finally, a prolix argument built on reasons of international law, theology, politics, and common sense arranged in a *pro et contra* format for the purpose of justifying the demands raised. In this connection only the first section is of interest. In it, the necessity is asserted that

> "their Excellencies be pleased during the course of this year's five remaining months, to govern the realm and take full command of the war effort during the King's absence abroad as a Dictator in conformance to the Constitutions of 1635 and 1661, as well as, according to the exigencies of the time change, the arrangements by which *Salus Regis, Populi et Regni* according to the dictates of common sense, need to be changed".

The Estates in Stockholm were urged in this way to guarantee the Council against repercussions "one for all and all for one". Rosén viewed the words as "a direct reply to the fear expressed to Jackson by Horn and the Council for the King's vengeance if negotiations were initiated".[64] Furthermore, the

---

[62] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 52.
[63] D 831:2, KB.
[64] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 49.

Estates should be summoned before the end of the year. The Estates in Stockholm were also urged to request "that the armistice and peace mediation that the Queen of England appears to have offered" not be rejected.

The petition which Rosén mentions is reported in the Council's July 28 minutes.[65] According to available information, it was presented by the Peasantry of Södermanland to County Governor P. Franc, who forwarded it to the Council. The Council's minutes refer to part of the contents:

"as it is said that Her Majesty of England offers a reasonable peace, the Peasantry's petition that the County Governor requests the authorities to make peace and summon the *Riksdag*, so that the Estates of the Realm can be consulted and deliberate what must be done".

The petition must have been destroyed at a later date by order of Carles XII, and no copy, much less a draft, has been found. Fortunately, the draft of a letter of July 26, that County Governor Franc enclosed with the petition is preserved.[66] Franc reports how the petition from the peasants in the county reached him:

"in today's mail, the 26 of the same month, I received with other items an undated letter written and signed, as if by all the peasants in Södermanland, which I hereby forward to Your Excellencies. I asked immediately at the Post Office where it had come from, if it were delivered here, or if it had come from another place. The Postmaster replied that it had come from Stockholm; the Stockholm stamp shows on the envelop. I find this letter very strange, and in its contents such statements that, first and foremost, ought to lead to further scrutiny. I cannot avoid communicating this to Your Ecellencies".

Franc further reports that previously, "a small number" of his peasants had complained about their "destitution" and all the burdens they were made to bear, and that he, Franc, always "in the best way" tried to soothe them. Between the lines is his surprise that the peasants would petition him in this manner.

The sequence of events is important in this connection. Rumor-mongering and propagandizing commenced very shortly after Roland's return to Stockholm. The Council's minutes of July 22, bear witness as well to "The speech of the Four Finnish Estates". A petition that claims to have originated with the Peasantry of Södermanland, sent from Stockholm in time to reach the County Governor on July 26, cannot possibly be, considering the available

---

[65] *Rådsprotokoll,* July 28, 1713.
[66] Franc to the Council, July 26, 1713, *Landskansliet, Södermanlands län A III:10, landsarkivet* in *Uppsala.* For Charles XII's reaction to the petition, see Charles XII to the Council, October 26, 1713, published in HH 11, p. 257. See also Chapter V.

communications, evidence of the peasants' collective collection to the English message that Roland on July 13, carried to Jackson.[67] This message was not to have been made public before it was officially presented to the Council on July 21 by the English Resident via Horn. The only possible intepretation is that it was part of an organized propaganda campaign built on purposeful leaks.

The next question is, who leaked the information? Who had access to it? Roland had with him Bolingbroke's instructions when he returned on July 12, to Stockholm. On July 13, he conferred with Horn at Ådö, and also delivered the instructions to Jackson.[68] During the next few days, Jackson called on the Councillors, who were in Stockholm to find out, in confidence, their attitudes to the contents of Bolingbroke's message.[69] No one else should have known about the matter before July 21.

The finger of suspicion points first to Roland. If he had functioned as an ordinary messenger, he would scarcely have been entrusted with secret information and could be deleted from the discussion. But this is not the case. Before he departed from Stockholm in March, he was ordered to memorize the Council's instructions so that he could deliver them to Gyllenborg verbally,[70] in case he was forced to destroy them during the perilous journey. He also conferred with Robinson, the English chief-of-delegation at Utrecht, who explained the reasons for English policy regarding Sweden. In addition he had conversations with Palmquist and Engelbrechten, the Swedish ministers in the Hague and Utrecht.[71] Thus, he was well-acquainted with the issue. After he returned home, he suggested to E. Benzelius, the younger, that he had a good deal of knowledge about the situation:

"Secretary Eric Roland has returned from England and I asked him how it was. He replied: 'Peace could be far away and is just the same quite close, if we want it, that is, if our Honorable Councillors will decide to negotiate'."[72]

Even in his own notations — where he could be least expected to exaggerate his own importance — he wrote: *"Ce voyage auroit assurément eu des heureuses suites scavori une raisonable Paix en cas qu'on eut osé d'accepter les offres de la Reine"*.[73]

---

[67] Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 1713. The importance of the time-lapse factor has been pointed out by Rosén. *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 52.
[68] X 370, UUB, Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 1713.
[69] Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 1713. Published in Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, pp. 79 ff.
[70] *Senatens registratur*, March 16, 1713.
[71] X 370, UUB. Roland to Palmquist, May 15, 1713, Hollandica 331.
[72] *Anecdota Benzeliana*, p. 36.
[73] X 370, UUB.

It seems likely that Gyllenborg kept him informed about his conversations with Bolingbroke, and that Roland knew a good deal about the English offer before it was officially presented. The knowledge that Horn had about the offer during the propaganda campaign, he most likely received from Roland, since Jackson first informed him on July 20. Horn was at Ådö until July 20: he had been expected in Stockholm earlier, but after Roland's visit he postponed his departure due to "indisposition".[74] Whether Horn really was indisposed or not, the fact that he remained could be easily interpreted as a desire to keep away from Stockholm while the propaganda was spreading through the capital. He would thereby diminish the risk of being suspected of indiscretely leaking secret information. Campredon expressed the same thought when he described the propaganda in Stockholm: *"Tandis qu'on emploie ces intrigues á Stockholm . . . le C:te Horn est toujours absent . . . fait semblant dene se meler de rien".*[75]

Horn was not hesitant to suggest that the rumors derived from Jackson's behaviour. Rosén singled out a letter to Vellingk on August 11, in which Horn wrote that

"on a fait de bonne manière quelques reproches à Monsieur Jackson sur ce que sa proposition était devenue si publique. Sur quoi il a juré, qu'il n'en avait parlé à personne qu'à ceux, qui la devraient sçavoir. Ainsi, comme il parait qu'il peut etre innocent, je n'ai garde de lui faire quelque tort".[76]

Since Jackson did not protest that his confidential offer became public knowledge too early, the possibility of his co-operation cannot be completely dismissed. Naturally, he could also have been anxious to lodge a protest if he shared the blame.[77]

It can be assumed that it was Horn who purposely leaked the information. Roland's subsequent connection with Horn's propaganda, his likely knowledge of the content of the English message, his secret visit to Horn at Ådö, and Horn's prolonged sojourn in the country — all point in that direction. In the assumption that Horn instigated the propaganda campaign, lies the implication that he used Roland's information about the English offer. But this does not necessarily follow. He could, naturally, have been informed by

---

74 Jackson to Bolingbroke, July 21, 1713. Published in Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* pp. 79 ff.
75 Campredon to Torcy, August 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
76 J. Rosén, *Den engelska anbudet,* p. 53.
77 Rosén, when he discusses Jackson, suggests that he, as a representative for English trading interests, "necessarily" had good connections with Stockholm's burghers. Roland came from a bourgeois Stockholm family (J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 77). On Jackson's mission see also J. J. Murray, *Robert Jackson's mission to Sweden (1709—1717),* in *The Journal of Modern History,* XXI, March 1949).

some of the Councillors in Stockholm with whom Jackson had conferred, but the limits of time make that less likely. It is remarkable that Horn spread misleading information about the English message — as shown above, England had not offered to mediate peace. Roland could have had incomplete information, or misinterpreted the intelligence he was given. Because of the insufficiency of the sources, it is impossible to establish Roland's role — the essential points are that rumors of English mediation were, in fact, in circulation, and that Horn appears to have been their perpetrator.

The established differences between the contents of the English message as it appears in Bolingbroke's instructions and in the propaganda can be compared with the information Horn provided on several occasions. On July 23, in a letter to Vellingk, Horn wrote that Roland had returned from England with Gyllenborg's report on Bolingbroke's May 30, verbal reply to the dispatches the secretary brought from Stockholm and Utrecht. Horn also wrote that after Roland had returned to Stockholm, Jackson submitted a proposal in behalf of his government *"assez conforme à celle, qu'on a fait au Comte de Gyldenborg dont vous etes deja sans doute informé"*.[78] If this description of Jackson's verbal message is compared with Horn's statements in Council after July 21, that in July, 1713, England "proposed peace and wished the Estates to convene",[79] and "only wanted the Council's agreement to conclude peace",[80] it is even more difficult to assume that Horn acted in good faith. Horn purposely misled either Vellingk or his fellow Councillors.

But whether Horn was misled by Roland, or — more likely — purposely spread false information, the fact remains that the rumors that were spread served Horn's purpose better than if the true contents of Bolingbroke's dispatch were known. A consistent tendency in the propaganda was to closely connect the English offer with demands of the same origin that the Swedish negotiators be given extensive authority. Bolingbroke did demand this, but as a self-evident *sine qua non* — considering Sweden's precarious situation necessary even for negotiating an armistice. He did not specify who should grant the authority. The propaganda linked the demand with an English requirement that the Council must abtain authority "in one way or another"[81] to negotiate. It is, above all, on this point that the propaganda

---

[78] Horn to Vellingk, July 23, 1713, E 5991, RA.
[79] *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
[80] *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713. See also Horn's statements in *rådsprotokoll,* July 22, 1713.
[81] According to Campredon: *"á la Régence á se faire autoriser d'une manière ou d'autre"*. Campredon wrote his letter on July 21, the same day that Jackson presented his message — *"le Sénat s'assemble aujourd'hui pour déliberer sur cette affaire"*. His information must be based on what had leaked out, probably as it reached the public in form of propaganda. (Campredon to Torcy July 21/August 1, 1713).

serves Horn's intentions. The claim that the English wanted the Estates to authorize the Council, comes only from Horn — on that point he also provided conflicting information and asserted that the Queen of England demanded the Estates' authorization of the Council and — later that autumn — that she "only wanted the Council's agreement to conclude peace".[82] Assuming that the final purpose of the campaign was for the Council to gain unlimited authority to negotiate peace, it follows that it was more suitable that the rumor that England promised to mediate peace was spread than that England used threats to make Sweden turn to its adversaries to petition for peace negotiations. A condition for England's ability to demand a certain kind of warrant from Sweden, must have been that England itself would participate in the negotiations.

The propaganda was undeniably effective. The assertions it presented have over the years become established historical truth. When all the assertions in the propaganda could not be found in Bolingbroke's instructions, one was forced to conclude that they were found in a verbal message. The existence of the offer to mediate has not been questioned.

Everything suggests that the English offer to mediate peace is a myth created by Horn's propaganda.

THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPAGANDA

The results of previous research suggest that Horn wanted, or even expected an offer of mediation when Roland was sent to England in the spring:

> "It would be even more strange if the Swedish authority, which during the decade after 1710, reached a decision on the convening of the Estates and peace negotiations against the will of the absolute monarch, let time slip by without attempting to, in some way, prepare public opinion".[83]

But that is, in fact, what Horn did. Evidence of propaganda first appeared in July, after Roland's return to Stockholm. If in March, Horn anticipated an offer for mediation some months later, he lost time by trying to influence public opinion, only after the offer had been made. If, however, such an opinion had already been created when an offer was expected during the summer, Horn could have taken advantage of the opportunity at once. Then he would not have run the risk that the diplomatic situation would change before the Council acquired its *carte blanche*. From that point of view, it would have been suitable if the *Riksdag* was already assembled.

That is exactly what Horn had planned. The previous chapter describes

---

82 *Rådsprotokoll,* July 22 and November 6, 1713.
83 J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 76.

the decision of May 30, to convene the Estates and its subsequent cancellation. It is almost certain that Horn did not champion the measure because of difficulties arising from the state's finances as he himself declared. The *Riksdag* would have been convened at about the same time that Roland was expected to return from London. Therefore, no propaganda for the purpose of convening the *Riksdag* was necessary before June 20, when the decision to convene it was annulled. An argument *e silentio* is, in that respect, that for the period before June 20, no propaganda has been found. During the time that the *Riksdag* was to have been assembled, it would suffice to carry out the necessary propaganda within its framework.

Here it is necessary to define the propaganda. Rich and convincing evidence exists that public opinion overwhelmingly favoured peace during the spring. But for the propagandists it was not just a question of this opinion's existence. The main purpose of the proganda was to obtain written statements from the Estates which the Council could show the King, if it had to defend its convening of the *Riksdag* in order to discuss peace. The propaganda was directly aimed at provoking actual or alleged statements from the Estates: the Finnish Estates' pamphlet appealing to the Stockholm Estates, the petition from the Peasantry in Södermanland, and the movements mentioned by Campredon, that sought to produce local petitions from the Estates for a convocation of the *Riksdag*,[84] though this last might be based on Campredon's conclusions after reading the pamphlets.

In a letter dated July 23, the Council informed the King of the English offer.[85] It is correctly described according to the way it was presented in the instructions. The Council declared that it had not ventured "to do the slightest thing" against the King's explicit orders, and, therefore, gave Jackson an answer on that basis. At the same time the Council did not neglect to describe at length the catastrophic military situation on all fronts, the lack of men and money, and the growing displeasure and intractability of the peasants. All of these circumstances

> "which have come to us and by word of mouth and in a detailed tract from the Peasantry in Södermanland that Country Governor Franc forwarded to us, have been expostulated, are in themselves, true and of such a nature that they could lead us to believe that Your Majesty, as far as we have time for consideration, will provide us with your gracious order concerning this proposition. We present these repeated reasons, that Your Royal Majesty doubtlessly would not be unwilling in some way to take advantage of these offers".

---

[84] Campredon to Torcy, August 23, 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[85] The Council to the King, July 23, 1713. Published in HH 11, pp. 205 ff.

This reference to the Södermanland Peasantry's petition is curious. When it was reported to Council on July 28, the suspicion was expressed — by whom remains unknown — that "no peasant has composed this, but someone else has been the instigator and made the draft. The letter must have been composed in Stockholm without the Peasantry's knowledge".[86] Franc's missive, which partially supported the suspicions, must, at least, have been seen by Chancery President Horn. Yet the petition was represented to the King as a genuine, spontaneous and representative statement of public opinion.[87]

The Estates' demands for a convocation of the *Riksdag* and peace negotiations, which were created or provoked by the propaganda campaign, were probably not meant to be not only for the benefit of the King, but also, for differing Councillors. Horn's assertion of the propaganda arguments in the Council debates, e.g., his reference to England's desire that the Estates authorize the Council — suggests this; otherwise, it would have been redundant. Thus, the propaganda campaign must have been meant to create self-evident, and provoke true expressions of, opinion to influence the King and at the same time to build defences against him. They were also meant to indirectly — by declarations of opinion — influence the Councillors who had diverging views.

In a letter dated August 19 (N. S.), Campredon touched the question of the Council's split over their position regarding the English offer.[88] In this account, he obviously relies on the propaganda version of the offer. In an account of Wachtmeister's and Cronhielm's views, he possibly confused them with the events in June. He writes:

"le Sénat a tenu plusieurs conferences sur cette importante affaire et presque tous ceux qui y ont assisté ont été d'avis d'assembler les estats Generaux pour estres authorisés á entrer dans ces propositions, mais comme il falloit á ce qu'ils croyent avoir l'aveu de Messieurs Wachtmeister et Cronhielm qui sont á Carles-

---

[86] *Rådsprotokoll,* July, 28 1713. The letter to the King on July 23 was pre-dated. It was corrected on July 29 *(rådsprotokoll,* July 29, 1713).

[87] On July 29 the letter to the King underwent final corrections. On two pages of the draft minutes, the secretary jotted some fragments from the discussion concerning the wording of the letter. These notations were likely never meant to be included in the final copy of the minutes since they were crossed out. The descriptions in the Södermanland's Peasants' petition are described in the final letter as "in themselves true". Reenstierna suggested a more cautious wording: "which appear true or mostly true". Höpken's suggested formulation was more affirmative: "the conditions stated are really true". At this point Carl Gyllenstierna interrupted and possibly asserted that Franc would assume responsibility for the petition: "Carl Gst remarked (illegable) ... that County Governor Franc forwarded the peasants' petition" *(rådsprotokoll,* July 29, 1713).

[88] Campredon to Torcy, August 19 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/125.

cron, ces derniers ont répondu qu'ils regarderoient comme traitres au Roy et à la Patrie ceux qui parleroient de convoquer les Estats ils ont demandé que leur suffrage fut mis dans le protocolle et ils ont depesche un Courier au Roy de Suede pour l'en informer".

His report can be compared with the information available in existing sources.

On July 23 — the same day that Jackson got the verbal reply — the Council wrote to Cronhielm and Wachtmeister concerning the English proposition, correctly stated, to find out what they thought.[89] They both hedged their answers. Cronheilm excused himself by saying that he had been absent so long from the Council meetings in Stockholm, and Wachtmeister by asserting that he could give no opinion, since he was unfamiliar with the situation.[90]

That the propaganda campaign was not started earlier was probably due, as pointed out before, to the fact that the decision to summon the Estates had already been made and that it, therefore, was unnecessary.

When the decision was annulled on June 20, the situation changed. There exists an isolated and unconfirmed piece of evidence that powers from within the Council started to try to influence public opinion and the general mood between the cancellation of the decision to convene the *Riksdag* and before the arrival of the English offer. Campredon reports that the Council, in connection the proclamation on July 1, of the new tax, secretly instructed the County Governors to append to the placards, which announced the tax, their own statement to convince the people that the precarious situation the realm found itself in was due to the fact that the Council did not have the power to do anything about it.[91] The adequate, but unspoken solution to which this referred, was that the Council be given the power it lacked.

---

[89] *Senatens registratur,* July 23, 1713.

[90] Cronhielm to the Council, August 9, 1713 and Wachtmeister to the Council, August 5, 1713, *Rådets handl. och brev,* RA. Rosén understood Tessin and Reenstierna to be Horn's opponents. He supports this point of view on the grounds that the two opposed the choice of Roland as the courier who would travel to England with the Council's written reply (J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 64 f.). At the August 1 meeting it was discussed whether Roland should take a letter to Robinson in Utrecht, and "that he could travel via Holland" *(rådsprotokoll,* August 1, 1713). According to Rosén, because Tessin and Reenstierna opposed the choice of Roland, it showed that Roland "of course" was to carry on "verbal negotiations". By preventing Roland from travelling, "the risk for deviations from the official reply was eliminated". Circumstances would reveal that it was suspected within the Council that Roland was Horn's tool in "a political course of action that was not approved by his opponents" (J. Rosén, *op. cit.,* p. 64 f.). The motives for Tessin's and Reenstierna's actions are not revealed in the minutes, but are Rosén's own conclusions. On August 11, Roland's journey was postponed indefinitely (J. Rosén, *op. cit.,* p. 64, note 134).

[91] Campredon to Torcy, August 12, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Placard in the *senatens registratur* July 1 and *ibid.* instructions to the County Governors — of course, without the exhortation — July 4, 1713.

ROLAND'S VERBAL MESSAGE

If Campredon's imformation is interpreted to mean that a propaganda campaign inspired by the Council — which in the given situation could only generally try to influence public opinion and assert the Council's lack of authority to act on its own — began before Roland's return to Sweden, it implies that Horn, by that time, knew or understood that an offer of mediation was on its way. Rosén asserts that this was so. He points out the uncertainty caused by reports of the *kalabalik* in Bender, that the Council lacked the freedom to carry on diplomacy as it saw fit, and that in March it received the message that the King had taken away its duties of equipping the fleet and transporting troops to Pomerania.

> "At the same time, or shortly thereafter, the rumor concerning the English plans to conclude peace without Charles XII's participation should have arrived. It is against this background that the mission to England was designed".[92]

The expression "designed" is unclear, but presumably it means that Roland, as Horn's chosen and faithful deputy, contributed to the wording of the offer and took with him "verbal messages".[93] Rosén was unable to show that rumors of an English peace ultimatum in March 1713, actually reached Horn and the Council. He assumes that it "should" have been the case. This unsupported assumption is, in Rosén's thesis, one of the conditions for Horn's "design" of Roland's mission.

But did Horn and the Council know what was being planned within the English government before they sent Roland? Roland left Stockholm on March 25, arrived in Gothenburg March 31, but did not sail before April 11, because, until then, there was no ship in the harbour ready to sail that was destined for the Dutch Republic.[94] If Horn knew about the English plans and allowed his knowledge to influence the designing of Roland's mission, he must have been informed a week, or at least several days before April 11. When was he informed?

The first time — and, as far as is known, the only time before the official presentation to Heinsius — at the end of April — that the English expressed to the Swedes, plans that they, together with France and the Dutch Republic, would present a peace plan and declare themselves against the party or parties who refused to accept it, seems to be March 24. Bolingbroke spoke of it to Gyllenborg as an alternative English plan, the only one

---

92 J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 34 f.
93 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
94 X 370, UUB.

remaining to the Queen.[95] Gyllenborg informed Vellingk of his conversation with Bolingbroke in a letter on March 24, which Vellingk received sometime between April 11 and 14.[96] However, Gyllenborg did not write a special letter to the Council about it. The Council was first informed when Gyllenborg on May 6, forwarded copies of his latest letters to the King and Vellingk to the *kanslikollegium*.[97] It is therefore, improbable that Horn knew about the English plans before Roland's April 11 departure from Sweden.

It now appears that Rosén, when he writes about the mission's "design" really is right — when he means the outbound journey. But he is not right in his argument. This is why. During the autumn of 1712, Bolingbroke and Gyllenborg discussed the possibility of English mediation, but it led nowhere, since the King had not warranted a Swedish negotiator, and was nat expected to do it.[98] As early as autumn 1712, Horn, who was kept informed by Gyllenborg, was, therefore, conscious of the English interest in mediating and that the decisive obstacle was the Council's lack of authority. With Roland's mission, Horn seems to have wanted to arrive at a solution to the problem in a way that would not reveal or compromise himself and his colleagues. When Roland according to his instructions met Robinson in Utrecht on May 8 (N. S.), he delivered a verbal message: he was sent by the Council in Stockholm to describe Sweden's desperate situation. The Council was now prepared to ovrecome an obstacle that hitherto stood in its way, and was therefore willing to accept a peace agreement without waiting for the King's approval, especially if the agreement would be dictated by others.[99] Roland's mission to Utrecht and London could thus be interpreted as a provocation of England for the purpose of gaining a peace ultimatum. A clearly worded English offer to mediate, or a threat to prescribe peace terms for Sweden, could then be used by Horn to convince the Estates to grant the authority to negotiate and assume the responsibility for their action. Because England's Swedish policy changed — unbeknownst to Horn when Roland departed — the prospects for the plan

---

[95] Gylleborg to Vellingk, March 24, 1713. Suggestions along the same lines were mentioned by Bolingbroke in a letter to Shrewsbury the same day (Letters and Correspondence, III, p. 515).
[96] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 24, 1713. Vellingk acknowledged receipt in a letter to Gyllenborg on April 14. In Vellingk's preceding letter to Gyllenborg on April 11, there is no mention of the letter in question (Vellingk to Gyllenborg, April 11 and 14, 1713).
[97] Gyllenborg to *kanslikollegium,* May 6, 1713, Anglica 206.
[98] Gyllenborg to *Kungl. Maj:t,* September 9, 20, 1712, Anglica 212.
[99] Robinson to Bolingbroke, May 8 (N. S.) 1713, SP 100/61, PRO. Robinson and Strafford to Bolingbroke, May 19 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO. See also Chapter III, p.

were affected. Horn, in that way, received an English offer, which did not offer mediation or an ultimatum, but which still, by slightly slanting its significance in the propaganda, could be used in the way he planned from the start.

Not much more can be said here — the argument could easily decline inte pure speculation. But it can be said with a fair degree of certainty, that the propaganda which circulated in connection with the arrival of the English offer is, in the form in which it appeared, an improvisation necessitated by the cancellation of the decision to summon the *Riksdag* — an attempt to make the best of a given but unexpected situation.

THE EFFECT OF THE PROPAGANDA

The verbal campaign, which made headway in July, is described by Campredon in his detailed letters of August 12 and 23 (N. S.). According to Campredon, news of the English mediation offer was spread in all the provinces while it was emphasized that the Council lacked authority to accept it. The same tale was spread among the burghers and magistrates in the towns.

"Tout cela à la fin de tacher de les exciter à demander unaniment l'assemblée generale des Estats qu'on regarde comme l'unique resource dans les conjonctures presentes".[100]

His next letter reports that the Council sent out emissaries in all directions *"pour engager les quatre corps du royaume à demander l'assemblée des Estats"*. The noblemen, who were chosen to make this proposal in Stockholm, travelled from town to town, equipped with memoranda, *"qu'on leur a dressés et gu'ils disent etre de leur façon, pour engager leur confrères à les signer"*. The memoranda did not attack the King's sovereignty, but it presented the threatening state of affairs and the necessity for summoning a *Riksdag* that could take appropriate measures to free the realm from war "on the basis of the offered peace". The emissaries also verbally suggested that the King had lost his senses and that, once the Estates were assembled, the heavy yoke could be cast aside. Meanwhile, Horn and his father-in-law, Nils Gyllenstierna, kept to their summer homes so they appeared not to know what was going on. Campredon suggests that the response (to the propaganda) was good since the number of persons who were *"mal intentionné pour son Roy"* had grown very large.[101]

There are a few scattered sources that confirm Campredon's picture. Eric Benzelius, the younger, witnesses the plans of the Nobility and Clergy to

100 Campredon to Torcy, August 12 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
101 Campredon to Torcy, August 23 (N. s.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.

submit the same kind of petitions to the Council that the propaganda tried to provoke. In a note of August 9, Benzelius reported a conversation with Archbishop Haqvin Spegel: "I spoke with the Archbishop about the news that the nobility and the burghers are upset that the clergy will not also submit a petition to the Council for the Council to conclude peace, so that the four estates can agree — one for all and all for one". At this point Spegel argued that this was only a rumor, and that the Council instead "asked English Resident Jackson to save them from peace proposals, since they did not have the power to act on them" and, added Spegel, "we have so little good counsel in these difficult times, that we do not need to offer it.".[102] Furthermore, Rector Törling of Stockholm wrote to Spegel and

"asked him about the above-mentioned message to the Council, and when the Stockholm Consistory was asked why it did not write *motu proprio*, answered that they could not venture a reply, before conferring with the Archbishop".[103]

According to the same source, the Nobility had prepared its own petition. "Doctor Hierne prepared a petition on behalf of the Nobility, and I have a copy of it. It states that Chancery Councillor Leijonstedt will sign it".[104]

However, it appears as if the Nobility, the Clergy and the Burghers in Stockholm could have agreed on a petition of the above mentioned type to the Council in Stockholm. It is uncertain whether there was one hundred percent agreement. Judging from the evidence, the petition in question was never submitted to the Council.[105] Jackson enclosed an English translation of it in a letter to London as evidence of the mood of the realm.[106] The petition is a direct supply to the exhortation in "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates" that the Estates in Stockholm should demand the Council to engage in peace negotiations on the basis of the English offer. It demands that the Estates be summoned:

"the public necessity as well as Your Exellencys own particular safety seems to require, that the states of the kingdom be fortwith convoked to deliberate on so important a work as the negoctiations of peace".

---

[102] *Anecdota Benzeliana,* p. 35.
[003] *Ibid.,* p. 35 f. The notation is dated August 11.
[104] *Anecdota Benzeliana,* p. 36. The copy discussed could not be found during a search of Benzelius' papers in *Linköpings Stifts- och Landsbibliotek.*
[105] The petition could not be found among the Council's letters and papers *(rådets handlingar och brev,* RA), nor is it reported in the Council's minutes for the late summer and autumn. According to the Dutch Resident the petition was supressed when some letters arrived from Charles XII (Rumpf to Heinsius, November 4 N. S., 1713).
[106] Jackson to Bromley, October 3, 1713. Jackson also reports that the petition was never submitted. J. Rosén has published Jackson's letter and the English translation of the petition in *Det engelska anbudet,* pp. 90 ff.

When England's offer of mediation was better known in the Realm, the danger was that the peasants' displeasure, if negotiations were not begun could break out in open revolt. The petition acknowledged that the Council would be unwilling to take such steps against the King's prohibition — but after the prohibition was made, the situation deteriorated so that it had to be said *alteri tempi, alteri cure.*

The proposed petition has previously been known only in Jackson's version. There is another copy in which some points are stated differently.[107] This latter variation, directed to the King and not to the Council,[108] presents an additional argument.[109] Briefly, this argument holds that the King's presence was essential for the preservation of the realm, and that this presence could be obtained by opening peace negotiations to thwart the "powerful men" who "conspired to not free His Royal Majesty from the Turkish domains"; i.e. peace negotations were presented as a tactic instead of as a goal. The fact that the petition was most likely never submitted — in such a case the Council would not have refrained from referring to it — and that it is preserved in two partially diverging versions, could be viewed as a sign that its perpetrators disagreed with each other and suggested alternatives, and in addition, that its submission was later considered unsuitable, on the basis of a changed situation.

It must be admitted that the propaganda, which was meant to produce petitions from the Estates concerning peace and the summoning of a *Riksdag,* was not very successful. With the exception of the above mentioned, probably false petition from the Peasantry of Södermanland, as far as is known, no such documents were submitted to the Council. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that two of the people who knew of these projects — Eric Benzelius, the younger, and Urban Hjärne — are considered to be close to the opposition, which allegedly was responsible for the creation of the new Constitution after the death of Charles XII.[110] Possibly, Hjärne was, in addition, engaged in the Council's propaganda campaign — Campredon mentions, in one place, a tract that one of the Councillors *"a fait composer par le premier medecin du Roy du Suède".*[111]

---

107 *Manuskriptsamlingen 1:48, Ängsöarkivet,* KRA.
108 Seems to be an adjustment according to the Council's order that all communications to the Council should be directed as if to the King *(senatens registratur,* July 7, 1713).
109 Point 9 in the document.
110 L. Thanner, *Revolutionen i Sverige efter Karl XII:s död,* p. 374. A. Fryxell, *Berättelser ur svenska historien, XXV,* p. 160 f. von Beskow, *Minne af Urban Hierne (Svenska akademiens handl. från 1796, 29),* p. 165.
111 Campredon to Torcy, October 28 (N. S.) 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. See also Fryxell, *op. cit.* XXV, p. 160.

A curious factor is that it took so long before it became known that the English offer had been rejected. On July 23, the answer was given verbally to Jackson. On July 31, the Council discussed that the reply to Jackson's proposal should be announced "in the newspapers",[112] and more than a week into the month of August, preparations were under way for the submission of petitions to the Council.[113] Without reaching any conclusions it is, nevertheless, easy to see that the public's lack of knowledge was a condition of the pro-Council propaganda's possibilities of obtaining the desired results.

The propaganda, which likely originated in the Council, did not go unopposed. From all appearances, the Council's reputation and prestige did not stand high in public opinion; its lack of unity was well known and its intents were suspect. Voices marked by indignation or wounded innocence were raised during the Council's debates, complaining about the public's suspicion and resentment. The crisis of confidence is starkly revealed by Frölich's outburst on September 3, in the Council: "It is said that the people speak ill of the Council. Those birds should be dragged out by the head and punished. The Council cannot proceed against a whole populace", which, nevertheless, led Reenstierna to ask soberly "if the Realm would be helped in that way".[114] The strong animosity against the Council is a theme that Campredon developed in letter after letter, most pointedly on November 19, when he wrote about the risks of domestic upheaval, when he believed that the Council in such a case *"seroient peut-etre la première victime de l'animosité d'une populace outrée de desespoir et de misère"*.[115]

It appears as if spiteful propaganda was directed against the Council and the suspicions were voiced that it used the situation to fish in troubled waters. It is therefore, natural that the pro-Council propaganda would give rise to strong protest. The pamphlet "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates" which very nearly stated Horn's views, gave rise to at least two known anonymous opposing pamphlets: "An Honest Clergyman's Thoughts and Remarks Concerning the Unhappy Condition of the Swedish Realm now in August 1713", and "A Simple Peasant from Uppland's Well-meant Remarks on a Speech Published under the Auspices of the Four Finnish Estates". The content and leanings of these pamphlets will be briefly discussed, only to the extent that they provide evidence of suspicion regarding the Council's intentions and credibility.

---

[112] *Rådsprotokoll,* July 31, 1713.
[113] *Anecdota Benzeliana,* p. 35 f.
[114] *Rådsprotokoll,* September 3, 1713. See also *rådsprotokoll,* June 20, July 1, 6, 1713.
[115] Campredon to Torcy, November 19 (N. S.) 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/125.

"The Simple Peasant. . ." is characterized by certain points of natural law. It reacts against the fact that "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates" appeals only to the three higher Estates, since the source of power is the people and the peasants were the foundation of the Realm. The most interesting aspects are that the pamphlet asserts that the Estates, in the existing situation, had the right to meet without the Kings's approval or presence, and, above all, the suspicion of the Council, which marks the pamphlet's warning that "Saul's regiment" could appear and that royal favorites could come to power, and "cast the Realm under their feet" in the name of the King. The only salvation would be to change the form of government so that "the King has his highness, the Councillors their authority, and the Estates their proper freedom".[116]

"An Honest Clergyman's Thoughts" presents a detailed argument based on natural law for the Estates' right to assemble without the permission of the King, and refers to the demands of the time, since *"necessitas non habet legem"* and *"salus populi est suprema lex"*. It also warned against oligarchy, since the best form of government was one in which "one governs by the counsel of many". The pamphlet therefore, prefers a "Royal Vicariate" and suggests that Princess Ulrika Eleonora, at the Estates' request, should "during the King's absence be part of the government" and with "the Counsel of the Royal Councillors", govern the Realm.[117]

Thus, both pamphlets attack the Council and suggest through historical comparison, strengthened by arguments based on natural law and reference to previous forms of government, the misfortune that would befall the Realm if the Council was given more power, or at all was allowed to continue its governing. However, both pamphlets concur with the demands for peace negotiations and a convocation of the Estates, which were presented in "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates".

If viewed as relics of the past, the pamphlets bear witness to the general war weariness. In its demands for peace negotiations, the propaganda inspired by the Council obviously drew willing response. Similarly, there seemed to have been general agreement that the first measure the desperate situation required was the summoning of the Estates. The wholehearted

---

116 *Strödda historiska handlingar, 30,* RA.

117 *Skoklostersamlingen,* E 8735, RA. *Rålamska samlingen,* fol. 71, KB. This pamphlet is treated in detail in C. E. Normann, *Prästerskapet under det karolinska enväldet* (Stockholm 1948), pp. 279 ff. The pamphlet is supposed to be written by the pseudonym Haqvinus Tilaesius, who presumably was a clergyman (Normann, p. 280), perhaps Jesper Svedberg, the Bishop of Skara (Grauers, *Några bidrag,* p. 227). The Vice-President of hte Appeals Court in Åbo, Sven Leijonmarck, has also been suggested as the author (W. Ahlström, *Vem författade "En redlig prästmans betänkande?",* KFÅ 1971).

assent to one of the principal demands of the pro-Council propaganda, cannot be seen as a general consent to the Council's policies. They agreed on the means, not the end.

First-hand knowledge of the debate is available only in the preserved documents, but whether these reflect the entire debate is unknown, since possibly only a selection survived. There is reason to remember this factor of uncertainty regarding two items in the preserved sources.

In a letter of November 19 (N. S.), Campredon describes a pamphlet ordered from within the Council that was directed against the absolute monarchy. Yet, no tract has been found that both attack the sovereignty of the King and also supports the Council — or at least avoids attacking it.[118] On September 22, a letter was reported to the Council from C. G. Mörner, County Governor for Gothenburg and Bohus, concerning the exchange of three officers imprisoned in the fortress at Marstrand, and "about some posted verses, which counsel the convocation of the Estates".[119] No document has been found that fits this description.

Many questions remain to be answered, but the following facts seem established: Bolingbroke did not offer, in May 1713, England's services to Sweden as peace mediator. Distorted information regarding the message the English Resident delivered to the Council in Stockholm in July, 1713, was due to deliberate leaks, prematurely distributed to the public and used in a propaganda campaign which called for the summoning of the Estates and peace negotiations. Previous research asserted that the English offer in its form was specifically formulated to fit Sweden's domestic situation, and that it had as a secondary purpose to find out to what extent England could depend on the Council to ally itself with plans to force Charles XII to make peace. Because this hypothesis is based on the formulation of the offer as it appeared in propaganda, this aspect, though it was part of the picture, should be toned down. Thus, the *resulting thesis* from previous research, to which I generally concur, becomes more pointed: Horn did not use an English offer of mediation, but apparently created a propaganda image of an English offer, in order to use it to forward his own interests. Just the same, it should be born in mind that it is circumstantial evidence that has been gathered against Horn, not hard evidence. But only with a point of departure in such a pointed hypothesis can the wealth of facts be connected and infused with meaning. And the only hypothesis that illumines

---

[118] Campredon to Torcy, November 19 (N. S.) 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/125. The pamphlet was enclosed with the letter, but was not preserved.

[119] Mörner's letter has not been found in RA. The *landsarkivet* in Gothenburg informed the author that a draft could not be found in the *registratur* of the County government.

the situation is that Horn tried to create a situation in which he and the Council would appear to be forced to give in to vociferous demands for a *Riksdag* and peace and, as a consequence, receive authority from the Estates to negotiate and conclude peace on their own if and when it would be necessary.

Chapter III Swedish Peace Feelers

ENGLAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SWEDEN, MARCH—JULY, 1713

The previous chapter included a description of how the information was distorted concerning the contents of the offer that the English resident delivered on July 21, to the Council, and how this distorted information was circulated and used for domestic political propaganda. This offer must also be placed in its foreign policy context. What importance did it have for English politics regarding Sweden?

As has been pointed out earlier, in March, 1713, the English attitude concerning intervention in the Great Northern War changed.[1] Earlier, the English government consistently avoided entering the war, claiming that the struggle against Louis XIV required all its resources. But they never specifically denied that a *casus foederis* existed. As late as early March, 1713, Bolingbroke talked about helping Sweden under the terms of the Defence Treaty of 1700,[2] and informed the English ambassador in Versailles that the Queen had ordered that a squadron be prepared for imminent departure to the Baltic.[3] But on March 18, the *aide-mémoire* composed by Whitworth stating that England was not obliged to help Sweden, was proclaimed.[4] Shortly thereafter Bolingbroke told Gyllenborg that England under the present circumstances had "no obligations" to Sweden and therefore could behave as a strict neutral during the ongoing war. Bolingbroke explained that only two courses of action were open to the Queen. One was to declare war on Sweden's enemies, however, none of her ministers would offer that advice as long as it was not known "whether his Royal Majesty intended to enter negotiations, or if they were assured of reciprocity". The second, and only possible course of action, was that England, together with France and the Dutch Republic, draw up a peace plan and declare itself against any of the warring states which refused to endorse it.[5]

Thus, England had totally reversed its position regarding Sweden. It changed the outward form of its policy from support — if only passive —

---

[1] See Chapter II, p. 33.
[2] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 3, 1713.
[3] Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, March 3, 1713, *Letters and Corr. III*, p. 480.
[4] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 24, 1713. See also J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 28.
[5] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 24, 1713. See also J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 29.

of its treaty partner, to that of becoming an impartial spectator of the Northern War. Here, it is impossible to clarify which conditions gave rise to this change of attitude. One can, of course, point to some of Gyllenborg's own attempts to explain the situation. He feared the influence Whitworth, the author of this new policy, had "because of the lack of people who understand northern affairs" and apprehended, that if Whitworth's views held sway, Sweden would pay dearly for the peace she needed so badly.[6] But, was Whitworth's policy created under orders, or through an agreement with Bolingbroke? The latter, about a week before the *aide-mémoire* was presented, outlined this policy for the French ambassador and Geheimrat von Dernath of Holstein. Gyllenborg, who found out about the new policy on March 17, assumed that it derived from current domestic difficulties. The aide-mémoire would discredit the preceding whig ministry, who had advised the Queen "to make alliances, one contrary to the other". Gyllenborg assumed that it would be presented to parliament, whose duty it would be to arrive at a decision concerning eventual English participation in the Northern War, and induce it to appropriate the necessary funds. Thus, the government would procure support before they took measures which must be judged unpopular among the war-weary Englishmen.[7]

Whether or not Gyllenborg had a solid basis for his speculations cannot be decided here. But the news of the events in Bender, which reached London at that time, could have negatively influenced the English government and Public Opinion.[8] For a long time Charles XII provided rich evidence of his unco-operative attitude and his insistance on compliance with the terms of the defence pact and the complete restitution of the Swedish Empire; this policy had always represented the decisive obstacle for every serious attempt to negotiate peace. At that point it seems to have occurred to the British that Sweden could be brought to an agreement without the participation of her King. Bolingbroke thought it "high time to think of saving him, in spite of himself".[9] The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford who, along with Bolingbroke, comprised the leadership in the Tory government, seems to have wanted to go further. According to a letter to a member of the Estates-General in The Hague, he considered the Swedish throne to be vacant and asserted that the vacancy must be filled

---

6 Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 13, 1713.
7 Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 17, 1713.
8 Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 27, 1713: "Generally the only topic of conversation here now is the unfortunate news from Bender, which makes the court more uncertain than it was before".
9 Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, March 24, 1713, *Letters and Corr. III.* p. 515. See also J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 29.

before any agreement could be made with Sweden.[10] He took up the question of the succession to the Swedish throne with Gyllenborg and von Dernath. The former declined to discuss the subject.[11]

As a result of the presentation of the *aide-mémoire,* the sailing of the British squadron to the Baltic was postponed. Before the postponement, one of Gyllenborg's contacts in the Admirality hinted that there was no pressure from higher levels of government to hurry the equipping of the squadron; such pressure would have been brought to hear if they seriously intended it to sail. Gyllenborg suspected that, by withholding the squadron, the English government purposely doomed Stenbock's army to defeat in order to make Sweden more receptive and willing to conclude peace.[12]

Rumors that England was preparing a peace plan began to circulate. At the end of the month such a plan was delivered to the English representatives at the peace conference in Utrecht.[13] The purpose seems to have been that, after the imminent ratification of the peace treaty had taken place, the Northern disputes would be settled. The proposal included these points: Tsar Peter would gain access to the Baltic at St. Petersburg and Ingria; Livonia would accrue to Poland; the Duke of Holstein would give up Schleswig-Holstein in favor of Denmark, and as compensation retain Oldenburg and Delmenhorst; Denmark would get Bremen.[14]

The peace plan, which earlier has been considered English by Swedish scholars,[15] seems to have originated with the Danes. Rosenkrantz, the Danish envoy in London, introduced the proposal to Bolingbroke. The Queen disapproved of the proposal, but its presentation at the peace conference was desirable as a meams of sounding out the attitudes of the Northern allies:[16] rumors had reached the Tory government asserting that the allies wished to seek peace.[17] The plan was, however, coupled with the threat that England and the Dutch Republic would show force of arms against any of the parties

---

[10] Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium,* May 5/16, 1713.
[11] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 27, 1713.
[12] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 17, 1713.
[13] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 31, April 3, 1713.
[14] Strafford to Bolingbroke, April 29, 1713, SP 84/246, PRO.
[15] F. F. Carlson, *Om fredsunderhandlingarne Åren 1709—1718* (Stockholm 1857), p. 44. Rosén is unsure how much stems from the British — "extremely uncertain" *(Det engelska anbudet,* p. 28).
[16] Strafford to Bolingbroke, April 29, 1713, SP 84/246, PRO. Compare Gyllenborg to Vellingk, April 7, 1713: In his conversation with Bolingbroke, von Dernath talked about "the peace proposal and its injustice", whereupon Bolingbroke "suggested that such a proposal had been insinuated, but he assured him on his honor that it would not win approval". — Vellingk thought he recognized Danish interests in the proposal (Vellingk to Gyllenborg, April 25, 1713).
[17] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 20, 1713.

that refused to accept it.[18] At least, on that point it concurred whti earlier plans in Whitehall.

The English ambassador to The Hauge, Lord Strafford, broached the subject of the peace plan when he conversed with A. Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, who for many years, was the real leader of Dutch foreign policy. Heinsius disassociated himself from the plan — from its contents, and from the manner in which it developed. He emphasized that the Estates-General would not participate in any measures which could drag them into a new war. Both sides would be insulted

"giving away the lest thing in that manner from the King of Sweden, would never be forgiven by him, and first or last he would fall upon someone of those who had forced him to it".

Heinsius thought that the warring parties must be more seriously encouraged to engage in peace negotations. On the basis of that conversation, Strafford recommended his government to convince the Swedes to enter negotiations and then wait to see what the respective parties had to say before engaging themselves on either side.[19]

Shortly thereafter, the problem took a new turn when Eric Roland, the Swedish government courier, arrived in Utrecht. His official destination was London, where he would try to hasten the promised help from the British fleet. But, as has been pointed out, on his way to London Roland, on May 8 (N. S.), met in Utrecht with J. Robinson, the head of the English delegation to the peace congress. He delivered a verbal message from the Council in Stockholm, the central point of which was briefly mentioned earlier. Its content is preserved only in letters from Robinson and Strafford to Bolingbroke, where they relate it. According to the letter Robinson wrote to Bolingbroke the same day he spoke with Roland, the contents of the message were as follows: Roland was sent by the Council in Stockholm to present Sweden's desperate situation, in the hope of obtaining immediate help. Robinson received the impression that the Council was

"disposed to surmount one difficulty that has hitherto stood in the way, beeing willing to accept reasonable conditions of Peace without waiting for the King's approbation, especially it they be prescribed by others".[20]

In a joint-letter from Robinson and Strafford, dated Utrecht, May 19 (N. S.),

---

18 Strafford to Bolingbroke, April 29, 1713, SP 84/246, PRO.
19 *Ibid.*
20 Robinson to Bolingbroke, May 8 (N. S.), 1713, SP 100/61, PRO.

the Council's call for help is summarized more sharply: ". . . their resolution is to accept any Peace Her Maj:ty shall think fit to propose". It appears that the English ambassadors were surprised by the new and apparently completely unforseen attitude in Stockholm. The message is forwarded with a cool and reserved comment: "Wc presume not to enter into those Conditions further than to give a handle to other thoughts".[21]

It is appropriate to stop here and examine more closely the two letters in which Roland's message is repeated. His description of his government's "consternation and despair" and of the impending debacle is related in more desperate tones in the second letter. One can otherwise distinguish a change in emphasis between the letter of May 8, and the one of May 19. Even if the writers' motives cannot be ascertained in each instance, the second letter appears more designed to convince Bolingbroke to respond to the Swedish plea than the first one. A similar change of emphasis is revealed in the passage concerning the government's desire for peace. In the first letter they are "willing to accept reasonable conditions of Peace", but the second represents them as having "resolution to accept any Peace". Both descriptions cannot be correct. There is no basis on which to venture a guess concerning what lay behind these discrepancies.

Bolingbroke must have found himself in a singular situation. He had received an appeal from the Swedish government to fashion a peace treaty on the terms he himself had planned. Bolingbroke's opinion that it was high time to save Charles XII "in spite of himself", and Oxford's notion that the Swedish throne was vacant correspond with the Swedish government's offer to conclude peace without royal authorization.[22] This expedient seemed to grow out of the course of events, since Roland (as pointed out before), was sent from Stockholm before rumors of a planned English ultimatum reached Sweden. Yet, Bolingbroke did not take advantage of the unofficial information and confront Sweden with an ultimatum. Why?

Earlier research has already stated that England's unwillingness to intervene on her own in the Northern conflict was based on the fear that the Dutch would use such an isolated English action to gain from Russia more advantages in the Baltic trade — at England's expense.[23] It is likely that this factor counted here as well. This is supported by the fact that Strafford tried

---

[21] Robinson and Strafford to Bolingbroke, May 19 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO.
[22] Compare Bolingbroke to Robinson, May 16, 1713, *Letters and Corr.* IV, p. 100: "Most certainly, My Lord, the necessities of Sweden and the interest of Great Britain call for the same thing".

to give the impression to the representatives of the allies in The Hague that England and the Dutch Republic acted jointly.[24]

It is even possible that he was motivated by consideration for France. The proposal might have been judged to be a provocation, aimed at compromising England with Charles XII, so that the eventual task of mediation would insteda go to France. The English were suspicious of the French and wished to keep them out of any mediation in spite of their position as guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia. They suspected that the French conspired to put Louis XIV in exclusive control of any mediation.[25] A comparable French interest in keeping England out seems also to have existed. Engelbrechten, the Swedish envoy at the peace conference in Utrecht, reported on May 4, a demarche by Marshal d'Huxelles, France's ambassador in Utrecht:

"il temoignoit particulièrement que comme c'estoit aux Ministres de France seuls de parler de nos affaires, il seroit très necessaire que M:r le C:te Gyllenborg informat M le duc d'Aumont (the French ambassador in London, author's note) à fond des engagemens de l'Angleterre, par lui faire voir la teneur des traittez".[26]

Possibly, in this question, the Tory government was crippled by internal disagreement. Earlier that spring, when Bolingbroke sent the Danish inspired peace proposal to Strafford in The Hague, Oxford was not informed, and a week later, when Oxford was discussing peace rumors with von Dernath, Oxford asked "if he had not seen a proposal that Lord Bolingbroke recently composed, stating that Bolingbroke still had not uttered a single word to him".[27]

The Earl of Oxford's view that the Swedish throne was vacant and his connection of the problem of peace with the question of succession was noted above. According to him, Sweden must have a Regent; only then could peace be negotiated with that state. According to Oxford, the Duke of Holstein was next in line of succession, but the relinquishment of his hereditary territories ought to be a condition of his elevation to the throne.[28] This in its turn, would

---

[23] Chance, *op. cit.*, pp. 702 ff. See also Chapter II, p.

[24] Strafford to Bolingbroke, May 9 (N. S.), 1713: "I thought it best to show the Northern Allies the Queen and States acted in Concert in their affairs, by which I Hope the Dutch may loose their aime of getting the Russia Trade from us, as they have seem'd long to drive at".

[25] Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, May 29, 1713, *Letters and Corr.* IV, pp. 118 ff. Bolingbroke to Robinson and Strafford, June 13, 1713, AddMSS 22206, BM. Compare with Rosenkrantz to Fredrik IV, May 1/12 1713, as referred in E 6806, RA: ". . . . the main thing that peace negotiations began with the mediation of the Maritime powers, and that France was eliminated as mediator".

[26] Engelbrechten to Palmquist, May 4, 1713, Hollandica 325.

[27] Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 31, 1713. For the Tory government see G. M. Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne,* III.

[28] Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium,* May 5/16, 1713.

immediately force England to face the issue of fulfillment of the Maritime Powers' joint guarantee of Holstein according to the Peace of Traventhal — guarantees which the Dutch, in the existing situation, did not think they were bound to carry out.[29] J. Palmquist, the Swedish envoy in The Hague, assumed that Oxford's attitude "could be the key to the English government's singular and curious state of mind".[30] Robinson did what he could in Utrecht to dampen the unfortunate impression the Swedes received. Engelbrechten could report that Robinson

"m'a assuré de ne pouvoir croire ce que nous autres debitions fussent les veritables sentimens du Ministere, Le Gr. Tresorier étoit homme à faire semblant tout autre chose, qu'il ne vouloit véritablement".[31]

It is impossible to decide here whether or not these conflicts could have influenced Bolingbroke's decision. His May 26 answer, to the Swedish initiative mainly echoed Strafford's earlier suggestion, that all parties be convinced to enter peace negotiations; the immediate goal would be a cease fire based on the *status quo*.[32] But the final answer differs from this proposal on an important point. Neither Robinson nor Strafford had allowed the question of unlimited Swedish authority to negotiate — in Bolingbroke's reply the vital condition for English participation — any great significance: ". . . that a Congress being form'd Sweden will come into it one way or other, whether a formal consent be had or not".[33] It also differs to the extent that Bolingbroke insisted that Sweden take the initiative to begin negotations — at that point he ought to have been more convinced of the Swedish Council's desire for peace than of the allies readiness to begin.

The political propaganda that circulated in Stockholm in July and August, regarding rumors of an English offer to "mediate peace", called for the convening of the Estates. The central issue of this propaganda was the English demand that the Swedish negotiators have unlimited authority. The authorization to negotiate peace that the Council could not obtain from the King could be obtained from the convened *Riksdag*, and that would be the reason for its summons. But what was not apparent to the public during this propaganda campaign was that Bolingbroke in reality expected the authority of the Swedish negotiations to be only ostensible. Delegation of authority

---

[29] Strafford to Bolingbroke, May 9 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO.
[30] Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium*, May 5/16, 1713.
[31] Engelbrechten to Palmquist, May 4, 1713.
[32] Robinson and Strafford to Bolingbroke, May 30 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO.
[33] Robinson and Strafford to Bolingbroke, June 9 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO.

"would draw into no consequence, which the king needed to apprehend, since by private instructions to his ministers he might direct them to make what use he should think fit of the authority given to them".[34]

Most important, according to Bolingbroke, was that the parties have an opportunity to meet and converse. Through such means a solution could be found:

"if a treaty were once agreed to, if the Ministers of the Partys concerned and those of their common friends began once to talk together something good might be struck out and incidents would fall in which might be improved to the reconciling of disputes and to the forming of some system of peace".[35]

Considering Sweden's desperate situation, Bolingbroke's requirement of unlimited authority to negotiate, must be viewed as both a prerequisite for and a necessity during the preliminary direct contacts among the parties that Bolingbroke wanted to bring about.

Bolingbroke's reply to the Council's inofficial peace feelers was negative; England had not dictated peace terms for Sweden by threat of war. England was not prepared to do that. But through his resident in Stockholm, Bolingbroke applied discrete pressure to the Council so that it would take the steps that he wanted. Jackson was instructed to secretly find out from the Councillors

"what they, as good patriots and lovers of their country and as faithfull servants to their prince would wish that the friends of Sweden should do, in case the king's inflexible temper should carry him to refuse to set a treaty on foot... in short, let them suppose the worst can happen and then let them freely tell us, what should be done for their preservation by driving the king to rescue his kingdome in spite of himself".[36]

Some weeks later Bolingbroke expressed the choice he believed he had given the Swedish Council when he reported Queen Anne's fear that the Council would rather remain passive and watch the storm gather "than to venture to displease their king by taking the only method, that is left to save their country from ruin".[37] There could be little doubt that he wished that the coming Swedish negotiations — after the preliminaries were passed and an

---

[34] Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713, SP 104/154, PRO. Published in *British diplomatic instructions, I, Sweden 1689—1717* (London 1922), p. 57 ff. This was also asserted to Gyllenborg, who communicated it to the King. Charles XII could "still by special instructions limit it at his own gracious pleasure" (Gyllenborg to Kungl. Maj:t, May 26, 1713).

[35] Bolingbroke to Robinson and Strafford, May 23, 1713, AddMSS 37273, BM.

[36] Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713. See also J. Rosén, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[37] Bolingbroke to Robinson and Strafford, June 13, 1713, AddMSS 22206, BM.

armistice established — be more than a sham. He seems to have hoped that the Council would go the whole distance on its own and with or without the King's blessing, conclude peace.

Bolingbroke's next step was to confer with the Danish, Russian and Saxon ministers in London. He reminded them of England's defense alliance of 1700, with Sweden, and told them that the course of events now forced the Queen to play a more active rôle. The alliance prevented her from continuing to be a passive witness to further conquest at Sweden's expense. At the same time he also hinted that Sweden could be expected to show more willingness than before to negotiate, and appealed to the allies that they, for their parts, be as willing to negotiate as they had always claimed. He added that France, as a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, would not passively view Sweden's demise.[38]

Bolingbroke then wrote to the English ambassador in Versailles, and asked him to arrange that the French government remind the allies of Louis XIV's obligations to Sweden and that he "intends to perform them".[39] The French reply was negative.[40] Not much could have been expected from France, and its refusal could scarcely have been a surprise.

Bolingbroke feared that the Council in Stockholm, when it had not received the ultimatum it had requested, would decline to initiate peace negotiations on its own. He also worried about the Dutch Republic's negative attitude toward a common action against the allies. In the case when the Council replied in the negative, a new program of action was drawn up in London two weeks after the dispatch was sent to Jackson. Bolingbroke formulated it in a letter to Robinson and Strafford. The Queen's policy would then be as follows:

> "She will treat for Sweden and she will undertake for them without the concurrence of any of the Ministers of that Kingdome and also she will concurr in forming a plan of Peace and in pressing its acceptance, without convening any of the Partis".[41]

With this, the original construction of the peace plan reappeared, more far reaching and radical than ever, designed after the Swedish Council's own wishes, though perhaps to a greater degree than they really desired. The self-assumed rôle as arbiter and guardian of Sweden seemed to be closer

---

[38] J. P. van Borssele van der Hooghe to Heinsius, June 13 (N. S.), 1713. Bolingbroke to Jackson, May 30, 1713.
[39] Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, May 29, 1713, *Letters and Corr. IV*, p. 134.
[40] Shrewsbury to Bolingbroke, July 4 (N. S.), 1713, *Letters and Corr.* IV, p. 179.
[41] Bolingbroke to Robinson and Strafford, June 13, 1713, AddMSS 22206, BM.

to Oxford's view of the vacant Swedish throne than to Bolingbroke's exceptionally cautious policy.

The ambassadors in Utrecht and The Hauge were instructed to emphasize to the Dutch that the Queen was "wholly disposed to take any of these measures", and to pressure the Dutch into co-operating with the Queen in the project. Otherwise, the Dutch Republic would have to shoulder all the blame if the balance of power in the Baltic was destroyed and if German protestantism lost its strongest supporter; the plan, as such, could be discussed and modified, since "any method" would be better "than none at all".[42]

The English ambassadors in the Dutch Republic began to work at their stations to influence the Swedes and the Dutch by means of diplomatic representations. By May 30, Robinson proposed to Engelbrechten a general cease fire and evacuation of Pomerania. Because he had no instructions, Engelbrechten could give no reply, but he informed Charles XII of the proposal.[43] On June 9, Robinson told him that the English would ask the allies to formulate their demands as a basis for a pending peace conference, and that Charles XII would have to answer these. Meanwhile, England would propose and insist on a general cease fire. Later that day he he took up the same question, but said then that no initiative would be taken with the allies' ministers until Palmquist replied from The Hague that he had the King's authority to negotiate. Robinson informed Engelbrechten on June 30, that England, should the Swedish Council reject the English proposal for a peace conference, intended to negotiate for Sweden on its own, and conclude peace on Sweden's behalf, without any participation at all by the Swedish ministers.[44]

Strafford had a lengthy conversation with Heinsius on June 30 (N. S.), and presented the English standpoint and demands. Heinsius took a negative and unyielding position. He emphasized that the Estates-General was concerned about every measure that could engage them in a new war, and that co-operation on that point was completely impossible. Though all his appeals proved to be fruitless, Strafford was able to obtain an agreement that they together would summon the envoys of the warring parties to a meeting so that they there could express their demands. That would, according to Strafford

---

42 *Ibid.*
43 Engelbrechten to *Kungl. Maj:t*, May 30, 1713.
44 Engelbrechten to *Kungl. Maj:t*, May 9 and 30, 1713.

"be in effect entring into a Negociation as much as if they agreed to a publick Congress, since no Minister wou'd dare to reject anything they had advanced to the Queen and States Ministers in concert".[45]

Even that attempt was doomed to failure. At the conference with the allies' ministers, which occurred a few days later, Strafford offered the services of the Maritime Powers and informed them that England and the Dutch Republic intend to draw up a peace proposal. The ministers were asked to write to their respective governments to obtain the demands that were made, clearly formulated and reported. The rift between the Maritime Powers must have been evident to the allies at that time, when the English talked of "mediation" and the Estates-General of *"bons offices"*. In a resolution on August 17 (N. S.), the Estates-General questioned whether *casus foederis* existed according to the terms of the Peace of Traventhal and stated that peace in the North would be served best by absolute neutrality on its part.[46] Thus, English efforts to create Anglo-Dutch unity, which was a condition for English action, finally were proved to have been wasted.

When in a letter to Gyllenborg on August 11, Vellingk, disillusioned and bitter, wrote about having his secretary make a summary of all of England's promises, in order to create *"un beau receuil de fausses promesses a fournir au Public"*,[47] he expressed the feelings which were spreading among the Swedish leaders. They considered the English treacherous and unreliable. This ally made promises and did not fulfil them. After the English concluded peace with France in April the Swedes found it difficult to continue to understand and accept their passiveness. It seems certain that the Dutch attitude was decisive in the issue and that England, wary of that state, did not dare to act on its own. It must also be pointed out that the English government showed signs of having been seriously concerned about Sweden's loss of power in the Baltic, over Russian expansion, and over the threat to Sweden's position as a source of protestant power in the German Empire. They had gone so far as to resort to the language of force to the allies, while they did not seem to be willing to carry it out on their own. But perhaps the most important change in the English policy concerning Sweden was that they no longer considered themselves bound by the guarantees of the Peace of Traventhal regarding the Holstein dynasty, but instead, wanted to base their eventual intervention on the 1700 Anglo-Swedish defense alliance. It does seem likely, that the complicated Swedish problem of succession, which be-

---

[45] Strafford to Bolingbroke, July 1 (N. S.), 1713, SP 84/247, PRO.
[46] Lamberty, *Memoires*, pp. 307 ff.
[47] Vellingk to Gyllenborg, August 11, 1713.

came current after the report of the *Kalabalik* in Bender, cast its shadow over the events. At least it appears that the leaders of the Tory government were conscious of the problem, which could blaze up at any time.

CHARLES XII'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

Mauritz Vellingk held a singular position in the Swedish Foreign Service. After the Governor-Generalship of Bremen-Verden was lost to him, he lived in Hamburg and functioned as unoffical foreign minister and contact between Charles XII and the Council. He soon caome to serve as intermediary for Charles XII in his attempts to make contact with Prussia regarding an alliance.

Through Gyllenborg, Vellingk found out about the rumors that had begun to circulate in London that spring concerning a pending English peace proposal.[48] If only Sweden's right to restitution and reparations formed the basis of such a proposal, Vellingk had no reason to argue against the possibility that Sweden could "have peace forced upon itself, even allow the Queen to moderate the question of indemnity".[49] In a letter of April 22, to Chancellor of the Court von Müllern, head of Charles XII's foreign office, he reported the English plans to force the parties to accept a ready made peace proposal. On the basis of the deteriorating military situation, he expressed hope that the King would at last decide to give "his Council freer hands to do what is necessary under the prevailing conditions".[50] On May 13, Vellingk took up the matter again and specified a three point program for Swedish action:

1. Palmquist, Sweden's ministre in The Hague would be given authority to negotiate with England and the Dutch Republic; 2. *"les mains libres au Senat de pouvoir agir et se regler suivant la conjoncture et pro re nata";* and 3., that the King return home.[51]

If Vellingk thought that he, in his letter of April 22 to von Müllern, could influence the King to assume a more reasonable and co-operative attitude to the once more repeated proposals for peace talks, he was gravely mistaken. The King sent a direct answer to Vellingk. He would not listen to talk of placing his "legitimate affairs" under arbitration that England had taken upon itself, much less, submit himself to an arbitrary peace. Since he could not believe that the Queen had any part in the plan, he was sure that it would disintegrate. He refused to grant any authority, and informed

---

48 Gyllenborg to Vellingk, March 24 and 31, 1713.
49 Vellingk to Gyllenborg, April 11, 1713.
50 Vellingk to von Müllern, April 22, 1713.
51 Vellingk to von Müllern, May 13, 1713.

Vellingk that the Council, when faced with any invitations to negotiate, should excuse itself *"cum defectu mandati et instructions"*.[52]

Vellingk's second letter, sent on May 13, arrived on June 11, at the King's headquarters. It was the subject of a long discussion the following day. The King's attitude remained the same and he refused to read Vellingk's letter or even consider his proposal.[53] On July 8, he issued categorical orders to Gyllenborg, Engelbrechten and Palmquist to refuse to co-operate with all agreements that "under the guise of friendship would be forced upon us".[54]

Vellingk kept the Council in Stockholm informed of his actions during this period, of his appeals to the King and recommendations that the Council be given more authority. He sent Horn copies of his letters to Turkey

> "so that my illustrious Brother and other well-disposed patriots be convinced that I, for my part, have spared no efforts, nor provided the slightest reason for His Majesty to gain support for his current actions and ideas".[55]

Horn answered in appreciative phrases that the King could not have received better counsel, than that in the letters, *"elles portent le caractère d'un zèle sage, discret, bien entendu"*.[56] Rosén viewed Vellingk's behaviour as characterized by his "uncertainty, if events did not develop in such a way that the King be set aside, and the Council assume the leadership". At times, according to Rosén, Vellingk's letters seem to have been "meant for Horn rather than for Charles XII and von Müllern".[57] It seems plausible to interpret Vellingk's actions as an attempt to procure guarantees in Stockholm in case of a turn of events. But these actions can scarcely be interpreted as taking sides in the face of such an eventuality. He presented his counsel and views to von Müllern, not to Charles XII, and motivated this procedure by claiming that he did not dare to present his views *"aussi nuement"* to the King himself. This caution proved to be in vain — Müllern showed the letters to the King. von Müllern counseled Vellingk in the future to inform him about what should not be shown to the King on loose pages, since he was asked if any letters had come from Vellingk after every mail delivery.[58] It therefore seems most logical to interpret Vellingk's behaviour as an attempt to keep all channels open when faced with an uncertain future.

This deadlocked situation was opened another way. In May, Charles XII

---

[52] *Kungl. Maj:t* to Vellingk, May 15, 1713.
[53] *von Kochens dagbok*, p. 215 f.
[54] *Kungl. Maj:t* to Gyllenborg, July 8, 1713, to Engelbrechten and Palmquist same day.
[55] Vellingk to Horn, June 24, 1713. See also J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 33 f.
[56] Horn to Vellingk, August 6, 1713.
[57] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 34.
[58] von Müllern to Vellingk, July 9/20, 1713.

had written to Vellingk proposing a Swedish alliance with Prussia. According to this proposal, Prussia would provide an army of 25—30,000 men which would be combined with a comparable Swedish force. This Swedish — Prussian army would first free Sweden's German territories, then force Denmark to make peace. Stanislaus would be returned to the Polish throne. After that the Swedish — Prussian army, combined with a Polish — Lithuanian force, would compel the Tsar to give up the territories he took from Sweden plus additional territory which would serve as a *"barrière"* for Sweden. For its efforts, Prussia would be given the Polish See of Ermeland, and, if that were not enough, with half of the reparations the Tsar would be forced to pay when peace was concluded.[59] Vellingk was granted very comprehensive authority on May 18, to negotiate this alliance: to take counsel and agree with the Prussian ministers on everything that seems suitable given the nature of the situation, to stop our enemies and procure our common security

("consultandi, transigendi atque concludendi cum ministris Majestatis Borussicae, de iis omnibus quae pro re nata compescendis hostibus atque procurandae communi securitati utilia et accomodata videbantur").[60]

This unlimited authority in reality was limited by the King's definite orders in the instructions, that no Swedish territory or privilege could be given up.[61]

Vellingk perceived how unrealistic the project was, and delayed presenting it in Berlin.[62] If the Prussians realized how little was offered them, their interest in an alliance with Sweden would cool. Prussia's main goal was to gain control of Stettin, and Vellingk was forbidden to give up Swedish territory. He also deemed it necessary to first gain concrete assurances of English support. The appearance of an English squadron in the Baltic would greatly benefit his negotiations.[63] During the period of waiting which followed, von Müllern hinted to him that the King would perhaps give in and participate in the peace negotiations that the Maritime Powers wanted, if the Prussian negotiations were fruitless. von Müllern promised to try to press the King to the Maritime Powers' negotiations.[64]

---

59 Kungl. Maj:t to Vellingk, May 18, 1713: "Projet suivant lequel le Roi de Suede entrera en negociation avec le roi de Prusse" *(utrikes registratur 1713).* Research has deemed the plan as an unrealistic fantasy. According to B. Lundberg, *De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och Preussen 1709—1715,* (Lund 1893) p. 104, it shows "what little understanding of the reality of the situation Charles XII possessed". He cites Paludan-Müllers view: "characteristic of its originators' state of mind".

60 *Utrikes registratur,* May 18, 1713.

61 Kungl. Maj:t to Vellingk, May 18, 1713, *utrikes registratur 1713.*

62 B. Lundberg, *op. cit.,* p. 106.

63 Vellingk to Gyllenborg, August 25, 1713.

64 von Müllern to Vellingk, June 22, 1713.

Some time later Charles XII did take a step, if not toward peace, at least toward cease fire. On July 8, he gave Englebrechten permission to join the cease fire and evacuation of Pomerania suggested on May 30, by Robinson.[65] In a letter dispatched at the same time von Müllern informed Engelbrechten that, of course, the King's "permission concerned only the evacuation of Pomerania", but that Engelbrechten should still ask Vellingk for his opinion concerning an evacuation of the Duchies of Bremen, Holstein and Mecklenburg.[66] The letters were sent under open seal — *"cachet volant"* — via Vellingk, who read them and forwarded them to Engelbrechten.[67] With the same post, and also under open seal, the King's order of July 8, to Palmquist, Gyllenborg and Engelbrechten to reject all English peace proposals which would be forced on Sweden, were sent via Vellingk.[68]

RUMORS REGARDING VELLINGK'S AUTHORITY

The clandestine information the Council gave the British government, that it was prepared to conclude peace without the King's permission and on England's terms was not received, as has been shown, in the manner hoped for. Instead, the Council was encouraged to take the initiative that it wanted to be forced to take by England. It did not dare to take that step, and its answer to Jackson was therefore negative. It referred to the King's order, to the bonds of loyalty and obedience to him, adding that negotiations of that type could compromise Charles XII with the Turks. Some of the statements were infused with bitterness and a touch of astonishment, that England had not reacted to the signal:

"il n'y a rien que le Senat souhaitte plus, que de trouver en Expedient, par lequel on pourroit etre à couvert de tous les inconvenients cy dessus mentionnés, en meme tems, que Sa Majesté accomplit son glorieux dessein. Un pareil Expedient ne sera pas si difficile à trouver".[69]

In order to understand the Council's situation, it must be remembered that it was often poorly and slowly informed of Charles XII's diplomatic activities. At the same time, the King's own order condemned the Council to inaction in such matters, and forbade it to give instructions to Swedish emmissaries abroad. Mail was slow and irregular. Denmark refused to allow —

---

[65] *Kungl. Maj:t* to Engelbrechten, July 8, 1713, *Utrikes registratur 1713.*
[66] von Müllern to Engelbrechten, July 9, 1713, *Utrikes registratur 1713.*
[67] Engelbrechten to *Kungl. Maj:t*, September 8, 1713.
[68] von Müllern to Vellingk, July 9/20, 1713.
[69] *"Copie de la Declaration du Sénat de Suede faite a Mons:r le Resident Jackson"*, SP 100/61, PRO. Vellingk astutely observed: *"Le retour du Secretaire Roland à Stockholm ou pour mieux dire, la proposition que M:r Jacson a fait, a fort embarrassé le Sénat sur la reponse a luy faire"* (Vellingk to Palmquist, September 12, 1713).

to and from Sweden — free transit. This, especially during the winter, posed grave difficulties for the Council in its foreign correspondence.[70] In addition, mail from Turkey took a particularly long time. Then too, Charles XII scarcely took the trouble to keep the Council informed of his diplomatic considerations and plans; correspondence usually concerned only financial questions, appointments and military problems. The Council depended on reports from Swedish diplomats to the *kanslikollegium* when it wanted a clear picture of the King's foreign policy. In their turn, the Swedish diplomatic missions were forced to work with insufficient funds so that they sometimes could not pay for the incoming mail, which remained locked in the local post office.[71] The Council's continued rôle in the efforts to obtain peace during the coming autumn would be based wholly on such sporadic, and at times uncertain, often delayed, reports that were available regarding the King's policy.

On September 5, the Council was informed of the King's letter of May 15, to Vellingk, which forbade the Council to submit to English arbitration and which told them to decline all peace proposals with the excuse *"cum defectu mandati et instructionis"*. Then they discussed it. The minutes contain the statement that the King, in the letter, gave proof of "a special grandeur of spirit", and Horn declared that "we will stand by our brave King".[72]

On October 19, a letter of September 9, from C. G. von Friesendorf, the Swedish minister in Berlin, to the Chancery was reported in the Council. Among other things, it revealed that the King had given Vellingk an order "concerning the establishment of a cease fire here in Germany".[73] When the same information also arrived from Gyllenborg in a letter of September 29,[74] it seems at first glance to be a corroboration, but it turned out that Gyllenborg was in fact informed by von Friesendorf.[75]

Meanwhile, there is nothing to suggest that the King actually gave Vellingk that kind of authority. No such document is found among the royal warrants and instructions in Vellingk's own archive, nor does a copy appear in the records of the foreign service or among the royal papers. Where did now Friesendorf obtain his information?

---

[70] Gyllenborg to Bolingbroke, September 10, 24, 1713, SP 100/61, PRO. *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
[71] J. Sandberg's aide-mémoires, July 29 and December 7, 1713, *Betänkanden och memorial i utrikesärenden,* 22, RA.
[72] *Rådsprotokoll,* September 5, 1713.
[73] *Rådsprotokoll,* October 19, 1713. von Friesendorf to *kanslikollegium,* September 9, 1713. The minutes record that the letter was dated September 10. That ought to be a mistake, since von Friesendorf sent no letter that day (Borussica 57, RA).
[74] Gyllenborg to the Council, September 29, 1713.
[75] von Friesendorf to Gyllenborg, September 9, 1713.

The explanation seems to be as follows. It has its origin in the negotiations that G. H. von Görtz carried on in Berlin concerning a restitution of the territory of the Duchy of Holstein. von Görtz reached an agreement on June 22 (N. S.), with the King of Prussia, whereby the latter promised to try to effect the restitution of Holstein if the administrator of Holstein could convince the King of Sweden to relinquish Stettin and its territories in favor of Prussia and that Stettin would be sequestered for the duration of the war. The Prussian King would, in every way, support the Duke of Holstein's right of succession to the Swedish throne. If Stettin, at the time of the Duke of Holstein's elevation to the throne, had not been relinquished to Prussia, the administrator pledged himself to give up the city, in his and the Duke's names, to Prussia.[76] The execution of this agreement was stymied because Stettin's commander, Governor General Meijerfelt, refused to evacuate the city without direct orders from the King. Thus, von Görtz was prevented, for the time being, from fulfilling his part of the agreement. As a further consequence, Russian and Saxon troops continued their siege of the Pomeranian fortresses, which they otherwise would have discontinued.[77] Thus the risk reemerged that Stettin would fall to the allies and could no longer be offered to Prussia.

On July 13 (N. S.), J. E. von Fabrice, the Holstein envoy to Charles XII, wrote von Görtz that the King ordered Vellingk to conclude an alliance with Prussia. von Fabrice hoped that by a common Prusso — Swedish action, Augustus of Saxony could first be separated from his allies, and then Denmark could be forced to make a separate peace that could give the house of Holstein full restitution. In a July 20 supplement to the same letter, von Fabrice reported that von Müllern summoned him that morning and said that Charles XII was then prepared *"a faire une paix raisonnable"* and as a first step was ready to participate in a cease fire which could be general or limited to Germany, if the guaranteeing powers for their part would actively influence the allies to accept an armistice and evacuate Schleswig, Holstein, Mecklenburg, Bremen and Pomerania. Finally, Müllern asked von Fabrice that the Holstein ministers in England and the Dutch Republic try to effect the plan without revealing that they did it at the request of the Swedes.[78]

It is obvious that von Fabrice's reports were welcomed by von Görtz. If a cease fire could be established in Pomerania without unnecessary delay,

---

[76] S. Grauers, *G. H. von Goertz*, SBL 17, p. 170.
[77] B. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 97 ff., H. Almquist, *Holstein-Gottorp, Sverige och den nordiska ligan i den politiska krisen 1713—1714* (Uppsala 1918), Chapter I—II.
[78] F. E. von Fabrice, *Anecdotes*, p. 254 ff.

Stettin could be kept from falling. In the meantime, von Görtz needed a continued Swedish possession of Stettin in order to rescue his agreement on the Holstein restitution. The city could then be relinquished to Prussia in connection with the pending negotiation of a Prusso — Swedish alliance. von Görtz now tried to connect the Prusso — Swedish negotiations and Charles XII's interest in a cease fire. von Görtz, who at that time was in Berlin, made repeated attempts to influence Vellingk, who, via envoy von Friesendorf, proved the Prussian court on its interest in an alliance. von Görtz wrote to Vellingk on August 19, and expressed his satisfaction that Charles XII agreed to *"une pacification génerale et à un armistice"*. He asked Vellingk to do all he could to gain a cease fire and told him that he, Görtz, could probably convince the Tsar and Augustus, if only Denmark were pressured from another source. At the same time he made clear to Vellingk that the entire question of Prussia's alliance with Sweden rested on the problem of Stettin

"je crois, qu'un ofre de Stettin, fait à present, viendroit si à propos, que le Roi de Prusse s'engageroit à marcher avec 30.000 hommes".

To avoid alienating Prussia so that she might join the allies, von Görtz recommended that Vellingk, in the coming talks with Prussia, relinquish Stettin, even though the King's instructions forbade him to do it. The King would naturally remain free to ratify or reject the treaty. And if Vellingk was fearful of displeasing the King by going beyond his instructions, von Görtz finally offered to assume the responsibility

"et qu'il luy plut, de me substituer en vertu de son plein pouvoir, je n'hesiterois pas de m'exposer á un desaveu du Roi pour l'amour des interets de la Suède".[79]

Vellingk's reply has not been found, but it seems to have made clear that the King's order forbade him to relinquish Stettin and, possibly, that the King's instructions concerning a cease fire, had in fact, been given to Engelbrechten. At that time von Görtz accepted the first excuse, which he relegated *"au nombre des autres imperfections, qui se trouvent presentement dans le gouvernement de Suede"*. But he was insistent on the question of the cease fire, which had to be agreed on before the Saxon artillery reached Stettin.[80]

---

[79] von Görtz to Vellingk, August 19, 1713. He repeated his recommendation the next day, more categorically: *"sans l'ofre de Settin il n'y a rien à faire"* (von Görtz to Vellingk, August 20, 1713).
[80] von Görtz to Vellingk, August 27, 1713.

In reality, there must have existed a common interest between von Görtz and Vellingk that Stettin would not fall, since, if it did, Vellingk would lose his trump card in the negotiations with Prussia. A few days later, he accordingly changed his atittude completely.

A draft of a letter that Vellingk took the initiative to write to von Görtz on September 1, reveals what transpired. In the letter, Vellingk asked to meet Görtz in person at the Hamburg city gate. He told Görtz: *"vous pouvez sans rien risquer avec la Suede entrer en negociation"*. He asked Görtz to meet him at the gate, in order to verbally report the terms that would be presented. The draft does not deal with these, but shows that Vellingk was afraid of compromising himself. He asked von Görtz not to write down the terms that were discussed

"cette precaution est absolument necessaire pour ne pas donner occasion a des sinistres usages á taire si par hazard cette importante negociation ne se concluoit pas".

This draft was preserved together with a rough draft written in another handwriting, which begins:

"Le Comte de Vellingk declare ad 1. Qu'il est suffisament authorisé pour convenir d'un armistice a des conditions raisonables sur quoi il ne sera pas desavoué ni du Roy, ni du Senat. Son honneur est au reste engagé a ne rien promettre par rapport à l'Armistice qui ne soit executé et respecté par touts les Gouverneurs de touttes les Places Suedoises en Allemagne".[81]

The next day, Vellingk wrote to von Müllern to report the main points of his agreement with Görtz. He praised von Müllerns practice of forwarding to him, under open seal, the King's orders to Engelbrechten to arrive at an agreement on the evacuation of Pomerania, and on a cease fire — *"vous avez agit par inspiration"*. Vellingk now declared himself prepared to carry out the King's order in place of Engelbrechten

"je n'avance rien d'incompatible avec les intentions de Sa M:té, j'ai seulement pris la liberté d'en faire l'insinuation d'une manière compatible avec la presente situation fort different de celle qu'a occasioné cet ordre . . . plusieurs routes aboutissent a une mesme lieu, mais on les fourni pas touttes avec le mesme agrement et succès, je me flatte de V:re suffrage d'avoir trouvé la moins scabreuse".

Furthermore, he stated that the offer for a cease fire that he could make would meet strong resistance from the allies, as well as, the Maritime Powers

[81] Vellingk to von Görtz, September 1, 1713, E 5966, RA.

as long as it was not coupled with the peace mediation that England offered. He would, therefore, try to co-operate with W. Breton, the English minister in Berlin, who offered to serve as mediator. Vellingk then intended to work with von Görtz to seek a settlement with the Saxons and the Russians regarding an evacuation of Pomerania and an armistice in Germany.[82] von Görtz later informed him that Prince Menshikow, for the Russians, and Count Flemming, for the Saxons, were already empowered to sign an agreement. Therefore, an agreement could be reached without too much delay.[83]

On September 9, Vellingk gave Müllern more details in a letter. He enclosed the proposal that he drew up, which called for a one year's cease fire and allied evacuation of Rügen and Pomerania. von Görtz would then give this proposal, seemingly his own, to Breton, who in turn would present it to Friesendorf and the allies as a basis for common discussion. Friesendorf was told of the proposal beforehand and and concurred with it, so that everything depended on what position the allies would take. At the same time, von Görtz would ask the Holstein representative in The Hague to try to influence Lord Strafford to present the same proposal to the ministers of both sides in The Hague, claiming it as his own, *mutatis mutandis* — in that form the proposal would present armistice terms for the other theaters of war.[84] Vellingk asked Palmquist to try to convince the Holstein representative, beforehand, to draft the proposal in such a way that the evacuation of Holstein, Schleswig, Gottorp, Mecklenburg and Pomerania would be immutable demands, while the evacuation of Bremen and the Russian evacuation of Finland, especially Viborg, would remain negotiable. In addition, he would demand that the armistice also apply at sea. Strafford was not to be told that the proposal originated with the Swedes. Meanwhile, Görtz would travel to Copenhagen to try to interest the Danish court in the proposal.[85]

When Vellingk took that decisive step, rumors that he, in fact, had authority from Charles XII to conclude an armistice and peace had circulated for several weeks. von Görtz had told Friesendorf that Vellingk had the King's warrant to conclude an armistice argreement. Friesendorf, who knew that Vellingk was about to begin negotiations with the Prussians, but not that Vellingk's instructions were, in fact, very limiting, believed him.[86] The rumor had even reached England's minister in Berlin, who offered to serve

---

82 Vellingk to von Müllern, September 2, 1713.
83 Vellingk to Palmquist, September 19, 1713.
84 Vellingk to von Müllern, September 9, 1713.
85 Vellingk to Palmquist, September 8, 19, 1713.
86 von Friesendorf to *kanslikollegium*, August 9/20, 1713, idem to Vellingk, August 25, 1713.

as mediator.[87] Furthermore, portions of the contents of Charles XII's July 8 letter to Engelbrechten, regarding an armistice and evacuation of Pomerania, had become known and published in the newspapers, in spite of the fact that they should have been kept secret.[88] A short time later, Gyllenborg in London could inform Bolingbroke that he had heard from dependable sources that Vellingk had the authority to conclude a cease fire, and that he expected confirmation from Vellingk any day.[89] These rumors must have been nurtured by the fact that Vellingk did not dare submit any concrete demands in Berlin for the Prusso — Swedish negotiations that had not yet begun in earnest. It was suspected or understood that Vellingk must have received instructions and authority from Charles XII, but their contents were unknown. Thus there was great uncertainty in Berlin. Against the background of the resistance Vellingk made before September 1, against von Görtz' advice to begin on his own initiative, negotiations on a cease fire, it seems probable that if these rumors were purposely spread, von Görtz was their source; he wanted to pressure Vellingk and at the same time, interest the allies and the Maritime Powers. Thus, the ground was well prepared for the project which now was set in motion.

It is clear that Vellingk's act exceeded his authority. The warrant he possessed was expressly meant to be used in the pending negotiations with Prussia and its use was strictly limited by the accompanying instructions, which forbade any relinquishment of Swedish territory. Since Vellingk lacked the necessary authority, sooner or later he would find himself in the situation of having to break off negotiations or decline to sign an agreement. Palmquist in The Hague also lacked authority; his planned negotiations had just as little chance of being carried on to a satisfactory conclusion. Therefore, it must be asked why Vellingk, with von Görtz' help, used roundabout ways to inspire the English ministers in Berlin and The Hague to present armistice proposals, when the Swedish representatives there were unable to enter such agreements.

Vellingk's own explanation, as he gave it to Palmquist, was that he had acted in complete co-operation with von Müllern. The terms in the armistice proposal, which would be made known to Stafford via Görtz' arrangement as a Holstein proposal, was constructed mainly according to von Müllern's recommendations.[90] The plan was reportedly based on von Müllern's *"pen-*

---

[87] von Friesendorf to Vellingk, August 5, 1713. Vellingk to Palmquist August 26, 1713.
[88] von Friesendorf to Vellingk, August 20, 1713. Engelbrechten had complained to von Friesendorf about this.
[89] Gyllenborg to Bolingbroke, September 10, 1713, SP 100/61, PRO.
[90] Vellingk to Palmquist, September 8, 19, 1713.

sées particuliers". von Müllern forbade him to reveal who the real instigator was, and Vellingk appealed to Palmquist to use the same discretion.[91]

I also appears that von Müllern did forward to Vellingk

"un petit projet de l'armistice a faire avec ses degrès et venant seulement de moi, quoi que je sois assuré de le faire ensuite agréer à Sa Maj:té".

Vellingk received the proposal in the same delivery that contained the King's instructions to Engelbrechten on a cease fire, forwarded under open seal. von Müllern suggested that the proposal ought to be made known to Robinson as a Holstein project. von Müllern's communication of the King's instructions to refuse all offers of mediation to Engelbrechten, Gyllenborg and Palmquist was followed by a hint to moderate the King's rejection of England's initiative for peace negotiations in direct letters to the pertinent ministers. At the same time, von Müllern informed Fabrice about Engelbrechten's instructions concerning a cease fire, so that Holstein on its part, would promote Sweden's possibility to gain peace.[92]

At this point in the discussion, a direct question can be posed: Were these the armistice terms that Charles XII would accept and to which (their origin remaining unknown to the mediators), he would submit? Would the King work through a third party in order to procure an armistice, and by that means seek contact with his adversaries? There is evidence that this was not the case. The scheme was meant to be presented as a mediator's proposal, but the King, in letters sent simultaneously to Engelbrechten, Palmquist and Gyllenborg, definitely rejected all such efforts from the Maritime Powers — at that time the only possible mediators. On this point, von Müllern specifically tried to counteract the King's ideas. He also told Vellingk not to mention the scheme, whether in letters to him or in communication with the King.[93] It is more likely that this was von Müllern's own initiative and that the scheme included the terms that von Müllern, through conversation with the King, gathered would be acceptable to him. Thus, the terms that the King had imparted to von Müllern would, without the King knowing how, return to him in the text of an English proposal.

When Vellingk, in collusion with von Görtz, took the initiative to elicit English armistice proposals in Berlin and The Hague, he could have considered his efforts to be in line with the King's own plans. von Müllern led Vellingk to believe that the King had come to see that a cease fire was the

---

91 Vellingk to Palmquist, September 19, 1713.
92 von Müllern to Vellingk, July 9/20, 1713.
93 *Ibid.*

only means by which Sweden's remaining German possessions could be saved.[94] That both he and Palmquist lacked authority to enter armistice negotiations posed no decisive difficulty for Vellingk. He plainly based his case on the fact that the King's instructions to Engelbrechten on conclusion of a truce in Pomerania were not accompanied by formal warrant. He had interpreted it for Palmquist in such a way that, the King's Chancery had not considered a warrant necessary for such a *"demarche preliminaire"*,[95] that the King's approval of the measure would be contained in his instructions to Engelbrechten, and that Swedish support for the the English proposal that would be made would imply to the allies that the Swedish representatives had formal authority.[96] Rumors of Vellingk's possession of authority would, therefore, be useful. von Müllern as well as Vellingk viewed the pending armistice as the first step toward general peace. von Müllern admitted that his maneuvers were meant to facilitate possibilities for peace.[97] Vellingk expressed himself more clearly: if an armistice, approved by Charles XII, were finally agreed upon, it would be easier to convince the King to take part in real peace negotiations.[98] But it must be noted that their argument was built on the most insecure of premises — that von Müllern had, in every case, correctly understod the reticent autocrat's changing plans and notions, uninfluenced by his own wishful thinking, and accurately evaluated the effects of his own attempts to influence the King.

At first glance, it could seem odd that Vellingk turned to Palmquist and not to Engelbrechten, who received Charles XII's instructions to negotiate. The explanation probably lies in Vellingk's disapproval of him. Engelbrechten had not taken seriously Vellingk's advice to moderate Charles XII's rejection of England's services, and instead reported the King's reply to Robinson as *"un dernier ordre du Roy"*. He repeatedly expressed his irritation over Engelbrechten's formalism, clumsiness and secretiveness,[99] and with a sigh admitted later that autumn that he could not always keep Engelbrechten out of all negotiations.[100] He, nevertheless, informed Engelbrechten of his actions and enclosed a copy of the proposal, but Engelbrecten answered sternly that he did not find that its contents agreed with the King's orders, since the evacuation of Bremen was made a negotiable

---

[94] von Müllern to Vellingk, July 12/23, 1713.
[95] Vellingk to Palmquist, October 3, 1713.
[96] Vellingk to Palmquist, October 3, 6, 1713.
[97] von Müllern to Vellingk, July 9/20, 1713.
[98] Vellingk to Palmquist, September 8, 1713.
[99] Vellingk to Palmquist, September 22, 26, November 14, 1713.
[100] Vellingk to Palmquist, November 14, 1713. Even Palmquist was displeased (Palmquist to Vellingk, October 3, 1713).

matter — the same order that for Vellingk himself was very well acquainted.[101]

The plan was set in motion through parallel actions in Berlin and The Hague. It was delayed somewhat in The Hague due to the late arrival of von Görtz's instructions to the Holstein minister — General Berner, and Palmquist could, naturally, not take up the question himself.[102] Berner did not consult Palmquist about von Görtz's instructions,[103] so Palmquist instead went and asked Lord Strafford if he could possibly provide more details about the cease fire proposal that the British minister in Berlin reportedly had made. Strafford knew nothing about it, but said that Engelbrechten let him know "a big secret" — that Charles XII was inclined to consider a cease fire.[104] On September 30 (N. S.), Palmquist was summoned to a conference with Strafford and a committee of the Estates-General, where Strafford, on behalf of both, presented an armistice proposal — but because peace was the goal of the armistice he considered himself forced to demand that the Swedes show their warrants.[105] But the question of the warrants was never brought to a head since the allies' ministers gave the proposal such a cool reception — they were of course prepared to negotiate, but had orders not to make any statements about the conditions before the conference opened.[106] Palmquist presumed that the only gain made in The Hague was increased goodwill from the Maritime Powers when their proposal was accepted.[107]

The operation carried out in Berlin had just as little success. Breton's armistice proposal seemed to come too late to save Stettin, and Flemming, who was to negotiate for Saxony, had left Berlin for the Polish court.[108] Menshikow rejected the proposal on behalf of the Russians, who promised *"monts et merveilles"* of their bombardment of Stettin, while the Commander of the fortress prepared the city for sequestration.[109]

It is important for the argument that follows, to determine how these events were perceived by the Council in Stockholm. As earlier mentioned, von Friesendorf's letter of September 9, and Gyllenborg's letter of September 29, were reported to the Council on October 19, along with the information that Vellingk had received Charles XII's commision to

---

101 Engelbrechten to Vellingk, September 23, 1713.
102 Palmquist to Vellingk, September 16, 1713.
103 Palmquist to Vellingk, September 19, 23, 1713.
104 Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium,* September 18/29, 1713.
105 Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium,* September 22/October 3, 1713.
106 Palmquist to *Kungl. Maj:t* and *kanslikollegium,* September 25,/October 6, 1713.
107 Palmquist to Vellingk, October 7, 1713.
108 Vellingk to Palmquist, September 12, October 6, 1713.
109 Vellingk to Palmquist, October 3, 1713.

enter a cease fire agreement. During the Council meeting the following day a letter of September 14, from Vellingk to Horn was reported in which he relates how he (becauce of von Müllern's practice of sending him the communications under open seal), was able to read the King's letters to Gyllenborg, Palmquist and Engelbrechten ordering them to refuse England's services, and his instructions to Engelbrechten concerning the armistice. He enclosed copies of these and of his own letter of September 2, to von Müllern. According to the Council's minutes, Vellingk's letter and those enclosed with it were read at the meeting. Thus, the Council ought to have received a clear picture of Vellingk's intrigue and his lack of necessary authority. The reading did not provoke comment from the Councillors present.[110]

The same day, later in the meeting, andther letter from Vellingk was reported — this time to Secretary D. N. von Höpken — which reported that the King had agreed to *"une armistice tant generale que particulière par rapport à l'Allemagne"*. Both secretaries here recorded expressions of joy around the Council table. Carlson: "and their E were happy about it", Adlerburg: "G. H. (Horn): "Thank goodness! We must save that letter, it is encouraging, that His Majesty has come so far; God keep us that it has not come too late".[111]

A reading of that day's minutes provides cause for wonder. The contents of Vellingk's letter with enclosures, in which he revealed to the Council the intrigue that he (in co-operation with von Görtz and with von Müllern's blessings), had set in motion were neither referred to nor commented on by the members present. On the other hand, when his letter to Höpken was read, it produced expressions of relief, thankfulness, and joy. In his letter to Höpken, did Vellingk assert that he had received the authority from King that he lacked? It is impossible to answer that question since the letter cannot be found. In this connection the fact must be established that the Council, in its continued activity regarding peace, without discussion and as a fact, referred to Vellingk's possession of a warrant from Charles XII to enter a cease fire argreement. Judging from the reactions, Vellingk's possibility for negotiating a cease fire was deemed brighter than he himself judged his general situation a few months earlier — when he communicated with

---

[110] Rådsprotokoll, October 20, 1713. The draft minutes were taken that day by both secretaries Carlson and Adlerberg. The original as well as the enclosures to Vellingk's letter of September 14 have not been found in *Arvid Horn's samling*, RA, among Vellingk's other letters to him, nor among the Council's papers and letters. Vellingk's draft, however, is preserved (*M. Vellingks samling*, E 5967).

[111] *Rådsprotokoll*, October 20, 1713. Vellingk's letter to Höpken has not been found, nor has Vellingk's own draft.

the Council: "I alone have the honor of being delegated to carry out all of His Majesty's diplomatic negotiations, but when my warrant and instructions are examined, I am bound to present such conditions, that the powers with which I negotiate will find it impossible to agree and fulfil".[112]

THE COUNCIL'S AUTHORIZATION OF VELLINGK

At the beginning of November, 1713, the Council took two measures which created some new opportunities to act regarding the peace question. On Nowember 2, Princess Ulrika Eleonora took her seat in the Council, after appeals from the Councillors. She was given two votes. The same day the Council decided to summon a *Riksdag* to convene on December 14.[113] The circumstances surrounding the Princess' entry into the Council and the significance of that step will be described and analysed later in the thesis.

On the basis of these new conditions, Horn, at the Council meeting on November 6, brought up the old problem of peace negotiations and asked if a decision ought to be reached before the *Riksdag* convened the following month.[114] This issue was discussed during subsequent meetings, and after a vote on November 10, the Council agreed to try to obtain a cease fire before the *Riksdag* assembled. In order to do it they would begin formal peace negotiations. These negotiations, according to what was said, would be a sham, necessary for obtaining a cease fire. No royal order was considered jeopardized by these plans, since Charles XII was believed to have already authorized Vellingk to enter a cease fire agreement. In instructions and a warrant dated November 28, Vellingk was ordered to begin negotiations toward the main goal of general peace, if possible through English mediation or, failing that, for a separate peace with Russia or Denmark.[115]

The minutes of the Council are practically the only source useful in the search for the motives and judgments which formed the basis for this decision. Since it was a decision that clearly overstepped the limits of the Council's authority, one suspects that the decisive discussions were separately carried out (in addition to the regular meetings), and not recorded in the minutes. Yet the motivations, and their defense which were recorded in the minutes, are, of course, of interest. There was no unanimity in the Council: two of the Councillors had rejected the decision and recorded their reservations. Therefore, their criticism must also be examined.

The common point of departure was as follows: everybody seems to have

---

112 Vellingk to the Council, July 18, 1713, *rådets handl. och brev*, 76, RA.
113 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 2, 1713. See also Chapter VI.
114 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 6, 1713.
115 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 6, 10, 19, 20, 28, 1713. HH 11:2, p. 290 ff.

agreed that the *Riksdag,* as soon as it convened, would take the initiative in the peace question and to that end demand action by the Council. The Estates were expected to respond to the propaganda current during the summer and autumn, which, judging from the evidence, had been inspired by the Council. All this was self evident and understood. Thus, on November 6, Horn brought forward for the decision whether

"the question of peace be dealt with now, that is if thereby we wait to discuss it until the Estates are assembled or if we ought to talk about it before".[116]

The same day Cronhielm said:

"Now there is no question that peace is desirable, since no sensible patriot would not give such counsel, but now it is asked whether or not discussion ought to be delayed until the Estates meet".[117]

To Reenstiernas criticism of the far-reaching authority which was intended to be granted to Vellingk, the Princess posed the counter-question, for what purpose the Estates would otherwise be convened.[118] At the same time, the necessity of fending off the Estates initiative was stressed, so that the leadership of any peace negotiations would remain with the Council. Tessin then asserted, that when the Estates made their peace proposal, they ought to be met with the information that it "had already been accomplished".[119]

The attempt to defend in the minutes the measures that were about to be taken seem a little labored, and are based on the premise that the King had forbidden certain real acts, but not their simulation. Charles XII, in his latest directive of May 15, ordered the Council to *"cum defectu mandati et instructionis"* decline peace negotiations. Time and again during the discussion it was repeated by various Councillors that the King ordered Vellingk to enter a cease fire agreement. The Council had the same goal, and if a cease fire was wanted, peace must be negotiated. Peace negotiations as such, would be a simulation.[120] Whether some of the Councillors thought the Council should go farther on its own initiative cannot be determined in the minutes alone. Some of the Councillors had in their remarks conjured up the possible consequences. In a written vote on November 6, Carl Gyllenstierna expressed the opinion that under the prevailing conditions it would be better to *"urgente necesitate"* relinquish a small part of the Empire, and then in

---

116 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
117 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
118 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 28, 1713.
119 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
120 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 10, 19, 1713.

peace and tranquility retain the rest, rather than risk crown, realm, and subjects. Sweden's position could be likened to that of a patient afflicted with gangrene — better to amputate in time than to lose everything.[121] Falkenberg warned that "when peace is projected, there will be time enough to say whether or not anything will be ceded".[122]

During the course of the discussion conflicting views of Horn and Tessin became more pronounced. Tessin's objections concerned the measure, as well as the manner in which it was decided. In a polemic directed at Horn he questioned whether it was suitable or even defensible to authorize Vellingk in such a manner. He warned that the King had taken away such authority from the Council, and if the Senate now instructed Vellingk, these orders might conflict with the orders he received from the King. In such case, Vellingk would undoubtedly obey the King. Furthermore, if the Council managed to go so far as to enter negotiations, the allies would immediately ask what authority the Council had from Charles XII. When the vote was taken, Tessin dissented. Instead, he suggested seeking a separate peace with Denmark. This step was fully supported by the King's letter of January 10, 1711, in which he authorized the Council to conclude peace with Denmark.[123] But Tessin, during the same deliberations, abstained from referring to the King's instructions of February 3, 1711, that, because they absolutely prohibited the cessation of territory and concessions of any kind on the part of the Swedes, made impossible any worthwile negotiations.[124] Tessin wished to present the proposal, he said, to escape the King's displeasure, to avoid misusing the presence of the Princess, to maintain "an honest name before all honorable men", and finally, to avoid Vellingk's "own discretion" or accusation that his hands were tied, "besides avoiding debasing myself by engaging in something in which I should not do".[125]

Even Jacob Reenstierna opposed the decision. He characterized the mea-

---

121 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.

122 *Ibid.* — It can be observed that the Council's November discussions at first dealt with the peace question and then, at their close, with the problem of armistice. At first glances this could be interpreted that a principle disunity existed over the right to conclude peace; thus, the discussion went over to a more permissible topic, armistice. Whether a suggestion to conclude peace, which was not recorded in the minutes, was rejected cannot be determined through the available sources. Had such a decision been made or such a proposal been rejected — it should not be sought in the minutes. According to the minutes, the Council and the Princess decided to negotiate peace — not to conclude peace.

123 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 19, 20, 1713.

124 HH 7, p. 39 ff.

125 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 28, 1713. F 105, UUB. — Princess Ulrika Eleonora, long after, when she felt herself in need of defending her behavior during these discussions — perhaps to place the blame on others — stated in a memo dictated to Ehrenstrahl that Tessin never found the peace negotiations to be "criminal" (Promemoria, September 1, 1714, K 258, RA).

sure as hopeless — with it, too much would be done to excuse themselves to the King, and too little to really help the kingdom and gain peace. Through the exaggerated concern for guarding themselves they would be beating the air.[126] In a dissent written into the minutes he expressed his doubt that Vellingk could negotiate on such an "obscure instruction", and that by departing from the King's wishes they were "exposed to all sorts of consequences". He opposed England's mediation, which would only waste time, and agreed with Tessin about a separate peace with Denmark.[127]

Reenstiernas description is accurate. Most remarkable is the difference between the freedom Vellingk received in his warrant and the limitations placed upon him in his instructions. Drafts of the warrant and the instructions were prepared in the *kansli-kollegium*.[128] During the discussion of their final formulation Horn emphasized, with the avid assistance of his subordinates Ehrenstahl and Höpken, that the warrant, which would be presented to the mediators and Sweden's adversaries, must be broad, in order to allow Vellingk a good deal of freedom to negotiate and conclude preliminary agreements. Otherwise, it would not be accepted. Horn characterized the warrant as "only a formality" — the instructions would "defend our actions before the KKing".[129] He was able to win his way on this point without great difficulty. But when the question of how a preliminary agreement could be linked to subsequent royal ratification in the text of the warrant, the final wording posed obstacles which some Councillors considered insurmountable. The undisputed point of departure was that peace was an *"jus regium"*, but while the Council's draft promised that the Council would secure ratification, Tessin and Cronhielm insisted that they could only promise to try to obtain ratification. Tessin voiced the core of their argument against the proposed text: "It would seem that His Majesty were dependent on the Council if that isn't changed".[130] Cronhielm added that the allies would point out that "the subjects of the King could not do it".[131] Even on this issue the leaders of the Chancery succeeded in establishing their view, expressed most succinctly by Höpken:

"If we do not say that the King has given his government power and authority to negotiate and conclude peace, we shall gain nothing at all".[132]

---

126 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 21, 1713.
127 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 28, 1713.
128 *Kanslikollegium protokoll*, November 17, 1713.
129 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 20, 1713.
130 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 19, 20, 1713.
131 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 20, 1713.
132 *Ibid.*

The final text of the warrant was broad. It promised that the senate would obtain the King's ratification within a definite period of time and, if, for some reason, that couldn't be produced, the ratification of the Council and the Princess:

"Promittimus itaque Nos intra debitum et praefixum terminum super hisce omnibus aut procuraturos S. R. M:tis nostri respective etc., aut si ex quacunque causa id a Nobis praestari non posset, Nostra ratificationum diplomata esse expedituros".[133]

The formulation of the instruction caused less strife, though a few changes were made. In the final version Vellingk was told to rely on England's offered services; to try to obtain French support as guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia; to seek, at once, an armistice and free passage of mail through Denmark; to facilitate an agreement with Augustus of Saxony by not ruling out Swedish recognition of his right to the throne of Poland; and to work first and foremost toward achieving a general peace, and if that should prove impossible; a separate peace with Russia or Denmark. Before Vellingk "finally" concluded an agreement, he would regularly correspond with the Council to obtain its opinion.[134]

Furthermore, a letter to the King, dated November 28, was drafted in which the Council accounted for its actions. They referred to the fact that Sweden was so weak that it could no longer defend its own borders, that its allies and guarantors had not intervened, and

"that the armistice to which Your Royal Majesty to everyone's satisfaction graciously agreed . . . in no way can be obtained, as long as the land is not ready and willing to negotiate peace itself".

In addition, they declared that no reliable information regarding the King's health and intentions had arrived, nor was there any hope that it would arrive in time. The measures had been taken in order to "use Your Royal Majesty's most gracious will concerning an armistice", and, therefore, they submitted the decision to the King's "most gracious pleasure". Copies of Vellingk's warrant and instruction and of Tessin's and Reenstierna's dissenting opinions were included.[135]

How serious and risky Tessin and Reenstierna viewed the majority's decision is illustrated by an incident in connection with the preparation of

---

133 *Rådets handl. och brev*, 45, RA. Published in HH 11:2, p. 292 ff.
134 Princess and Council to Vellingk, November 28, 1713, E 5977, RA. Published in HH 11:2, p. 292 ff.
135 Princess and Council to Charles XII, November 28, 1713, *Rådets handl. och brev*, RA. Published in HH 11:2, p. 286 ff.

Vellingk's warrant and instruction. They signed the letter to the King with the note *"ut in voto"* under their signatures and attached their vote. On December 9, when they were to sign the warrant and the instruction, they also wished to put *"ut in voto"* under their signatures. The majority of the Council would not allow Tessin and Reenstierna to "withdraw themselves". Cronheilm asserted that *"ut in voto"* could not be written on a warrant.[136] The next day Ulrika Eleonora intervened. She summoned Tessin and Reenstierna and pleaded for their signatures without any notations. They felt themselves compelled to give in, in exchange for a reservation in the minutes that their actions would not "burden" them or "prejudice" their votes.[137]

On October 25, the King received information from von Friesendorf about the armistice proposal that Breton presented in Berlin. von Friesendorf reported that it was based "on the grounds that His Excellency Count Vellingk drafted with Your Royal Majesty's gracious approval".[138] If this was a surprice for Charles XII, and what he in that case thought of Vellingk, remains unclear. One week later, von Müllern wrote to Horn and related that the King decided to no longer insist upon Stanislau's right to the Polish throne, and instead sought to divide his enemies by a separate peace.[139] At about the same time, it appears that Charles XII received the news that the Council gave Vellingk authority to negotiate peace. Therefore, von Müllern took it upon himself to warn Vellingk:

"Notre maitre ayant été informé de la commission de laquelle V:re Excell:ce a éte chargée par le Senat touchant une paix à faire, je lui demande pardon si je l'avertis, qu'Elle fera bien d'en ecrire ici, afin qu'en l'omettant ce Prince n'en prenne occasion de soubconner que Votre Excellence puisse avoir des vues secretes en luy cachant cette affaire".[140]

von Müllern's letter is remarkable. It was written on November 5, before the Council authorized Vellingk and before any discussion of the matter was recorded in the Council's minutes. Had there been a preliminary agreement between the Council and Vellingk, that he would receive from the Council the authority or the instructions which he could not obtain from the King? The likelihood that the matter was at least discussed receives some support in a letter from Vellingk to Palmquist on October 13, when the activities inspired by Vellingk and von Görtz were set in motion in Berlin and The Hague. He wrote:

---

136 *Rådsprotokoll,* December 9, 1713.
137 F 105, UUB.
138 von Friesendorf to *Kungl. Maj:t,* September 13/23, 1713.
139 von Müllern to Horn, November 2, 1713.
140 von Müllern to Vellingk, November 5/16, 1713.

"Pour revenir, Monsieur, a nos negociations futures de paix, je ne prevois pas que le Sénat nous pourra fournir aucunes instructions la dessus, n'ayant pas Liberté de le faire; Mais je ne doute pas, que nous n'en recevions de Turquie d'inexecutables comme d'ordinaire".[141]

In its first part, Vellingk's statement has the character of an argument. It appreciates the likelihood of a certain measure on the part of the Council and seems to hang in thin air if it is not assumed that the question was previously discussed.

As stated before, Charles XII very likely had not given Vellingk the authority to negotiate an armistice. This is supported by the fact that Vellingk discussed his lack of authority with Palmquist, and touched upon different ways to compensate the lack. The close connection that existed between Vellingk's assumed authority, and the Council's own authorization of him — and that the former was the basis for the latter — have already been demonstrated. The Council undoubtedly acted on the basis that Vellingk really possessed Charles XII's authority to enter an argeement on a cease fire. In this case, one seems to build on information which did not come from the King, since such a direct message would undoubtedly have been recorded in the minutes and repeated when the Council delegated its own authority. After October 20, Vellingk's possession of royal authority was not questioned — not even by Tessin and Reenstierna. Had the least doubt existed on that point, it would certainly have been asserted by these opponents. All seem to have been so convinced that he possessed authority that they did not motivate their authorization of Vellingk instead of Engelbrechten — the person who, as far as anyone knew, already had the King's instructions concerning a cease fire and evacuation of Pomerania.

It is obvious that something is missing. The message, which finally convinced the Council that Vellingk, in fact, possessed the King's authority, has not been traced. A gap has been found earlier — Vellingk's letter to Höpken, which was mentioned in the Council minutes for October 20, and in which Vellingk reported that he had received the King's consent for a cease fire general, as well as, limited to Germany. The letter which, according to Horn's commentary, "must be saved" cannot be found. What that gap means can, of course, not be judged before the letter is seen. But perhaps a hypothetical draft can be composed: if in the letter Vellingk gave a final and authoritative confirmation that he had the King's authority, the Council would not have acted other than the way it did. If Vellingk provided such confirmation — in reality misleading — is it likely that he did it on his own

---

141 Vellingk to Palmquist, October 13, 1713.

initiative and responsibility? It is difficult to find a plausible motive for such behaviour. Another interpretation seems more likely: the letter to Höpken could have grown out of an agreement between Horn and Vellingk so that Horn, on this basis, would be able to convince the opposition in the Council to back a decision to grant authority and instructions for pending peace negotiations. That Vellingk obviously discussed with Palmquist an authorization by the Council, and that the letter from Vellingk to Höpken — which could be very compromising for Vellingk — cannot be found, ought to strengthen such a hypothesis. That the King, before the decision was made by the Council, or even — according to the minutes — was discussed by them, found out about what was going to happen, can be taken as an indication that there was co-operation between Horn and Vellingk and that the King possibly had more effective sources of information than was supposed.

A number of facts and observations lead to the central issue — conspiracy or no conspiracy. First, and most important: the peace feelers the Council's leadership — i. e., Horn — verbally transmitted to the English chief negotiator at the peace convention in Utrecht seems at first examination, extremely far reaching to the point of implying that the Swedish Council was prepared to rebel if they should go the whole hog. But a closer examination of the two letters from the English representatives in the Dutch Republic to the foreign ministry in London, in which the message is repeated, reveal such variation in their reproduction of the verbal message's main point, that one could suspect a tendentious alteration in at least one of the letters. Thus, what Horn really communicated remains to some extent uncertain. It is clear, however, that Horn wanted Sweden confronted with an English peace ultimatum. This desire does not necessarily imply conspiracy on Horn's part — but it is obviously a matter of concealed obstruction of the Kings's war policies.

Furthermore, the problem is bound up with the question of the domestic propaganda during the summer discussed in the previous chapter. Evidence suggests that Horn, while using the misleading information that circulated concerning the contents of the English Residents' offer of English "peace mediation", tried to provoke petitions for the convening of the Estates, so that they would later authorize the Council to — on its own — negotiate peace. Even these measures could be interpreted as simple obstruction, even though, in that connection, Campredon levelled accusations against Horn for engaging in conspiracy.

The instructions and warrant for Vellingk issued November 28, are almost wholly a creation of Horn and his subordinates in the Chancery.

Together, they pressed their content and formulation in the Council. Tessin's and Reenstierna's reactions reveal deep concern for their own security in the face of the possible consequences. The most remarkable aspect of the situation is that Horn, in the text of the warrant, promised the Princess' and the Council's own ratification of a resulting agreement if, for some reason, the King's ratification could not be obtained. The warrant is thereby useful, even in a situation in which the King would have no rôle. The instruction does limit Vellingk's freedom of action, mainly in that it compels him to "correspond" with the Council. Nothing more than a new instruction would be necessary to make the simulated negotiations which the Council initiated and controlled into a true negotiation of peace. It is possible that the Estates' enthusiasm for peace could be channeled by the promulgation of a new, revised instruction by the Council and the Estates. Thus, the situation would be reached that the pro-Council propaganda had previously sought to provoke. It is not certain that that was Horn's intention. But the possibility lies in the situation he created. And to the question of Horn's motive belongs the fact that the information that legitimized his initiative to his colleagues cannot be traced.

The clandestine suggestion to Robinson, the circumstances of the propaganda in Stockholm during the summer and the empowering of Vellingk late in the autumn — all this could be viewed as the expression of veiled obstruction of the King's war policies. The consistent theme in this obstruction, is the attempt to provoke manifestations of the will of others outside of the Council, and thereby create situations where the Council would be forced to take action to obtain peace, under pressure from the English government and the Swedish Estates. It does not necessarily follow that this policy of obstruction is also an expression of Horn's own lust for power, since the conditions he tried to create could also be used to influence the King to a more peaceful policy. If Horn obstructed or conspired, or if he chose the first alternative with the other in reserve, cannot yet be determined. Both methods could have been employed in parallel efforts, and Horn could scarcely be suspected of wanting to prematurely sink his own ship. But it is incontestable, that if Horn continued what he started, he must arrive at such a choice sooner or later.

Chapter IV Conflict Between the Council and the Estates Regarding Matters of Taxation 1713–1714

In the foregoing chapters attention has been concentrated on the Council's, and especially Horn's, activities against the background of Campredon's theory of conspiracy. The state of the national finances has been discussed only in passing, in connection with the formulation of the thesis that Horn used financial difficulties as an excuse for convening the *Riksdag*. This chapter will present new perspectives and pose new questions. The condition of the national finances, though it is important, will not be in itself, the object of scrutiny. Instead, the main object for inspection will be the financial policies pursued by the nation's leaders. The latent struggle between the absolute monarchy and the Council, which appeared in earlier chapters, is here exchanged for conflict between the highest executive authority, on the one hand, and representatives of the people, who held the power over the purse, on the other. The Council's ever more desperate search for money was bound to lead to confrontation with the Estates, in their capacity as the Bank's trustees, and on the basis of the power of the purse which was indirectly granted to the *Riksdag* in Charles XII's contribution edict of 1712.

CONTROVERSY CONCERNING TAXATION OF ASSETS OF THE SAVINGS BANK

The Estates' first test of strength against the Council was indirect, in that its representative, the Bank's Board of Governors, questioned the Council's authority to tax the funds deposited in the savings bank. An understanding of this controversy requires a short description of the Bank's organisation and standing, and of the new form of property tax introduced by Charles XII.

Bank deposits were divided into two accounts, the savings accounts and the exchange accounts. The savings bank held interest-accruing deposits with limited right of withdrawal. If a deposit was not withdrawn after one period, it was automatically renewed for another period. Upon withdrawal, the entire deposit had to be taken out. Discounting was not permitted, but savings certificates could be mortgaged to the Bank. Previously, the rate of

interest varied, but in 1701 it was set at 4 %, and 4½ % for those who wished to obtain interest on the interest.[1] The Bank statutes specifically stated that the Bank was required to accept deposits only to the extent that it could in turn reinvest the funds.

This measure was aimed at avoiding the hability of too much idle capital, which would cut into the Bank's earnings. The principle of balancing deposits with investments was not always easy to live up to, considering Sweden's undeveloped money market and the Bank's lack of knowledge of modern discounting systems which influence the balance between supply and demand for capital.[2] The Bank's earlier difficulty of lending enough funds to corporations and individuals to match its deposits disappeared with the Crown's growing need for loans during the early years of the war. Deposits increased 143 % from 1701 to 1709, enabling the Bank to grant the Crown everything it demanded; up to 1709 it had loaned the Crown over 5 800 000 daler sm. But news of the defeat at Poltava drastically altered this situation. There was a general run on the Bank, the Board of Governors could not cover all the deposits subject to withdr a wal and therefore decided that such deposits could no longer be redeemed. The result was that savings certificates became irredeemable savings certificates with fixed interest, which circulated as currency. The Bank tried its best to shore up the value of these certificates by paying interest punctually, but the general scarcity of money was too great and the interest rates too low to maintain their value at par.[3]

The Exchange bank held interest-free current accounts. Its primary importance was that its deposit receipts came to be a medium of exchange, whereby difficult cash payments could be avoided. Since the current deposits could be withdrawn on demand, the Bank statutes specified that these funds in their entirety must be kept available for the depositors, and could not be used for lending.[4]

After 1709 the Bank stopped providing new loans to the Crown with the exception of a few anticipations, i. e., short term credits against the security of income from certain crown trust estates, plus interest. When the Crown failed to meet its interest payments, the Board of Governors was forced to violate the Bank statutes' prohibition by using current deposit funds to pay interest on savings certificates, and for more anticipations for the Crown. The Governors therefore lived in fear that the current depositors would

---

[1] S. Brisman, *Den palmstruchska banken och riksens ständers bank under den karolinska tiden (Sveriges Riksbank 1668—1918: 1,* Stockholm 1918), p. 143 ff.
[2] S. Brisman, *op. cit.*, p. 211 ff.
[3] S. Brisman, *op. cit.*, p. 213 ff.
[4] S. Brisman, *op. cit.*, p. 131 f., 137.

withdraw more of their assets than the Bank could cover. The Bank's illegal transactions would be revealed and the Board of Governors held responsible for violating the statutes.[5] This was the Bank's situation in the spring of 1713, on the eve of its conflict with the Council over the taxation of the Bank's assets.

On June 4, 1712, Charles XII issued a new taxation edict from his court in Bender.[6] The new levy consisted of a contribution based on a personal tax declaration. He also called for an administrative reorganisation, and, accordingly, a new department of the Estates, the Contribution Revenue Board *(kontributionsränteri),* was formed. It would complement the work of the Revenue Board *(statskontor),* which administrated ordinary state income, by managing the extraordinary income such as the contribution.[7] It was up to the Council, on the basis of the Revenue board's accounting of the government departments, to establish the amount needed during the current year to cover "the nation's necessities". The Contribution Revenue Office, using the Council's figure, would decide what per cent of the declared property would be taken out in tax. The percentage would be the same for all degrees of wealths; the tax, therefore, would be proportional. At the same time, other extra levies such as the army transport tax and the ten per cent tariff on salaries would be discontinued.

In compliance with the King's desire, on October 14, 1712, the Bank's Board of Governors constituted itself as the *kontributionsränteri.* Councillor of the Realm Jacob Reenstierna was named by the King to head this group. Their duties were to compute the percentage of the levy, as described above, and administrate the resulting income according to the Council's directions.[8]

In principle, all real estate and personal property were subject to tax and were to be declared. The real estate of the Crown, the Church, schools and philanthropic organisations were exempt, and farmers did not need to declare their taxable units of land. Personal property meant all assets, whether or not they provided income — money, shares in shipping and enterprises as well as in goods, in Sweden and abroad.[9] Different interpretations of this last point led to conflict between the Council and the Bank's Board of Governors.

---

[5] See Chapter I, p. 20 f.
[6] Charles XII to the Council, June 4, 1712. Published in HH IX, p. 326 ff.
[7] F. Lagerroth asserts, that the King "makes use of the Estates by including them in his administration. The constitutional dualism between the King and the Estates was replaced by an administrative dualism between the King's department and an administrative body of the Estates" *(id., Den svenska monarkin inför rätta,* Lund 1972).
[8] HH IX, p. 326 ff. J. E. Almquist, *Om Kontributionsränteriet. Dess organisation och första verksamhet med särskild hänsyn till 1713 års nya beskattningsmetod* (KFÅ 1917), pp. 97, 122.
[9] HH IX, p. 329.

On March 4, 1713, Horn told the Council that the current contribution of 1 % on all taxable property could not be expected to produce as much as the last year's extraordinary taxes. Up to that point the Council did not subject bank deposits to taxation "since we have no reason, according to the contribution placards", and wrote to the King arguing that such assets be freed from taxation. But against the background of the Crown's acute financial difficulties, the Council found itself obliged to give up this generous position and, while waiting for the King's answer, subject savings deposits to the 1 % contribution. A letter was sent to the Board of Governors that same day, March 4, prescribing the 1 % tax and ordering it to work out a suitable collection system and to inform the Council how much revenue could be expected.[10]

On March 14, the Board of Governors refused to carry out these orders, pointing out several practical difficulties and explaining how such a tax would affect the Bank. It stated that it would be impossible to sort out the deposits of foreigners, which were not subject to the contribution, because deposits had been made "under unknown names". Furthermore, the savings deposits were already advanced to the King, so that the depositors would be forced to pay tax on their frozen assets. If the contribution should be taken out in deductions from the interest payments (interest was 4 % or 4½ %, which was lower than private borrowers paid), it would fall heaviest on the depositors who lived solely on their interest income. Furthermore, the Board asserted that the revenue to be gained from taxing bank deposits would be small in comparison to the irrepairable damage and loss of confidence which his Majesty the King and the State, due to the destruction of the Bank's credit and following bankruptcy, should suffer. Finally, the Board of Governors reminded the Council that it was prevented, by oath of secrecy before the Estates, from revealing what ought to remain secret. Therefore they could not reveal the estimated value of the proposed levy, since to do that they must reveal the total value of the savings deposits.[11] In addition, the Governors referred to the King in Council's own promises and guarantees. Funds deposited in savings accounts were, according to the King's assurances of 1668, confirmation of 1675, and repeated, specific guarantees of 1689 and 1700, freed from all levies and all kinds of encroachment by the State.[12] Thus, the Royal guarantees stood in conflict with a poorly formulated contribution edict. In addition, the Estates themselves had guaran-

10 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 4, 1713. *Senatens registratur,* same date.
11 *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* March 14, 1713.
12 *Ibid.* Cf. Stiernman, *Samling utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och Förordningar angående Sweriges Rikes Commerce, Politie och Oeconomie, III,* p. 661 ff., *IV,* p. 133 ff. Schmedemann, *Kongl. Stadgar, Förordningar, Bref och Resolutioner,* p. 1581 f.

teed the depositors that their deposits would be free from all forms of confiscation and fees.[13] In the face of these arguments, the Council hesitated and tabled the issue while they waited for the King's reply.

While they waited for the King's reply the Crown's funds were further depleted, causing the Council to renew its assault on the Bank deposits. In late June and early July, the Council discussed the situation. The immediate cause for the ren e wed discussions was the rumor, related by Reenstierna, that Casten Feif's wife "received a letter from her husband stating that the King did not want the bank deposits and securities to be exempted from taxation".[14] This hearsay enabled the Council to reach a decision, though only after a thorough discussion beginning with a reconsideration of the Board of Governor's March 14 letter. The discussion bordered on resignation to the facts as well as to desperation. After the Board of Governor's arguments were swept aside with a few impatient gestures, Reenstierna expressed the consensus: "it looks as if the Swedish Empire were made for the Bank but not the Bank for the Empire, so that the state is subordinated to the Bank's credit". Nils Gyllenstierna asserted that if they did not use "this expedient . . . we shall be bankrupt and have our enemies on us from all sides". Another argument held that freeing the bank deposits from the contribution would provide opportunities for criticism of those council members who had money in the Bank.[15]

On July 1, the Council sent a written order to the Board of Governors to subtract immediately 2 % from all savings deposits which did not belong to churches, schools, hospitals, the Vadstena veterans home and other philantropic organisations and deposit the proceeds in the Contribution Revenue Office's account in the Bank, explaining "we cannot make any exceptions".[16] In reply, the Board of Governors attempted to transform this withdrawal to a direct transaction between the depositors and the Crown. They suggested that the savings account creditors themselves be allowed to declare the size of their deposits and remit the assessed amount, since the Bank in its vulnerable position couldn't be weighted with further payments.[17] The Board of Governors could, by placing the responsibility of declaration on individual depositors avoid breaking its oath to refuse to give out information on the Bank's status.

---

[13] Stierman, *op. cit.*, p. 666 f.
[14] *Rådsprotokoll*, July 1, 1713. Securities here means properties mortaged by the Crown in return for loans.
[15] *Rådsprotokoll*, June 30, July 1, 1713.
[16] *Senatens registratur*, July 1, 1713. The previous 1 % contribution was raised in April to 2 % (*Senatens registratur*, April 11, 1713).
[17] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t*, July 13, 1713.

In spite of this oblique compliance the Governors did not give up the fight. On July 15, they wrote to the councillors who had not been in Stockholm, A. Horn, G. Cronhielm and H. Wachtmeister, and appealed to them to try, through letters, to convince their colleagues in Stockholm to hold fast their earlier decision to wait for the King's reply. They also made personal appeals in the Council for a postponement.[18] Their efforts were in vain. The Council repeated its decision in a letter to the Governors dated July 16, this time referring to a letter state secretary Feif had sent to Reenstierna, clarifying that the King did not want bank deposits to be excepted from the contribution.[19] The Council exhibited no understanding for the Bank's arguments and asserted that the fee did not hurt the Bank, only its creditors. Since "capital was no longer the province of the Bank" and the interest for the first half of the year had already been paid — interest being paid January 1 and July 1 — and since the Board of Governors refused to reveal how much revenue would result from the 2 % assessment, the Council stated that it would allow the Treasury and the Revenue Board to borrow up to 100.000 daler sm against the Bank's income from the Stockholm harbor tolls, which it held for security for short-term credits to the Crown, as long as the Governors refused to reveal the amount of available revenue.[20]

The Board of Governors began to resign itself to the situation. Its appeals to the Councillors out in the provinces proved fruitless, it received friendly but negative or noncommittal answers.[21] The governors hesitated to repeat their request for postponement, for fear of appearing argumentative. Vice President J. Thegner, who was likely the dominating force on the Board of Governors, gave in with the resigned view that there was nothing else to do but "let the persons in power keep consel".[22] The Board of Governor's resistance was broken.

The Council acted swiftly. On July 18, a royal proclamation was published stating that "certain and dependable information" had arrived from the King's headquarters that it was the King's will to levy a contribution on securities and savings deposits; therefore 2 % was now being deducted from such holdings. Holders of securities were directed to deposit their tax-

---

[18] *Bankens Acter* 39, Rb. *Bankofullmäktige* to Horn, July 15, 1713, *A. Horns samling*, E 4282, RA.

[19] On April 7 Feif wrote to Reenstierna from Demotica, informing him that "His Majesty finds it unfair that savings deposits and credits be excepted from the general contribution". On the letter Reenstierna noted "Stockholm, July 20; reply 25" (F 147 o, UUB).

[20] *Senatens registratur*, July 16, 1713.

[21] Wachtmeister, July 29, Cronhielm, July 29, Horn, July 31, 1713 to *bankofullmäktige, Bankens Acter 39*, Rb.

[22] *Sekreta bankoprotokoll*, August 4, 8, 1713.

payments in the exchange account in the Bank or with the revenue offices in the provinces. The levy on savings deposits would be administered by the Bank.[23]

The taxpayers were apparently extremely distressed by this levy. Eric Benzelius the younger relates that owners of bank assets were embittered and the security holders furious and dissatisfied. The indignation was directed not only at the decree, which was described as "unlawful", but also in conflict with the Council's own practices. ". . . should they apply such hard fines on the basis of a private person's letter? Should they not wait for the King himself to write? Should he not honor his subjects with a letter?".[24] At the root of this resentment there seems to lay the fear of royal abuse of power such as occurred during Charles XI's hardhanded *reduktion*, and which had given rise to widespread uncertainty in matters of ownership as well as fear of doing business with the Crown. Benzelius wrote: "the creditors are saying: is this the manner in which the King keeps his promises and assurances . . . is it true that anyone in power who proposes that the King's will is not right shall be declared disloyal?"[25] Even a member of the field headquarters was conscious of that aspect — Casten Feif, in a letter of April 1, asked Reenstierna to "hold forth the insecurity which arises from fear of confiscation of wealth, which leads many to make false property declarations. It would be beneficial for our subjects to be freed from that anxiety".[26]

With the help of the Treasury and the Revenue Board, the Council negotiated 48 041 2/3 daler sm in bills of exchange for Stralsund, and 17 223 2/3 daler sm in bills of exchange for Karlskrona from Stockholm's Great Harbor toll. This was done so hurriedly, that the bills weren't even delivered to the Contribution Revenue Office before they had to be used, whereupon the office was ordered to credit the amount. At the same time the office was asked to discuss with the Treasury board and the Revenue board how the remaining part of the 100 000 daler sm could be obtained.[27] A few weeks later, Reenstierna requested the Board of Governors, i. e., the same people who were directors of the Contribution Revenue Office, to review the case to see if they could make that sum available to the Crown. The governors found it very risky to turn to the current account deposits, when no other funds were available, so they refused. Moreover, they feared that any such payment would be interpreted as the Bank's admission of 100 000 daler sm

---

[23] *Senatens registratur*, July 18, 1713. Cf. J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
[24] *Anecdota Benzeliana*, p. 36 f. The note is dated August 14.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Feif to Reenstierna, April 1, 1713, F 147 o, UUB.
[27] *Senatens registratur*, July 18, 1713.

as a lower limit for its taxable assets; in effect their promise to keep the Bank's holdings secret would thus be broken.[28]

The Board of Governors prepared to enforce the prescribed 2 % levy on savings deposits. On September 2, the Bank commissioners were instructed to deduct from the interest premium, an amount equal to 2 % of the face value of the deposit certificates, when their owners presented them at the Bank to collect the accrued interest. This transaction would be credited to a special account, the "contribution centonals" account. But, continued the Board of Governors' instructions, "since there was no legal basis or command for allowing such deductions to accrue to the Crown, it appeared that they should go to the Bank in lieu of outstanding interest on Royal loans, not paid when the Crown requisitioned the return on the Stockholm Great Harbor toll; thus, the Bank would be paid through the above mentioned contribution". These funds would remain in the special account until the Bank's affairs with the Crown were officially settled.[29]

The Crown was now forced to obtain the balance, 34 735 1/3 daler sm, from other sources and followed the familiar path to this goal. The Director of the Stockholm Great Harbor toll, H. Ehrenpreus, finally succeeded by promising the Stockholm merchants interest on their credits of 6 % up to the day their goods were taxed at the lower rate in customs, and allowing those claims to be transferable to obtain the necessary funds. The general shortage of hard currency forced the Council to take some of the money in bills of exchange.[30]

Thus, the Council succeeded in obtaining the money it thought it had the right to demand of the Bank, by taking away from the Bank part of its security. The Board of Governors, for its part, kept the revenues from the 2 % contribution which it had been obliged to deduct from its customers' interest earnings, while it awaited the final settlement of the Crown's debts. But the Board of Governors was stalemated. The statement of the savings deposits which was demanded of the Board of Governors was, in its view, impossible to produce, since it would partially reveal the Bank's status.

One perhaps could have thought that the Council would allow the Stockholm Great Harbor toll to revert to the Bank after part of its future income had been discounted, the part which comprised the estimated amount to be levied on bank deposits. It didn't. Instead it proclaimed that the toll would not, as before, be cleared through the Bank.[31] This alarmed the Board of

---

[28] *Sekreta bankoprotokoll,* August 8, 12, 1713.
[29] *Bankoprotokoll,* September 2, 1713.
[30] *Rådet* to *kammarkollegium* and *statskontoret,* August 15, 26, 1713. *Handlingar ang. Banco-Wärket.* Rb.
[31] *Senatens registratur,* October 1, 1713.

Governors and they protested vigorously to the Council and appealed to the King in Demotica.[32] According to the Governors' estimates, 60 000 daler sm more than the negotiated 100 000 daler sm had been obtained through the toll up to October 21.[33] Revenue from the toll was now denied the Bank indefinitely. Since much of the savings interest payments were made with the income from the toll, which the Crown had consigned to the Bank as payment of interest and short term loans, it represented a heavy blow to the Bank and a threat to its continued existence.

The conflict was settled by the arrival of a letter from Charles XII, who uncompromisingly stipulated that savings deposits were taxable and that no private property of any kind could be excepted since "this would provide the opportunity for many to hide large portions of their most valuable property with the excuse that it is deposited in the Bank, in the case that such capital is excepted".[34] On October 27 the Council sent the Board of Governors an order to report the total taxable amount deducted from the interests on deposits.[35] When the Board of Governors was thus forced to break secrecy, it was revealed that only 17 718 daler sm had been subtracted from certificates presented at the Bank — a sum far short of 100 000 daler sm.[36]

Thus, the tug-of-war between the Council and the Bank's Board of Governors was decided by a royal decree. On rereading the documents which record this controversy, one finds such differing points of view and so little understanding of the opposing argument, that one is tempted to describe it as a dialogue between deaf men. Against the Governors' legal point of view, referring to royal privileges, the guarantees of the Estates and their own oath, stood the Council with extremely frail legal support — prodded by the immediate need for more money, and reinforced by second hand information concerning the wishes of the King. Against the Board of Governors' warning that the Bank was on the brink of destruction, stood the Council's warning that the whole nation was on the verge of catastrophe. Meanwhile, there is reason to question whether the choice between the Bank and the Nation was really the choice the Council faced. Herein lies another question: To what extent had the Council understood the Bank's position?

A strong belief in the Bank's solvency and possibilities runs like a red thread through the minutes of the Council's discussions, in spite of all the Governors' warnings. It is difficult to find another plausible explanation

---

[32] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* October 7, 16, 1713.
[33] *Sekreta bankoprotokoll,* October 21, 1713.
[34] Charles XII to the Council, March 27, 1713. Published in HH XI, p. 99 f.
[35] *Senatens registratur,* October 27, 1713.
[36] *Bankofullmäktige* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* November 4, 1713.

other than that the Bank's great service as creditor during the years before 1709 had created too much confidence. The true situation was unknown to the Council due to its being kept secret. Now, when the Board of Governors raised so many objections against the Crown's supposed moral right to new loans in the face of the threatening catastrophe, misgivings were entertained in the Council that the Bankers were guilty of incompetence or fraudulent dealings. In a discussion on December 29, after the *Riksdag* convened, the Council sketched a new plan of action, based on these suspicions. It included participation in the Bank's affairs through the Council's direct representation on the delegation from the Estates which would audit the Bank. In addition, it wanted the Bank's net profits to be placed at the Crown's disposal.[37]

This matter was taken up by Tessin, who recalled that the Bank statutes stated that the Bank's profits ought to be used for common weal — "with the King and Fatherland's honor and wellbeing to the public use".[38] He said he could not see "in what way any ready cash could be obtained, with less than that the Bank was able to provide loans; therefore perhaps there ought to be an audit". Tessin tried to calculate how much of the Bank's interest margin could be considered its net profit. He calculated the Bank's lending to eighty barrels of gold, and 6 % interest on that to 480 000 daler sm. He subtracted from these earnings 4½ % interest payments on the same capital, which equalled 120 000 daler sm. After subtracting 20 000 daler sm for overhead costs, 100 000 daler sm would remain and could be considered the yearly net profit.[39] "If profits during these times when the Bank is in decline are so great, what must they have been earlier? Isn't this worth investigating?". Tessin suggested that one or more of the Councillors after taking oaths of secrecy, ought to accompany the deputation from the Estates to audit the Bank.

Tessin's suggestions for representation on this deputation was voted down by the majority, in spite of Horn, who felt that the Estates could be convinced to comply by a "forthright proposal". Tessin persevered and instead suggested that they, as members of the Nobility, could go. This argument was equally unsuccessful and the objection that it would appear "that they

---

37 *Rådsprotokoll,* December 29, 1713.
38 *Sweriges Rijkes Ständers Beslut och Förordning om Banken i Stockholm. Den 22 September Åhr 1668.* Published in Brisman, *op. cit., bilagor,* p. 82 f.
39 One barrel of gold equalled 100 000 daler sm .— Tessin calculated the interest on deposits at a rate of 4 ½ %. As previously mentioned, interest payments differed — 4 % simple interest and 4 ½ % compound interest. Cf. *Kongl Maij:tz Ständers Deputerades Underrättelse öfwer några ärender, som Wexel- och Lähnebanquen för tiden angå* (June 5, 1701). Published in Brisman, *op. cit.,* bilagor, p. 142 ff.

mistrusted the Board of Governors if someone from the Council were named to the deputation and that this would awaken misgivings in the Estates" determined the majority's view. On the other hand, Tessin found it easier to get sympathy for his demand that the Bank share its supposed profits. Uncertainty concerning the size of the profit prevented the arrival at a precise figure for a reasonable percentage of the profits. Cronhielm said that he had, on an earlier occasion, spoken with the Governors about the Bank's profits and revealed Tessin's figures, whereupon they said that there were no more than 50—60 barrels of gold, and that 7 or 8 had laid idle, that the King had deposited funds which couldn't be reinvested, that the Bank "was in the process of being built up" and that "there are bankruptcies worth a few barrels of gold". Cronhielm thought it best to bill the Bank for as large a sum as the profits might be "and then they must reveal and explain their affairs". This course of action was rejected, but a decision was made that the Bank's profits accrue to the King and the common weal. A deputation from the Secret Committee, which had waited to be heard, was called in to be told the decision. Tessin also told the Committe members, that anyone who touched the cash deposits or the interests would be considered a traitor — only the profits were demanded for the King's service.[40]

A thorough investigation into the Bank's condition, which would produce a clear answer to the question of how realistic the Council's assumptions were, would be too lengthy to be contained within the framework of this thesis. It should not be necessary. There is nothing which suggests that funds accruing from yearly net interest had been built up during recent years. The author of the first part of the history of the Bank of Sweden, S. Brisman, concluded that the capital holdings existed "only on paper" with the explanation that the Bank never made any significant write-offs. Pure loss accounts had been carried forward year after year as assets. The Estates' auditors for the year 1700 would, after careful examination, have discovered that losses were greater than the capital assets.[41]

The Council's and the Board of Governors' divergent views can now, apart from the legalities involved, be seen in a different light, and the ruthless measures taken against the Bank seem a little less brutal. The Council had obviously proceeded on the assumption that the Bank was much stronger and had more reserves than was, in fact, the case. They can have viewed the action against the Bank as, if not always legal, morally defensible at a time when the existence of the country was in question. The situation in-

---

[40] *Rådsprotokoll,* December 29, 1713. SU prot., same date.
[41] Brisman, *op. cit.,* p. 130.

cluded irony, since the secrecy meant to protect the Bank and its depositors nearly caused its fall.[42]

NEGOTIATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY TAX OF 1714

The Crown's immediate need of revenue from a new extraordinary tax was one of the first problems the *Riksdag* confronted in December, 1713. Since this additional income was required at once, but would flow into the treasury intermittantly during the course of the year, there arose a new, acute need for credit. The only possible collateral, all the other possibilities being mortgaged, was the new extraordinary tax which must be levied. The underdeveloped money market in Sweden, the Council's unfamiliarity with common English and continental methods of organizing credit for the state[43] and the widespread public lack of faith in the Crown's financial dealings dating from Charles XI's *reduktion* left the Bank as the Council's only possible creditor. When the *Riksdag* convened, the Council risked becoming doubly dependent on the Estates' good will and willingness to agree to the pending extraordinary tax, and on their preparedness to act as the Crown's creditor in their capacity as head of the Bank. During the following discussion it is worthwhile keeping in mind that the risk for such dependence lay in the situation on the eve of negotiations concerning the 1714 levy.

The secret proposition contained a request for the Estates's humble consideration and advice how the project could be promoted and the proper funds procured.[44] The basis of this tax was formulated in Charles XII's taxation edict for 1713:

"If something better can be suggested, to alleviate the difficulties and further the aims of the King and to lighten the burden on his faithful subjects, each and every suggestion is warmly welcomed, and should be brought to the Royal Coun-

---

[42] Demands for participation in the Bank's profits *ad publicos usus* had been raised earlier, in the debates with the First and Second Estates during the 1686 *Riksdag*. This was during the Bank's expansion during the 1680's, but experts discouraged the demand, referring to the Bank's own need of profits in order to consolidate its position (S. Grauers, *Den svenska riksdagen,* p. 238). Claims for Council representation on the Estates' control commission seem never to have been stated earlier.

[43] The government's discounting of future tax revenues through short term loans occurred also in England, where the Bank of England was relied on to its full capacity as creditor. The English also developed another method of finance — the building of corporations, where the subscription for shares occurred via the surrender of current state obligations, whereby their value soared and the state could more easily place new loans on the market. In return, the corporations enjoyed broad rights. In France, a good deal of the Crown's credit needs were channeled through a special group of tax farmers, army suppliers and others — *les fermiers* — who performed great service by arranging the state's transactions and advancing its payments. E. Hechscher, *De europeiska staternas finanser på Karl XII:s tid* (KFÅ 1921), p. 74 ff. G. Lindeberg, *Svensk ekonomisk politik under den görtzka perioden* (Lund 1941), p. 84.

[44] The Princess' and the Council's secret proposition, December 18, 1713, R 4877, RA.

cillor, who will present them to the Government should they prove useful in improving the existing system of taxation. But in 1713 the current Edict is to be strictly followed."[45]

It was now up to the Estates to suggest a more efficient taxation system, in the case of the extraordinary tax, as the existing system had functioned poorly during the past year. The Revenue Board had painted a very dark picture. The extraordinary expenses had been so great in comparison to what the levy had procured, that nothing of it could be used to support the ordinary departments of the government, which had been obliged to help pay the extraordinary expenses; thus they declined to a so "unfortunate situation" that they had a deficit of 20 barrels of gold. The departments were obliged to acknowledge a "real deficit", and in order for the civil servants to be paid at least that part of their salary which covered the basic necessities of life — the interests which were stated for their pay were not available — the funds remaining from the preceding year had to be used to the extent that they had flowed in late.[46] The report of the Contribution Revenue Board wasn't encouraging either. The board's right to administrate the funds had been usurped when the County Governors acted independently and used the collected revenue. For that reason the Contribution Revenue Board declared that it was not responsible for deficiencies. As a result of the County Governor's arbitrary actions, and because the incoming funds were used for other purposes, the Contribution Revenue Board could not pay its assignments.[47]

The Secret Committee shouldered this problem first in its December 21 discussion. The atmosphere was doubtful and cautious. After the presentation of the Contribution Revenue Board's report, mayor Hyltén spoke for the Burghers, stating that it must first be known what was needed for defense and for equipping the fleet; only then could the methods for obtaining money be discussed.[48] The next day secretary Ehrenstrahl from the chancery appeared in the Secret Committee with the message that the Admiralty in Karlskrona had asked for immediate payment of additional funds — if the Admiralty didn't get the money at once the ships would be useless "so that it appears that the fleet has fought its last battle" — and that admiral Leijonhufvud had asked for money to equip the squadron which was scheduled to be dispatched from Stockholm to Finland in March. The Revenue Board and the Contribution Revenue Board stated that no funds

---

[45] HH IX, p. 339.
[46] *Statskontoret* to *Kungl. Maj:t,* December 18, 1713, R 4878, RA.
[47] *Kontributionsränteriet* to *Kungl. Maj:t* November 16, 1713, R 4878, RA.
[48] *SU prot.,* December 21, 1713.

were available and that they had no idea how they could be raised. Ehrenstrahl beseeched the Estates to take immediate action to raise the money. The same day the Secret Committee constituted a deputation from its members to discuss how to raise the funds and how to apply the levy. The majority, after a short discussion, proposed a return to the old methods of taxation.[49]

The question of a new method of taxation was discussed in the Secret Committee and in the separate estates. The first step would be for the separate estates to arrive at a common view.

The Nobility were most disgruntled over the 1713 Contribution. They felt themselves at a disadvantage, especially compared with the Clergy and the Burghers, and criticized the benefits they felt these estates enjoyed. They considered the Clergy to be especially favored, since they did not pay tax "in proportion to their income, which cannot be considered to be other than a salary".[50] They charged that the Burghers had compensated for their tax payments by raising prices up to 25 %, thereby passing their burden into the gentry. In addition, they criticized the tax on factories which provided little if any return on investment, as well as the tax on wastelands.[51] The revelation of the size of private fortunes in an assessment before a local director, in the presence of district — or, in the case of the city, block — residents, who would see to it that no one made a declaration that was too low, was considered to damage credit, while the "trafficing burghers" in Stockholm, for precisely these reasons, were allowed to declare their property *sub rosa,* that is, in private.[52]

It is not possible to follow the debate in the fourth estate since there are no extant minutes, but the Peasants almost immediately backed the Nobility in their fight against Charles XII's Contribution Edict. Their deputation presented requests to the Secret Committee on December 22 and January 4 for a return to the old system.[53] It is difficult to determine which parts of the new edict took the brunt of the peasants' criticism — they claimed that the peasants had "neither men nor money",[54] and that under the new system the lazy would have it easiest, while "those who work day and night to build up something for themselves will pull the whole load".[55] From the diffuse

---

49 *SU prot.*, December 22, 23, 1713.
50 C. Ribbing in *SU prot.*, December 29, 1713.
51 *SU prot.*, December 29, 1713 and January 2, 1714.
52 *SU prot.*, January 2, 1714. Cf. J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 142, G. E. Axelson, *Bidrag till kännedomen om Sveriges tillstånd på Karl XII:s tid* (Visby 1888), p. 130. Cf HH IX, p. 330.
53 *SU prot.*, December 22, 1713 and January 4, 1714.
54 *SU prot.*, December 22, 1713.
55 *Bg. P.*, December 29, 1713.

protests, it appears that they believed that they could not pay and that they viewed the property tax as a punishment for energy and hard work.

The essential resistance to a revision of the Contribution Edict came from the Clergy and the Burghers, but there was a great difference of opinion among the Burghers. There a group of mayors, of which V. Silentz from Gothenburg was the most active, resisted every change of the edict. Silentz registered his reservations in the minutes to every decision taken in that direction.[56] On the other hand, representatives of the trading interests spoke up for revision, and pointed out the merchants' difficulties in estimating foreign assets; what they owned one day could disappear the next in transit or through their debtors' bankruptcies. The city secretary of Stockholm, O. Brehmer, tried to mediate and recommended a compromise between the new and old tax forms. His suggestion failed and on January 4 the majority decided to recommend a reworking of the tax on the lines of the old system.[57]

On December 29 a majority of the Clergy voted to retain the new levy.[58] Their view was crystalized in a memo which stated that they had not found it possible to change the King's order on the basis of their own wishes — yet they dared ask if the levy on menial labor ought to be continued, if craftsmen ought to be taxed according to their income and not according to their capital, and if even hired hands, taverners, and all dependent tenants ought to be taxed.[59]

On January 4 representatives of the four estates met in the *Riddarhuset* to try to reach a common view concerning taxation. Mayor Hyltén, as spokesman for the Burghers, requested the retention of the old tax, coupled with a lowering of the towns' quota, in exchange for payment of an extra war tax. The Nobility had a purely negative attitude toward the new tax and the peasants spoke for retention of the old tax.[60]

The Clergy decided earlier to support the method decreed by the King. On the morning of January 4, the estate remained unanimous when the Archbishop asked the Clergy's representatives if they had any further remarks on the tax question before they went to the meeting of the Secret Committee. All replied that they would hold fast to the "previously written position".[61]

---

[56] *Bg. P.*, January 29, 1713. In the draft of a memorandum — the original probably never submitted — Silentz asked to be excused from all discussions and deputations that aimed to annul the King's Contribution Edict (*Göteborgs stadsarkiv, Gc:3, landsarkivet, Göteborg*).
[57] *Bg. P.*, January 4, 1714.
[58] *Pr. P.*, December 29, 1713.
[59] *Pr. P.*, December 30, 1713.
[60] *SU prot.*, January 4, 1714.
[61] *Pr. P.*, January 4, 1714.

The same day Archbishop Spegel read the Clergy's statement to the Secret Committee and promised to provide a copy to be appended to the minutes.[62] Reports concerning what happened later diverge. The remaining records are the minutes of the Secret Committee and the diary of one of the Clergy's representatives on the Secret Committee, *Lektor* A. Wibiörnsson from Linköping. According to the minutes, the *lantmarskalk* observed that the proposition had given the Estates freedom to submit reports and suggestions concerning how best to obtain funds and pointed out that the Council would not object to such suggestions.[63] According to Wibiörnsson, Spegel's speech provoked stronger protest: "the Clergy's vote by no means pleased the nobles, and they demanded that the Clergy agree with the other estates. The bishops agreed to this".[64] In the minutes, the *lantmarskalk's* reminder was followed directly by remarks from Bishops Bilberg, Iser and Lang and from Dr. L. Molin, and all expressed different motives for calling for the rejection of the King's Contribution Edict and a return to the old form of taxation. In addition, according to the minutes, Molin and Lang, in direct reply to the content of the Nobility's demand (as it was recorded by Wibiörnsson), stated that the Clergy would "conform itself" to the other estates.[65]

Judging from the minutes, this complete about face on the part of the Clergy seems to have some unannounced and appears confusing, almost beyond explanation. That it was the result of the *lantmarskalk*'s courtly reminder, that even in case of passage suggestions were welcome, is not convincing. Wibiörnsson's diary suggests that the Nobility made more forceful statements. These, rather than the remarsks recorded in the minutes, probably forced the bishops to retreat.

The Clergy's capitulation is important. Agreement was reached within the Secret Commitee to reject the King's taxation edict and revert to earlier forms. The way was open for the Estates to repudiate the King's will.

On the basis of this unity, the special group within the Secret Committee, which had been named on December 22 to study the question, was set to work preparing proposals for new taxes. These proposals would be submitted first to the Secret Committee and then to every estate *in pleno*.[66] This group submitted its proposal on January 13, but its discussions cannot be chronicled since there are no extant minutes and they were likely never kept. Conrad

---

62 *SU prot.*, January 4, 1714. Appendix 12 to the Secret Committee's minutes, but is missing there. In a volume of copies (R 2383) it is noted: "Number 12 was never delivered by the Archbishop".
63 *SU prot.*, January 4, 1714.
64 Wibiörnsson's diary, January 4, 1714.
65 *SU prot.*, January 4, 1714.
66 *SU prot.*, January 4, 1714.

Ribbing was the spokesman for the group. It submitted a draft for a petition to the Council for a change in the method of levying the contribution, and a draft of a new contribution edict. Their suggestions were discussed in the Secret Committee and within the separate estates.

These drafts cannot be found.[67] Since the texts of the proposals are not available, the objections to them must be examined to determine on which points the finished text was the product of changes and reworking.

According to the instructions of the Estates, the group fashioned its proposal for new taxes on the basis of the old forms. Nevertheless, the proposal was not only open to hard criticism from the Nobility, but also from the Burghers. The objections of the Nobility were expressed most clearly during the course of their debate on January 14;[68] the Burghers' in the text of a memo submitted January 16, to the Secret Committee.[69] The group proposed that crown mortgages, arranged after April 13, 1700, and bank assets should be taxed, but in the final proposal they are freed from tax, in agreement with the wishes of the Nobility and the Burghers. The group also suggested taxes on rental property, vehicle and hearth taxes; raising of the lesser toll, excise tax on tobacco and oven fees, but all were struck from the completed proposal at the demand of the Burghers.

Quite clearly, the Burghers, especially pushed through their objections during the appraisal of the tax proposal. But to compensate for these deletions, the Burghers were forced to suggest higher taxes on something else. In a memo the Burghers proposed that the ordinary contribution in certain cases be doubled and that, in addition, an extra emergency and war levy should be raised.[70] The Clergy gave its approval the same day,[71] and after a few days' discussion the Nobility agreed, with the condition that the ordinary tax could be paid in goods and equipment.[72] The strongest opposition came from the Peasants, who strongly protested the doubled contribution. After undergoing a few days of intensive persuasion they finally agreed to support the Burghers' position, but with the reservation that they could give no more in an emergency and war levy than eight öre daler sm.[73]

Agreement was reached. The desire to repudiate property tax and revert

---

[67] *SU prot.*, January 13, 1714. The petition and the proposal for a new contribution are numbered 19 and 20 as appendices to the Secret Committee's minutes, but are missing.
[68] *RAP*, January 14, 1714.
[69] *SU prot.*, January 16, 1714 and appendix 22.
[70] *SU prot.*, January 16, 1714.
[71] *Pr. P.*, January 16, 1714.
[72] *RAP*, January 18, 1714. The First Estates' representatives in the Secret Committee agreed on the evening of January 16 (Wibiörnsson's diary, January 16, 1714).
[73] *SU prot.*, January 19, 1714.

to the old forms of taxation now dominated the *Riksdag*. In compliance with its directive, the special group within the Secret Committee also proposed such a reversion, while the change the Burghers had suceeded in pressing lay within the framework of such a program. The general atmosphere in the Secret Committee is illustrated by Governor Sparrfelt's attempt to read his own memo concerning retention of the King's tax. "Because of din" nothing could be recorded in the minutes. When the tumult subsided he was told that "no reflections" could be offered on such a suggestion.[74]

On January 20 the Estates' Contribution plan was signed. That same day a delegation with the *lantmarskalk* at its head went to the Council of the Realm and delivered the plan. The Councillors promised to examine the proposal and maintain contact with the Committee.[75]

The Council had landed in yet another difficult situation. A few days earlier it received a letter from Charles XII with the command that the tax of 1713 with some small changes should be enforced again in 1714.[76] The Estates stood pat on their proposal. The Council was therefore faced with the choice of defying the Estates or repudiating the King.

The Estates' discussion of the tax had been accompanied by the Council's insistent and ever more desperate appeals for advances on the 1714 contribution. The Estates were by no means prepared to provide immediate advances, knowing full well that the Council had no other possibility to recoup its finances. On December 24 a delegation from the Secret Committee, which had been summoned to the Council headquarters, demanded that the money which could be obtained must be placed under "the power of a competant man", so that there would be no "chickanery", an indirect criticism of the Contribution Revenue Board and especially Reenstierna's management of funds.[77] The Secret Committee asked to see the letter which the Council had sent to the King the previous spring concerning the tax as well as the generals' plans for the next year's defense.[78] Two days later they asked for information concerning how much money was needed to equip the squadron to Finland and the report from the Revenue Board.[79] The Council, pressed by lack of funds, capitulated on every point; it suggested that Deputy County Governor von Otter manage the advances and instructed the war college to reveal their plans for defense.[80]

---

74 *Ibid.*
75 The Estates' proposal published in *RAP, 17*, p. 348 ff.
76 HH XI, pp. 165, 167.
77 Wibiörnsson's diary, January 2, 1714.
78 *SU prot.*, December 29, 1713.
79 *SU prot.*, December 31, 1713.
80 Wibiörnsson's diary, January 2, 1714.

The Council was faced with a difficult choice. To openly disobey the King's order and accept the Estates' suggestion was extremely serious. On the other hand it was risky, at least in the short run, to decide against the will of the Estates. The King was far away and a defiance of his order would not have immediate consequences. When the Council debated the matter on January 26 and 27 it was suggested that an approval of the Estates' proposal would make them more willing to advance funds and that it was better to let them "adjourn happy".[81] Tessin suggested a compromise on January 26; the first half of 1714 the Estates' plan would be followed and the King's edict the second half. Horn and Tessin convinced their colleagues to decide in accordance with this compromise. The decisive arguments in this discussion were the necessity to have the co-operation of the Estates on the tax and therefore better possibilities for credit with the Bank, and that the Estates' program would produce more revenue. The Council decided to summon a delegation from the Secret Committee on the following day, without revealing in advance what the Council had decided.[82]

The following morning the delegation met with the Council. Horn stated that they had discussed the Estates' tax proposal and were prepared to agree to them if they could insure that they could produce greater revenue, that the taxes would be paid punctually to the Crown, and that the Estates could convince wealthy merchants to advance money against securities of the contribution. The Council required an answer from the delegation that same day. They were allowed to leave the council room but were requested to return at 1 p. m. with an accounting which demonstrated that the new tax would provide more income. The delegation returned at twelve with a calculation which showed that the Estates' tax would bring in 17 ½ barrels of gold compared with 12 barrels under the 1713 contribution. To the Council's further requests, the delegation replied that the new contribution would be easier to collect, since the Estates had agreed to it. However they thought that it would be difficult for the Estates to produce immediate credit, but that it was possible, after the tax decision had been made. In addition it was intimated that the Estates would find it easier to produce credit if the Council approved their proposal. At this point the Council presented Tessin's compromise, but it gained little sympathy from the delegation. This negative attitude placed the Council in an embarassing predicament. The delegation had to leave the room three times and wait in the hall, while the Councillors attempted to reach an agreement. When the delegation was called in the

---

[81] *Rådsprotokoll,* January 26 and 27, 1714.
[82] *Rådsprotokoll,* January 26, 1714.

last time they received the Council's approval.[83] The Estates had succeeded at last in their battle against the King's levy.

The emergency and war tax which the Burghers had pushed through in exchange for a lighter tax burden still had to be adjusted. On January 29, the Secret Committee met to discuss the problem. Two members of each estate were appointed to bring about a compromise of the various points of view, and they went into another room to negotiate.[84] Meanwhile, secretary Palmskiöld arrived from the Council headquarters and requested that the Secret Committe speed up its discussions of the war levy so that posters could be printed. He reminded them that since the Peasants were to get off with 8 öre sm in war levies, and that the Estates had promised that revenue from the contribution would reach 17 ½ barrels of gold, the deficit in the Peasants' war levy must be compensated.[85]

After Palmskiöld's appearance the discussion in the Secret Committee turned to the most important question of all, peace. This discussion is referred to in the Committee's minutes and in Wibiörnsson's diary. A comparison of these sources reveals important omissions in the minutes.[86] The portions reported by Wibiörnsson but missing in the minutes are the following: they discussed that the Princess and the Council would dissolve the Estates and dismiss them before they reach a decision regarding their demands for peace. "Some of the estates were displeased, saying: if we don't obtain peace, it is futile to pay the contribution, for until we reach the goal we have set, and after using up all our resources, so that they may negotiate peace, and if that does not happen, we dare not go back to our comrades. For that matter, before the Contribution Proclamations are printed, the Estates must receive an answer concerning their request for a peace commision". Then the minutes and the diary contain the main points of two speeches, one of Bishop Svedberg, who talked about the need for peace, and one of *lagman* G. Cederhielm, who stated that they had shouldered the contribution in order to obtain peace and for that reason all should speak out unanimously. Then Wibiörnsson relates a portion omitted in the minutes: The Estates shall join behind this matter "and stand for the common good. For that matter a written statement should be prepared, that all can sign, and Cederhielm and a few others went out to prepare it".[87]

After that interlude the group comprised of two members from each

---

[83] *Rådsprotokoll,* January 27, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date. SU prot., appendix 35.
[84] *SU prot.,* January 29, 1714.
[85] *SU prot.,* January 29, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] Wibiörnsson's diary, January 29, 1714.

estate, which had endeavored to reach an agreement on the extra emergency and war tax, returned to the room. Their proposal, which was immediately approved, was that this addition, in the same fashion as the previous years' extra war tax, should be simple and that the property which was not subject to tax under the Estates' contribution plan should be used, as well as buildings and capital of all kinds. In addition, the war levy was meant to function as an extra tax on what could be considered conspicuous consumption, when "the expense and cost which for each style of life exceeds its level" would be taken into expense during the assessment. Then the tax would be raised with "as much as the rich can afford". The assessments in Stockholm would be done by representatives of all three estates and in the provinces in the districts by the highest nobility and other persons of status, who would be appointed by the County Governor, as well as four clergymen appointed by the Consistory.[88]

The next day the Estates submitted a written statement to the Council concerning peace.[89] In this statement, in which they appealed to the Council for efforts to bring the empire nearer to peace, lay something which could be interpreted as a covert threat: the Estates would find it difficult to continue discussing and reaching decisions in other matters and later adjourn, before the Secret Committee was allowed to share the Council's "opinions and thoughts" in the peace question.[90] When a delegation from the Secret Committee led by the *lantmarskalk* gained a hearing in the council, Horn tried to quiet the peace sentiments by suggesting that the situation was not so serious as they believed and that the Russians were not strong enough to attempt an invasion of Sweden. He asked the Estates to wait two more months and referred to the fact that Charles XII himself, according to what von Müllern had reported in letters, intended to take advantage of the dissention among his enemies to obtain a separate peace with one or several of them.[91] When the *lantmarskalk* reported Horn's speech in the Secret Committee, its members became agitated and from several directions came shouts that if they delayed peace, everything would fall apart, and Bishops Svedberg and Gezelius as well as some of the Burghers stood up and spoke for the necessity of immediate peace. They decided to send another delegation to the Council to discuss peace, and at the same time submit the plan for extra emergency and war levies.[92] At this point the minutes and Wibiörnsson's diary again disagree over the course of events. According to

[88] *SU prot.*, January 29, 1714. Copy nr 38, R 2383, RA.
[89] *SU prot.*, January 30, February 1, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, January 30, 1714.
[90] *SU prot.*, appendix 37.
[91] *SU prot.*, February 1, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date. Cf. Chapter V, p. 135 f.
[92] *SU prot.*, February 1, 1714.

the minutes, many members of the Secret Committee asserted that the information concerning the extra war levy ought to be delayed until the Council answered the questions of peace. Carl Gyllencreutz then argued that if they sabotaged the tax the enemy could take advantage of them. It was decided that the plan "for that reason" should be delivered by the delegation.[93] According to Wibiörnsson's diary the majority of the Secret Committee considered to let the Council know that "they could not be assured that the Emergency and War levies would be willingly and honestly submitted, if the Council did not enter into peace negotiations".[94] When the delegation was admitted to the Council and submitted the proposal, a threat of this kind was presented by one of its members, Colonel Leijonhufvud; he requested that the Princess and the Council ally themselves with the Estates and try to obtain peace "since unless this happens the levies won't be paid".[95]

Judging from the available sources it appears that the negotiation of the extraordinary tax of 1714 was closed. The Council's warrant for the year's tax was dated February 1, and the warrant for the extra emergency and war levy was dated February 9.[96]

Now it is time for a summary. The main sources for this chapter are the minutes kept in the separate estates, in the Secret Committee and in the Council. The decisions of the Estates were made by the Secret Committee; therefore the dominant source here is the minutes of the Secret Committee. The foregoing discussion has shown that these minutes, when compared with the private diary of a committee member, contain important gaps. Incomplete minutes are less valuable as a source, but when these gaps can be filled in from other sources, and one presents the hypothesis that the omissions were purposeful, the minutes gain a new value. The gaps bear witness to a tendency. One can constitute what is missing in the minutes: the Nobility's demands of January 4, that the Clergy concur with the other estates in the repudiation of the 1713 tax form, which probably caused the Clergy's about face and the resulting unity among the estates. This was the basis for the later repudiation of the King's tax. Furthermore the so called conspiracy statement of January 29 was omitted, according to which the Estates would join "for the common good" to obtain peace, as well as the text of this statement which should have been written down and meant to be signed by all the members. Finally the minutes do not contain the threat made by the majority of the Committee on February 1, that payment of the extra war tax depended on the Council's co-operation in obtaining peace.

[93] *Ibid.*
[94] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 1, 1714.
[95] *Rådsprotokoll,* February 1, 1714.
[96] *Senatens registratur,* February 1, 9, 1714. Cf. J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.,* p. 157.

If one adheres to the thesis, that the gaps are not just coincidental, it is not surprising that just these passages are missing. They can therefore be used to support the assumption, that whoever was responsible for the final draft of the Secret Committee's minutes understood that the Committee had gone or risked going beyond its consitutional limits. All this is insufficient evidence on which to base any such conclusions, but it is worth bearing in mind during subsequent collation of the minutes and the diary in other business of the Estates. In this connection it ought to be mentioned that the drafts of the minutes are missing, that the complete final draft was written as a single project by one individual, and that the last recorded meeting is June 18, 1714.[97]

The other important source is the Council's minutes. As has been pointed out in another context, in the matter of the decision which entailed exceeding the authority of the Council, the decisive discussions most likely did not take place during the regular meetings and therefore were not recorded in the minutes. Since the Council directly defied the King in the matter of taxation, this reservation applies here. Still the Council's minutes are valuable because they illustrate how the Council would defend its actions. The tendency this reveals is of interest.

The point of departure is clear: the formulation of the Council's minutes should be determined by the fear that, in the future, the King should subpoena the minutes. The middle-aged Councillors had experienced the *kassationsakt* of 1689 and certainly remembered the lesson. Can one still, with this in mind, discover why the Council repudiated the King? If one examines the minutes for the decisive days, January 26 and 27, one finds the discussions are characterized by indecision and irresolution scarcely complimentary to the participants and therefore probably accurate. If one will systematize the arguments for collusion with the Estates and repudiation of the King one can list the most frequent: it was pointed out that the Council already exceeded its authority by adding another war tax the previous year against the King's orders; that agreement would make the Estates more willing to provide credit through the Bank; that they would be more willing to pay and that one would create a more favorable psychological climate if later in the year another war tax was needed. If one weighs the available facts against these arguments, one finds that that which weighs heaviest and what must have seemed most pressing in a situation of acute financial emergency is the willingness of the Estates to provide new and

[97] The editor of the Clergy's *Riksdag* minutes, 1713—1714, L. Thanner, pointed in his introduction to the many documents that are missing from the Clergy's archive and remarked: "One could suspect the reason why they disappeared: The Riksdag's dismissal due to the order of the absoulute monarch".

immediate credits through the Bank. Such a source of pressure, whether or not it was used, was available to the Estates through their power of the purse and their position as the Crown's only creditor, as well as on the double function of the tax as revenue and security. It does not seem impossible, that this might have been the deciding factor. It might also seem strange that such cries of distress concerning the Bank's catastrophic situation, which cropped up earlier, did not reach the Council by January.

In this connection another question can be asked. Had the Council decided to give in even earlier and was its resistance a sham? J. E. Almquist has suggested that perhaps the Council was bluffing, since on January 6 the Contribution Revenue Board had been ordered to phase out its activities.[98] The rechanneling of the revenue from the extraordinary taxes to the Revenue Board was an administrative reform and does not necessarily imply a pending tax reform. Still, there is reason to note a statement made in Council by Horn on January 27: "as we have taken the responsibility to repudiate the King, we must now, while we have a chance, use the good feelings of the Estates".[99] Can he have meant that through resistance draw out strong pressure from the Estates on the Council, and that the capitulation which was thought to be its result, could be named later as precedent for other, broader decisions? Another remarkable circumstance is that the Council, with the exception of Reenstierna who was isolated, never tested or even questioned the reliability of the calculations which showed that the Estates' contribution program would produce significantly more income than an assessment according to the existing method. The calculations were simply accepted.

The new tax had not only grown from the contact between the Council and the Estates. Prior to this the program had been drawn out of negotiations first within the separate estates, and then, on the basis of a subcommittee's proposal, in the Secret Committee where the interests of the several estates confronted each other. The interests which were best served were those of the Nobility and the Burghers, and especially the commercial interests within the Third Estate. The sources provide insufficient grounds for attempts to define what was really decisive in the agreement.[100] It is clear, however, that it was the crass economic interests of the Estates which were at stake. No ideal motives were expressed in the discussions, and no building of factions on such issues can be discerned.

---

98 J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
99 *Rådsprotokoll*, January 27, 1714.
100 J. E. Almquist thought he could establish that the Nobility's successful negotiations "must simply" be an expression for "the spiritual superiority" and greater power the First Estate enjoyed (J. E. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 159).

Chapter V Opposition from the Estates over the Problem of Obtaining Peace

CONTINUED OFFERS FOR MEDIATION

On December 14, the *Riksdag* formally convened. During the first weeks its attention was centered on peace, which overshadowed all other questions. The foreign policy background of the deliberations of the Council and the Estates can be described as follows.

In early summer, England tried to convince Sweden to enter peace negotiations with the Allies. Once Sweden began negotiating, England would try to obtain a *status quo* truce. At the same time the English applied pressure to the Allies coaxing them to the negotiating table with the threat that further conquests at Sweden's expense could lead to Englands intervention in the war — according to the terms of the Anglo-Swedish defense pact. The English governments expressed attitude toward fulfillment of the obligations of the pact differed depending on to whom they were directed, i.e. the Swedes were threatened that they would receive no support, the Allies with the intimation of English intervention. All this for the same purpose, namely: that a cease fire and peace negotiations begin, and that the situation on the fronts be fixed before the scales tipped further in the favor of the Allies.[1]

The requests for military support which Gyllenborg made in London earlier in the year were fruitless. On September 1, he delivered a new request to the English government, in which he asked that the Queen make a formal declaration promising not to neglect her treaty obligations to Sweden. Any English démarche in the cause of peace would thus gain additional weight and the Allies would be more willing to negotiate. The Allies' arrogance and unwillingness to negotiate was, according to Gyllenborg, based on the conviction that England did not intend to fulfill her treaty obligations. England's silence on that point would confirm their assumptions and therefore work against England's cause.[2] The new state secretary, W. Bromley, — Bolingbroke had recently left his charge of nordic affairs — answered September 16, that § 7 of the pertinent Anglo-Swedish defense pact stated that before the question of military support would apply, the agressor must be

---

[1] J. J. Murray in *George I, The Baltic and the Whig split of 1717* (London 1969), p. 76 ff. has presented English politics vis-à-vis Sweden in 1713. He has built his thesis on far fewer sources than has been used in this thesis.
[2] Gyllenborg to Bolingbroke, September 1, 1713.

requested by the treaty partners to solve the conflict through negotiation. Bromley assured that the Queen would do all that was required of her, if only the King of Sweden would first declare himself ready and willing to discuss peace, and that it was the Queen's hope that the Council, in the next post from the King should find itself *"authorisé de prendre les mesures convenables pour sauver leur Patrie"*.[3] On October 26 Bromley went a step further and informed Gyllenborg that the Queen intended to issue the requested declaration, if she had received previous assurance that Sweden would accept English mediation.[4]

The Swedish efforts to convince the Tory government to fulfill its obligations under the defense pact followed as has been demonstrated, two lines. During the spring and summer Gyllenborg asked for direct military action under the terms of § 8 of the pact. This help would take the form of an English squadron in the Baltic. Since the risk of the Allies attacking Sweden diminshed as winter approached, Gyllenborg changed his emphasis to § 7, requesting a public and formal English declaration that the Queen would fulfill her treaty pledge to secure Sweden's Empire through force of arms.[5] There is little doubt that such a binding declaration would have represented a diplomatic success for the Swedes in that it would have influenced the Allies. The only requirement for obtaining this was, Sweden's assurance that it was prepared to negotiate peace and accept English mediattion. Therefore, the Council's decision to give Vellingk the power to begin peace negotiations with the Allies and to seek English mediation, appears to be a direct answer to Bromley's offer of October 26. This was conceivable, given the timetable of events, but the connection cannot be demonstrated. The Council was first informed of Bromleys offer of September 16 at their meeting on November 7,[6] and Jackson received corresponding information concerning the English government's position on November 8.[7] It was likely that on this basis Jackson told Tessin that "the Queen is more concerned about Sweden and the working out of peace than before".[8] However, it cannot be shown that news of Bromley's conditional promise of an English declaration had reached the Council before the November 28, decision. In the Council discussions and in letters to Charles XII, there are no references to such promises, which, if they had been known, would have been men-

---

3 Bromley to Gyllenborg, September 16, 1713.
4 Bromley to Gyllenborg, October 26, 1713.
5 Cf. *Traktatsamlingen, England 14 A*, RA.
6 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 7, 1713.
7 Jackson to Bromley, November 9, 1713, SP 95/20, PRO. See also Bromley to Jackson, September 15, 1713, SP 104/154, PRO.
8 *Rådsprotokoll*, November 20, 1713.

tioned since one would thus have greater possibility to tell the King that the coming negotiations were a sham.

While the English tried to establish mediation, paralleling and, to some extent, competing efforts were made toward the same end. These originated at the court of Emperor Charles VI, where interference from the English and French was feared — France had guaranteed Sweden's German territories in the Peace of Westphalia, though it was presently tied down in war with the Empire — because it was likely to thwart the Emperor's interests. At the same time, the Allies believed that France and England were partial to Sweden, and therefore questioned their suitability as mediators. The Emperor took advantage of this mistrust and in July 1713, invited the warring parties to a congress in Braunschweig. He received immediate support from Denmark and Russia.[9] The English were overtly displeased with the Emperor's tactics.[10] They registered little interest in the plans for the congress[11] and proposed that the negotiations be held in The Hague.[12] At the time, autumn 1713, it ought to have been clear to all the interested parties that Charles XII would not send a delegation. Instead, many expected an independent peace initiative from the Swedish Council of the Realm.[13]

THE ESTATES' DECISION TO WRITE TO THE KING

Soon after the *Riksdag* convened, demands were presented from the Estates for opening peace negotiations. On December 16, Bishop David Lund, in his opening speech in behalf of the Clergy, asserted that the spiritual estates' "foremost consideration" was peace and hoped that the "Fatherland be rescued from the misfortune into which it had sunk".[14] On December 22, the Clergy proposed to the Secret Committee that a delegation be sent to the King to ask for Peace. The Committee adopted the proposal and it was decided that the Estates would present the King with a written resumé of the serious situation and ask him to save his empire through an acceptable peace. The *lantmarskalk* and two representatives from each estate went to the Council to discuss the delegation. The Council heard the Secret Committee's decision, expressed its agreement, and asked the delegation to return in two days, when there would be something urgent to discuss.[15] This was Horn's suggestion. His purpose was to read to the delegation the

---

[9] H. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 296 ff.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 300.
[11] Gyllenborg to *Kungl. Maj:t*, October 6, 1713.
[12] Gyllenborg to the Council, November 28, 1713.
[13] H. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
[14] *Bg P*, December 16, 1713.
[15] *SU prot.*, December 22, 1713.

council minutes and the most important letters concerning peace.[16] When the delegation returned to the Council chambers on December 24, they were informed by Horn that the Princess and the Council found it necessary, in order to strengthen the defense to try to prevent an enemy attack through "peace talks" and that the councillors now intended to inform the delegation as to what had been done. Horn said that they would have preferred to make this decision after the *Riksdag* had convened, but they thought it necessary to inform Swedish diplomats in good time, so that their answers would arrive before the *Riksdag* adiourned. The correspondence with the Princess concerning her perticipation in the Council, the Council's letters to the King on September 24, and October 14 and 30, and the Minutes of the Council discussions concerning peace were then read to the delegation, which was requested to keep this information secret.[17] On December 29, the Council agreed that this information could be shared with the entire Secret Committee. At the same time, Höpken informed the reassembled delegation of the contents of the King's letter of July 8, to Engelbrechten, and that England, after a reshuffling of the Tory cabinet, had "expressed itself more favorably toward Sweden, that it would maintain its guarantees".[18]

Horn summoned the residents of England, France and Holland on December 30 to inform them of the Council's charge and authority conferred on Vellingk. He asserted that the Council had acted by means of an order, which Horn did not describe more closely, that the King had conferred on the Council that, in an emergency when there was no time to obtain the King's directive, it could act on its own and the King would ratify the agreements later.[19] The residents were asked to inform their governments, but otherwise keep the matter secret until the Council received Vellingk's answer.[20] Horn explained the need for secrecy by saying that the Council was unsure of Vellingk's attitude toward his orders, because they lacked the King's approval.[21] If Vellingk should refuse to obey, the Council intended to continue to work along the proposed lines.[22] To Jackson's direct question, Horn answered that the Council would not send a representative to the congress in Braunschweig, and expressed the hope that the Queen considered it a meeting arranged by Sweden's enemies.[23]

---

16 *Rådsprotokoll,* December 22, 1713.
17 *Rådsprotokoll* and *SU Prot.,* December 24, 1713.
18 *SU prot.,* December 29, 1713.
19 Jackson to Bromley, January 2, 1714, Rumpf to Heinsius, January 13 (N. S.), 1714. Campredon to Torcy, January 12 (N. S.), 1714.
20 *Ibid.*
21 Jackson to Bromley, January 2, 1714.
22 Rumpf to Heinsius, January 13 (N. S.), 1714.
23 Jackson to Bromley, January 2, 1714.

Meanwhile, a group in the Secret Committee had worked out the draft of a message to Charles XII. It asserted that the Estates, under the leadership of Her Royal Highness and the Council intended to seek peace through the mediation of neutral states. City secretary Brehmer read the draft to the Council on December 31. Afterwards, Horn said that the Princess and the Council thought that it was a good draft and that they had no objections.[24]

How has earlier research described the policy that the Council, under Horn's leadership, pursued in its exchange with the Estates on the peace question during these weeks? Grauers interpreted the Council's charge to Vellingk to begin peace negotiations as a means to still the Estates' demands for peace and to secure the Council's control of the situation. "It was not coincidental, that he (Horn) pressed for the decision concerning peace before the *Riksdag* convened. He wanted to anticipate the Estates' action, and it was not difficult to discern from their desire for peace what course they would choose. When the Council had control of the situation it could prevent the Estates from taking risks. All the demands for peace could be stilled with a simple reference to the Council's action".[25] Rosén agrees with this much of Grauers' interpretation, but presents a different view as to why the Council chose to reveal its action when when it did. According to Rosén, during the early stages they had, by no means, intended to short circuit the *Riksdag's* demands for peace. He refers to the secret proposition, in which the Council revealed that it had found it suitable to allow the Swedish emissaries to consult Vellingk in matters where they lacked instructions from the King, but kept secret the decisive act, the Council's empowering of Vellingk to negotiate peace. "If the purpose of this warrant were to stop the Estates' demands for peace it ought to have been mentioned here. Instead, the Council kept it secret while waiting for the Estates appeal. Not until after such an appeal was presented did they dare to act."[26] According to Rosén, the Council's silence was meant to provoke the Estates to suggest peace negotiations, which later could be used to pressure Charles XII to guarantee their own relationship to him as well as to foreign powers. When the Estates' request was submitted, the *Riksdag* would be confronted with a *fait accompli* in the form of negotiations already begun. The *Riksdag's* only task would be to support and authorise the Council's measures.[27]

A survey of the sources provides the following information. On December

---

[24] *Rådsprotokoll* and *SU prot.*, December 31, 1713.
[25] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 217.
[26] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 73 f.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

22, the deputation from the Secret Committee reported to the Council in its chambers the Estates' decision to write to the King concerning peace and to send a mission to Demotika.[28] Very likely the minutes of the Council were read in the Chancery on December 23, for the purpose of extracting the portions which dealt with peace and making them available to the deputation. The following day they were read for the delegation. The excerpts covered the discussions leading up to the decision to commision Vellingk as well as the decision itself.[29] By December 24, the Secret Committee deputation knew of the Council's peace initiative, and by December 29, the entire Committee was allowed to be informed.[30] The Estates' letter to the King was read to the Council first on December 31,[31] then again on January 22,[32] and then was subjected to further revision by the Secret Committee.[33] The letter was probably sent at the beginning of March.

Thus, the Council had not kept its peace initiative secret while waiting for the Estates' request. Instead, immediately after it was informed that the Estates intended to write to the King, the Council decided to inform the Secret Committee's deputation about their peace action and Vellingk's commission.[34] It seems therefore more likely that they hoped for a display of solidarity with their peace initiative in the Estates' letter to the King.

But why was Vellingk's commission not mentioned in the secret proposition? Perhaps it was for tactical reasons: it might have been considered necessary to keep the decision secret to avoid counteracting the desire for peace which was expected to produce a statement from the Estates. It is questionable if this policy of secrecy was successful or if there was enough discretion among the councillors, since as early as December 16, Jackson, before he was officially informed, could report that the Council had sent a courier to Vellingk telling him to enter negotiations with the Allies should the Estates present such sharp demands for peace that the Council could not refuse to comply.[35] Apart from the problem of the Council's motives vis-à-vis the Estates and how Jackson got his information, this must have been the impression that the Council wanted to give Jackson. The need to seek support and legitimacy in an authorization from the Estates was likely rooted in the Council's relationship to the King as well as to foreign powers.

Now it is time to reconsider the motives behind Horn's conduct during

---

28 *Rådsprotokoll* and *SU prot.*, December 22, 1713.
29 *Rådsprotokoll* and *SU prot.*, December 24, 1713.
30 *Rådsprotokoll*, December 29, 1713.
31 *Rådsprotokoll*, December 31, 1713.
32 *Rådsprotokoll* and *SU prot.*, January 22, 1714.
33 Wibiörnsson's diary, January 8, February 8, 1714.
34 *Rådsprotokoll*, December 24, 29, 31, 1713. *SU prot.*, December 24, 29, 1713.
35 Jackson to Bromley, December 16, 1713.

December and the first half of January in the light of Campredon's theory of conspiracy. At the end of December, Horn found himself in a situation for which there is strong evidence that he tried to provoke: the Estates had convened and had declared that they were preparing a peace demand to the King. If Campredon's interpretation is correct, Horn ought to have tried to use this strong desire for peace and solicit authorization from the Estates to legitimize his efforts as peace negotiator for Sweden and perhaps bring about his break with the King. He did not act. Why?

An attempt to answer this question can begin with two interpretations already present. Grauers has asserted that Horn did not act because he did not conspire. The commissioning of Vellingk would be a double diversion against the Allies to gain time and possibly to obtain a truce; it was also against the Estates, i.e. to calm the enthusiasm for peace and to hinder them from taking any risks.[36] Grauers clearly perceived that Horn found himself in a situation that opened up new possibilities. "Had he really planned to conspire, he would, under those circumstances, scarcely have needed to exert himself to get what he might have wanted. His performance in such a situation is as good a demonstration as any, as to his good intentions".[37] Rosén says that Horn wanted the Estates to demand peace negotiations. These demands could be used to pressure the King and also serve as a cover. That Horn did not act should have been due to the fact that he did not want to give up his position of leadership. Once in motion, the agitation for peace would have prevented the Estates from being bought off with the announcement of Vellingk's commission. "The opposition tried harder to gain control of the the Council's negotiations. The Estates wanted *joint* negotiations with the Council. Horn didn't think he could manage this situation". Therefore, around the beginning of February 1714, he informed the Estates that Charles XII, according to a letter from von Müllern, had opened peace talks . . . What was involved was not to stop the demands for peace talks but to cut off a development that the Council did not want. The King was played against the Estates in the same way that the Estates had earlier been played against the King".[38] Horn thus should have contained himself, not out of duty to the King, but to thwart the Estates' demands to share leadership in seeking peace. But the Estates made no such specific demands until individual voices were raised in the Secret Committee on January 18 and presented under the Committee's aegis in the Council four days later. During

---

[36] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 217.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 222 f.
[38] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 74 f.

the preceding weeks nothing that, according to Rosén, might have held back Horn can be discerned. The question, therefore, remains unanswered.

But there can be two possible answers. Grauers' interpretation may be nearest the truth. If Horn had in fact not engaged in conspiracy, there is nothing mysterious about his conduct. This is likely, since the evidence earlier gathered against him can just as easily be interpreted as expressions of a clandestine effort to obstruct Charles XII:s war policies. But Horn's passiveness during these weeks certainly comprises no evidence. In a private letter of December 10, 1713 to Charles XII he wrote that the salvation and preservation of the realm were in perish if the King did not hurry home.[39] Such a letter does not demonstrate Horn's guilt or innocence, since in the light of the charges against him Horn might have thought it advantageous to demonstrate his loyalty in a letter. Another explanation is possible. Suppose there was a conspiracy. In that case, Horn would be expected to act *because* he had earlier engaged in conspiracy. But it must be remembered that the situation at the new year had changed since the preceding spring. One of the intrinsic, perhaps decisive factors which influenced Horn's conduct must have been his notion of the King's position and ability to act. On the heels of the reports of the *kalabalik* at Bender, drifted rumors that the Turks had imprisoned the King; that he had lost his senses; and that he was dead or would never return. Undependable and slow communications with Turkey kept the Council in a state of uncertainty and at the mercy of rumors and second hand information.[40] Finally, dependable information had arrived from Turkey to dispel the wildest rumors, at least in more responsible circles. During the first months of 1714 new rumors reached the Swedish capital. These asserted that Charles XII was able to return home, or that he was on his way and could be expected any day. Jackson reported on December 23, that Governor General Meijerfelt, upon his departure from Stralsund, had received a message from Casten Feif, which claimed that the King had decided to make a hasty departure from Turkey and return home. Since Feif didn't describe the King's itinerary, the men in Stockholm, who held positions of responsibility suspected that the message was meant to serve as a warning not to exceed their office.[41] A few weeks later the rumors came in floods, originating from apparently independent sources. On January 9, Jackson reported that "it is writ from all places" that the King had left Turkey and was on his way home via Poland.[42] Campredon reported on January 12 (N. S.), though with reservations, the

[39] Horn to Charles XII, December 10, 1713.
[40] A. Fryxell, *op. cit.*, XXV, p. 145 f. J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 7 f.
[41] Jackson to Bromley, December 23, 1713.
[42] Jackson to Bromley, January 9, 1714.

rumor that the King was on his way via Italy or, according to another source, via France.[43] The rumors also attributed to Charles XII a greater interest in peace, and held that he had sent Captain Peter Feif to France on a peace mission.[44] On January 22, Horn asked Campredon if he had received information from Torcy to confirm Feif's mission, but couldn't get any information in that respect.[45] Furthermore, Fribach, Vellingk's secretary, was said to have received a letter containing the information that Charles XII, incognito and followed by a small entourage, had left Demotica and that no one knew which route he had taken.[46] Colonel Schlippenbach, who had just returned from captivity in Denmark, told the Nobility on March 1, that the Danes had received similar information.[47] On March 6, Jackson reported his recent receipt of private letters, dated Demotica, December 23, which described the King's hasty departure, and that Casten Feif had informed him that the King undoubtedly would have left Turkey by the time Jackson received Feif's letter.[48] Campredon reported on March 14 (N. S.), that Charles XII had left Demotica, but that no one knew where he had gone.[49]

On February 4, Meijerfelts secretary Löwenheim appeared before the Secret Committee.[50] Löwenheim had been sent as courier to the King[51] and started on his return journey November 12.[52] He reported that the King had recovered from the sickness which had for a long time kept him bedridden, that he planned to return, and that the Emperor had promised him an escort through the Empire.[53] A month later, on March 5, the Secret Committee members, via a letter from Liewen, at the King's headquarters, received information that the King remained bedridden.[54] This information was supported by von Müllern's reports.[55] This gave rise to suspicions that Löwenheim had given them false information and they wondered whether he should be "excused without being punished". In his own defense, Löwenheim asserted "that he had been convinced to do it by others".[56]

It is curious that rumors of the King's pending journey home, or that he

---

43 Campredon to Torcy, January 12 (N. S.), 1714, Corr. pol. Suede/130.
44 Campredon to Pontchartrain, February 21 (N. S.), 1714, Aff. Étr. B I:1071, AN.
45 Campredon to Torcy, February 3 (N. S.), 1714.
46 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 2, 1714.
47 RAP, March 1, 1714.
48 Jackson to Bromley, March 6, 1714.
49 Campredon to Pontchartrain, March 14 (N. S.), 1714, Aff. Éftr. B I:1071, AN.
50 *SU prot.* and Wibiörnsson's diary, February 4, 1714.
51 *von Kochens dagbok*, p. 230.
52 *SU prot.*, February 4, 1714.
53 *SU prot.* and Wibiörnsson's diary, February 4, 1714.
54 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 5, 1714.
55 *Ibid.*, March 9, 1714.
56 *Ibid.* These discussions are not recorded in the Secret Committee's minutes.

was already on his way, were so legion, when his health ought to have rendered them unlikely. Rumors that the King intended to return to Sweden can, of course, have been well founded even though he was ill, but all the hearsay that the journey had been started, along with precise information concerning his route and stopping off places are even more surprising. The striking thing about these last rumors was that they had for some months been frequent, culminating in January and February. How had they come about and why just then? Were the rumors spread purposely? It is true that domestic unrest, uncertainty, and the generally charged atmosphere provided perfect conditions for spontaneous birth of rumors. But there is another side of the coin. In an unstable atmosphere of this kind, the public is susceptible and easily influenced by those who would spread rumors. Then there is the question of the King's health. The King undoubtedly had been seriously ill for a time,[57] but what is important here is when and to what extent he recovered. If someone were spreading rumors about the King's imminent journey home, then reports that he remained an invalid would affect the credibility of such rumors. On the other hand, his assertions would gain support if news of the King's recovery and good health arrived. Here, then, could have been a motive for a person or a group of people to convince Löwenheim to present false information to the Secret Committee. This rumor-mongering would, of course, not be an end in itself. A motive would be needed and this points to the King or his entourage. The rumor-mongering, if there was in fact such an effort, could have been the King's own idea or that of his closest advisers. The purpose would have been to keep the Estates and the Council in a state of uncertainty and insecurity so that they couldn't dare to take measures designed to question the sovereignty of the King or oppose his politics. It would be a war of nerves. As stated earlier, some of the people in Stockholm had interpreted the situation in this way.[58] Yet, postulations that the King himself originated the hearsay, enjoy only tenuous support from the available evidence. Too little is known about how his illness affected his mental capacities, though some informants report that he was gripped by periodic depression.[59] The hypothesis therefore leans on partially uncertain premises. On the other hand, the theory that there

---

[57] Fabrice to Görtz, December 28 (N. S.), 1713, *Anecdotes*, p. 292: "Le Roi de Suède a été fort malade, mais non pas à l'agonie". In December the King's health reportedly restored, but his illness had been so serious that it fed rumors that he was dead. (von Müllern to Vellingk, December 20, 1713). See also R. Hatton, *Charles XII* (London 1968), p. 386.

[58] Jackson to Bromley, December 23, 1713.

[59] Jackson to Bromley, January 9, 1714: according to information in private letters from persons in the King's entourage, "now and then ... a violent and dangerous Melancholy".

was a connection between Löwenheim's false information and the spreading of rumors supports the hypothesis as the only rational explanation. But just the same, it remains a hypothesis.

In summary, the following can be said. During the first five weeks of the *Riksdag,* Campredon's theory of conspiracy seems less believable than it was earlier, since Horn did not take the expected initiative — although his failure to act does not disprove the theory. Whether or not he conspired, the rumors of the King's return were enough to cause him to wait for the situation to clear.

THE ESTATES' DECLARATION OF JANUARY 22, 1714

In late January and early February, 1714, the question of peace regained the attention of the Council and the Estates. The speech of A. Hyltén, the speaker of the Burghers, in the Secret Committee on January 18, initated renewed activity in the Estates. Hyltén suggested that the Council be requested "to meet with the Estates to study closely" and discuss peace. It could be foreseen that the allies as well as the mediators would refuse to enter the negotiations the Council would try to initiate, because the Council did not have permission from its King to take such a step. Hyltén said that it was the Burgher's suggestion that Sweden submit to mediation from the Emperor, France, England and Holland and that the Princess, along with the Council and the Estates should unite and pledge each other allegiance. This suggestion won general approval in the Secret Committee; the only opponent was Archbishop Spegel who was overruled by his peers.[60] In the joint discussion with the Council which the Secret Committee had arranged for January 22, the *lantmarskalk* gave a short speech expressing the desire of the Estates for peace and their willingness to co-operate, followed by a reading of Hylténs January 18 speech. The members of the Secret Committee who were present adopted Hylténs proposal in the name of the Committee. The Council asked for a few days to consider the proposal before rendering a reply.[61] This, then, is the picture that emerges from the sources which have hitherto been used to relate this episode.[62] The Secret Committee's minutes are the only source used, since the January 22 joint

---

[60] *SU prot.,* January 18, 1714.
[61] *SU prot.,* January 22, 1714.
[62] Compare S. Grauers, *Några bidrag,* p. 218 f., which records the *lantmarskalk's* speech in Council, but does not note the Secret Committee's backing of Hyltén's suggestions on the same occasion. See also Bowallius, *op. cit.,* p. 255 f., and Malmström,, *op. cit.,* p. 21.

meeting was not recorded in the Council minutes. The Council's minutes should be compared with Wibiörnsson's Riksdag diary. The latter presents a different picture of the events, and differs on decisive points from the official record.

The events of January 18 in the Secret Committee are a case in point. Both sources agree in their report of Hyltén's speech, and both record the reading of an aide-mémoire which had been submitted by C. De Geer and which, among other things, demanded immediate peace negotiations despite the King's prohibition. The minutes and the diary refer to a Committee decision made two days later, on January 20, to present a proposal concerning peace negotiations to the Council at the joint meeting on January 22, and that a special deputation of four representatives from each Estate would develop the proposal. According to Wibiörnsson, — but not the minutes — the basis for the proposal was to be Hylténs speech and De Geers aide-mémoire.[63]

The twelve deputies on January 21 presented their proposal to the Secret Committee. The minutes and Wibiörnsson report sharply divergent versions of the content of this proposal. Wibiörnson reports that the deputies' proposal overstepped their guidelines: the Estates were ready "to take and seriously carry through on a peace initiative" and demanded that the Council promote this with the King; they would request to see the letters which had just arrived from the King, and ask the Council to seek the mediation of the neutral states. If the question should arise "who shall conclude peace, the answer shall be that the Estates will do it, under the direction of Her Royal Highness and the Royal Council". Foreign residents in Stockholm would be asked to inform their governments concerning this. It would also be made clear that "hereafter we can't consider the King's letters, since he can not judge the danger we face; otherwise we risk losing everything". The leader of the deputation asked, when the proposal was read, if everyone agreed with its contents. He invited anyone who did not to stand and present his criticism. Wibiörnsson notes no criticism, not even any discussion. He continues with other matters, so it seems likely that the

---

63 *SU prot.*, January 18, 20, 1714, and Wibiörnsson's diary for the same dates. According to the minutes the following persons were chosen to work out the proposal: Lillienstedt, Bonde, Banér and Leijonhufvud from the Nobility; Hyltén, Brehmer, Clerck and Auréen from the Burghers; Spegel, Lang, Svedberg and Molin from the Clergy. Spegel's participation — as one the originators, as set out in Wibiörnsson's diary — is surprising, but many examples show that Spegel lacked authority in this Riksdag and gave in easily. De Geer's aide-mémoire is appendix 27 of the Secret Committee minutes. A copy exists in K 207, RA, on which Princess Ulrika Eleonora noted that it was put together by Mårten Lilliehöök but was submitted under De Geer's name. She dated this copy January 21, 1714.

proposal was approved. This is however a conclusion *e silentio*. Adoption is thus more likely than revision or rejection.[64]

The minutes provide a completely different version. Here, the deputies never presented a proposal on January 21 but a memo for the *lantmarskalk*. It is a copy of appendix 31 of the Secret Committee's minutes. The original has not been found.[65] According to this memo the Estates would meet "together with the councillors to discuss how their Empire should be saved through peace". Concerning "the method, how peace would be obtained" the Estates wanted information on the changes that "ought to have entered the strategy since the councillors last communicated with us". The Estates would neither deprive the Council of their loyal advice nor abstain from committing themselves to a plan which could preserve and protect the King and the Fatherland".[66] The minutes register no comments, approval or rejection of the proposal. In addition, they report that "those points regarding peace which will be proposed tomorrow" were read. The formulation suggests approval from the entire Secret Committee was unnecessary in this case. It seems likely, judging from the minutes and the diary, that the deputies' statement, whatever form it took, was approved without changes.

The inconsistencies continue in the descriptions of the January 22 joint meeting. All the members of the Secret Committee participated, with exception of a handfull absentees noted in the minutes. Wibiörnsson's name is not listed among the absentees, so his report in this case is, as well that of an eyewitness.[67] Both sources refer to the *lantmarskalk's* short introductory remarks, which according to the minutes, were based on the contents of the previously mentioned memo for the *lantmarskalk*. Then, according to the minutes, the speech Hylén had given on January 18, was read as a proposal from the Burghers. The members of the Secret Committee declared themselves in agreement with Hylténs speech, adopting it as the Committee's own proposal.[68] But according to Wibiörnsson, Hyltén, answering a direct question from Horn whether the Estates had compiled their own proposal, reported "what they had done, and the proposal which the Estates had agreed upon was read". The tense Wibiörnsson uses — the

---

[64] Wibiörnsson's diary, January 21, 1714. In direct connection to the last point Wibiörnsson wrote: "that everybody present should sign the letter, and he who refused should be expulsed" — obviously a comment from the deputation, meant to circulate in the Secret Committee. It is not clear if the deputies had suggested a written proposal to the Council or if they referred to the December 22, letter from the Estates to Charles XII, which had not yet been sent.

[65] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 219, note 1, mistakenly refers to appendix 31 as "Hyltén's memo". According to the minutes it was read by Hyltén to the Secret Committee, but as an answer to the *lantmarskalk's* request to hear from the deputation *(SU prot.*, January 21, 1714).

Estates were agreed on the proposal before Hyltén began his summary — can be interpreted two ways: either Hyltén read his original speech from January 18, which had then won approval in the Secret Committee — an interpretation which agrees with the account in the minutes — or he read the stronger and more pointed proposal which the deputation, according to Wibiörnsson, had presented to the Secret Committee the day before and which was most likely approved. The choice between these two possibilities ought to be decided by Wibiörnsson's following sentence: "Then another proposal was read with almost the same content L d G". L d G probably refers to Louis De Geer, which likely was meant to be Carl De Geer. It was his aide-mémoire of January 18, which was read.[69] This provides a point of departure. De Geers aide-mémoire presents three proposals: neutral sequester of the North German fortresses, reinforcement of the defences during the peace talks which had by then become indispensable and ignoring of the King's prohibition against peace negotiations.[70] The last point concurs with a point in the deputation's proposal as it is reported in Wibiörnsson's diary.[71] On the other hand, the points in De Geer's aide-mémoire are not echoed in Hyltén's January 18, speech. Had they concurred, it would have been unnecessary to use both as bases for the deputies' work on January 20. Furthermore, if the deputies' proposal, which the Secret Committee agreed on the preceeding day had not been read, this ought to have been noted by Wibiörnsson with some expression of surprise. If the analysis is kept within the framework of Wibiörnsson's text, the sharper statement from the deputies rather than Hyltén's speech of January 18, most likely was read to the Council.

A diagrammatic summary of the two versions can be drawn in the following manner. "The deputies' proposal of January 21" in the diary corresponds to "the deputies mémo to the lantmarskalk, January 21" in the minutes. They present differing programs for action.

---

66 *SU prot.*, appendix 31.
67 *SU prot.*, January 22, 1714.
68 *Ibid.*
69 On the copy of De Geer's aide-mémoire which is found in K 207, RA, Ulrika Eleonora noted that the original was submitted by Carl De Geer, who was a member of the Secret Committee. The Secret Committee's minutes for January 18 reveal that the person who presented it was a member of the Secret Committee. Therefore, Carl De Geer must have been the source. The initial "L" must have been a mistake or a misunderstanding on the part of Wibiörnsson. The Committee's minutes confirm that the aide-mémoire was read at the January 22, joint meeting.
70 *SU prot.*, appendix 27.
71 "Of almost the same content" is an expression, which overemphasizes the similiarities between the aide-mémoire and the deputies' proposal which, in fact, exist. It can most likely be explained that Wibiörnsson understood this point to be the main one in the proposal.



Is it important whether the Secret Committee presented the Deputies' proposal or Hyltén's speech of January 18 as its unanimous view in the joint meeting? The answer is an unqualified yes. The deputies' proposal contains two points which do not appear in Hyltén's speech: a) that the Estates themselves, under the direction of the Princess and the Council would conclude peace, and b) no consideration shall be given to the King's orders. These two points decisively sharpen the Estates' demand. If these were presented at the joint meeting on January 22, it must have been in the interest of the Secret Committee to later on be able to conceal its actions, considering the risks for a possible royal subpoena of the minutes at a later date. The sources can be examined in the light of a working hypothesis that this was what had happened.

Referring to the diagram of Wibiörnsson's version, it can be noted that point "a" above emerged during the deputies' discussion, but that we cannot trace its origin. Point "b", on the other hand, originated in De Geer's aide-mémoire. What do the minutes reveal about its fate? There is a glaring discrepancy between the diary and the minutes. Wibiörnsson asserts that on January 18, the Estates approved the aide-mémoire.[72] According to the minutes De Geer was thanked for his "honest intention".[73] Wibiörnsson states that the deputies were instructed to work out their proposal on the basis of Hyltén's speech and De Geer's aide-mémoire. The minutes mention no directive for the deputies.[74] The result of the deputies' work is described differently, even in its form, in the divergent sources. The deputies' statement

[72] Wibiörnsson's diary, January 18, 1714.
[73] *SU prot.*, same date.
[74] *SU prot.*, January 20, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.

in the minutes, the so called memo to the *lantmarskalk*, looks so diluted and harmless, that one wonders why it was necessary to appoint a special group to produce such a document. In concurrence with the hypothesis, then, all statements that the Estates backed De Geer's proposal to repudiate the King were struck from the January 18—22 minutes.

The origins of the deputies' proposal that the Estates themselves conclude peace has, as has been noted, not been traced. In that connection a statement by Conrad Ribbing recorded in the minutes, after the deputies reported back to the Committee on January 21, is worth examination. According to Ribbing, the Estates would propose to the Council that the foreign residents in Stockholm be summoned to a meeting with the Estates.[75] The statement is completely incoherent if it is not transferred to the deputies' proposal as reported by Wibiörnsson. Ribbing's statement seems to be a suggestion, whereby the Estates in the introductory phase could fulfill its role as peacemaker.

Another curious point is worth pointing out. No council minutes seem to have been taken in the joint meeting. This departs from tradition, since minutes were apparently kept of all the Council meetings in the Council chambers with representatives of the Secret Committee. The meeting began at 9 a.m.[76] No Council minutes for the morning of January 22 have been found. This will be discussed later.

In respect of this point, all criticism has been raised against the minutes. Since the criticism is built on Wibiörnsson's diary, the diary must also be subjected to scrutiny. His version cannot be accepted without a closer study. However, the only source through which his version can be controlled is the Secret Committee minutes. Furthermore, little is known about his personal views and values.[77] The tone is factual, almost impersonal, hiding his personality and contributions. The minutes bear witness that he was a fairly passive Committee member. His diary does not give the impression that it was written for others; rather, it seems to be notes taken for his own

---

[75] *SU prot.*, January 21, 1714.
[76] Wibiörnsson's diary, January, 1714.
[77] Wibiörnsson's only statement recorded in the minutes is in *Pr. P.*, February 4, 1714, when that estate voted on peace after the Council, via the Secret Committee, told the Clergy about von Müllern's information regarding the King's plans for a separate peace. Wibiörsson stated that since the King himself was inclined toward peace, the question should not be pressed, but if the need became too great, the authority requested by the Council could be conferred. For this eventuality a number of *Riksdag* representatives should remain in the capital, because the formulation of the warrant did not cover all the possibilities. The statement shows that Wibiörnsson was a careful man, or that he lacked views of his own, that he was perhaps dependent, or possibly that he was a diplomat, since he agreed with almost all the views as they were presented.

use. If the minutes are correct and Wibiörnsson's diary wrong, there remains no motive to explain Wibiörnsson's untruths. It is essential to note that the differences between the diary and the minutes are thorough and consistent — reports and statements which supported the Estates' pretention to conclude a peace and contained a repudiation of the King's order seem to be eliminated from the minutes. The holes and corrections lead to the logical necessity of a completely different version from the January 22 diary of the decisive joint meeting. The Estates' interest in altering the minutes is obvious. On the other hand, there is no likely or reasonable motive for Wibiörnsson to modify an account in the notebook obviously meant for his private use, for the purpose of falsifying the events of the joint meeting. Especially when these notes would compromise his reputation, or put him under suspicion for taking part in traitorous discussions if the diary fell into unfriendly hands.

The hypothesis that the minutes were deliberately censored is confirmed in the following observations: an extensive comparison of both sources shows a consistent, fairly good agreement in fact, which makes the discrepancies quite glaring. The discrepancies can be interpreted as the expression of a tendency. This tendency is consistent and it can explain the differences in the recording of the Committee's treatment of the tax questions in January, discussed earlier,[78] and it can explain the differences just discussed. There must have been a clear interest from persons within the Estates to be able to produce an account that diverges from the diary in this manner. Wibiörnsson, had no corresponding motive to doctor his account. The minutes also contain a statement from January 21, which cannot be understood until Wibiörnsson's account is read.

The motives of those responsible for the minutes must be viewed against the background of the *kassationsakt* of 1689. The censure in that case arose from what was interpreted as usurpation of royal power and statements against the King's authority and integrity. The Estates' demand which, according to Wibiörnsson, was presented to the Council on January 22, had called for two measures where one would constitute the usurpation by the Estates of royal power — the right to conclude peace — and the other, the ignoring of the King's command — a direct setting aside of the oath of loyalty. The Secret Committee would, following the consequences of the above evidence and Hasselberg's interpretation of Charles XI's approval of the Estates' *kassationsakt* of 1689, have been guilty of leze-majesty. Because they failed to repudiate the Estates' request and instead asked for

---

[78] See Chapter IV, p. 115 f.

time to consider it, the Council also compromised itself. They presumptuously had the same interest as the Estates: to destroy all evidence of the January 22 discussion. That could explain the missing Council minutes.[79] Such an obliteration was easier to effect in the Council, where it sufficed to destroy a minute. It was more complicated in the Estates, here it involved the excision of certain statements from the text of the minutes. The only object of comparison is the diary, since there are no notes or first draft of the minutes. The discrepancies between the minutes and the diary can at last be explained. Those responsible for the minutes, in the face of risks of a future subpoena of minutes, and following censure, may have destroyed evidence by censoring all traitorous statements.

The most important result of this investigation is that the evidence seems to indicate that on January 22 the Estates asked for immediate peace talks with neutral mediators and that they — with the support of the Princess and the Council and against the King's expressed prohibition — conclude peace. They seem to have demonstrated pretentions to wider prerogatives than they had previously enjoyed. The Council did not immediately reject these claims, but instead asked for time to consider them.

THE INDECISION OF THE PEACE PROPONENTS

On January 30, the *lantmarskalk* and a deputation from the Secret Committee went to the castle to remind the Council of its promise to reply to the Committee's January 22, report.[80] When the deputies had gathered in an ante-room, they asked to speak with Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna, who consequently appeared. The *lantmarkskalk* reminded them of the Committee's "will for peace". Horn and Gyllenstierna answered that "the Council thought that the Estates had not agreed on the demand at the time of the meeting, since it was presented as one man's vote".[81] They returned to the Council chambers and briefly discussed the matter with the Princess and their colleagues and then asked the deputation to enter and present the Estates' point of view. Then von Müllern's letter to Horn of November 2, in

---

[79] Furthermore, at the January 22, joint meeting three Councillors took the occasion to ask privately a Secret Committee representative that the Estates' demand and De Geer's aide-mémoire be combined in a draft to the Council. (*SU prot.*, January 22, 1714, Wibiörnsson's diary, same date).

[80] *SU prot.*, January 30, 1714. The reminder was formulated in a special memorandum (SU prot., appendix 37), in which the Council, in a roundabout way was told that the Estates would find it difficult to continue their work "and come to a decision" before clear information about peace was received. See also Chapter IV, p. 114.

[81] This statement could refer to the Estates' demand or De Geer's aide-mémoire. In the first case it must be a — possibly intended — misunderstanding, since the minutes as well as Wibiörnsson (January 22) clearly present the three highest estates' expression of unity to the Council regarding the proposal — however it appeared.

which he wrote that the King intended to split his foes by concluding a separate peace, was read to the deputation. Horn asserted that it was the King's right to conclude peace and that he could obtain better terms for Sweden. Then he read alound a letter which the Council had written to Vellingk with the order that Vellingk seek naval support from France, England and Holland before spring. The *lantmarskalk* promised to inform the Secret Committee what he had heard, and then the deputation departed.[82]

It is interesting, as evidence of the atmosphere within the Secret Committee, to compare the *lantmarskalk*'s report of this meeting as given in the minutes, with Wibiörnsson's notation of the same incident. Though Wibiörnsson was not a part of the deputation, he recorded the *lantmarskalk*'s report on February 1, to the Secret Committee. The keeper of the minutes expunged from the *lantmarskalk*'s speech the entire discussion including all arguments raised against Horn's appeal to wait for the King to negotiate. According to Wibiörnsson's diary, Horn was hard pressed by the deputies. He was told that "Count Welling made no difference" and asked how the Council could commission Vellingk to negotiate peace and yet do nothing. They pointed out that von Müllern's letter wasn't the King's command, rather a report which did not demonstrate any desire for peace and only the King's intention to desert Stanislaus. Horn argued that the situation wasn't as dangerous as they thought and asked the Estates to wait two more months until General Liewen reported from the King's headquarters. Finally, Horn asked the Estates to "write up a statement and leave it with the Council. Especially as . . . it is certain, that the King has resolved to split his enemies and make Peace".[83]

On January 22, a request for a written statement had been made by three Councillors. This request was now repeated, and Horn's attempt to dispel doubts by saying that such a report would not be disloyal since the King himself had started to work for peace, seemed to draw at least one desirable reaction. A member of the Committee, C. Gyllencreutz, recommended such a step with reference to Horn's request. Gyllencreutz suggested, that in this written statement to the Council, they were to ask that the government conclude peace "in the event the King failed, or was in some way preven-

---

[82] *SU prot.*, February 1, 1714. The account of that meeting with the Council appears in the minutes for February 1. The minutes record the *lantmarskalk*'s account of what happened the day before.

[83] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 1, 1714. Another example of the correction of the Secret Committee's minutes is Sparrfelt's speech the same day, with the proposal that Secret Committee demand peace from the government, but then leave the matter in their hands "since it would be *juris regii etcetera*, but no one agreed" (Wibiörnsson, February 1). The minutes report no reaction to this speech (*SU prot.*, February 1).

ted from doing it".[84] At Per Ribbing's suggestion, an aide-mémoire was put together with the demand that the Secret Committee see the most recently arrived letters from the King, in order to establish a more solid basis before wording the requested statement. The aide-mémoire was composed by the *lantmarskalk*, who with a delegation returned to the castle the same day to deliver it to Horn. Horn replied that no additional letters had arrived from the King, apart from a communication concerning a petition from the Peasantry in Södermanland.[85] Horn added that "the peace efforts the Estates wish to make would prove very difficult for them. Our enemies will not join in any negotiations with them before the crown of Sweden is declared vacant". He promised that the Secret Committee could come to the castle on February 3, and hear the contents of the letters, and at the same time have the opportunity to confer with the Council about peace. When the delegation returned from its meeting with Horn, a special deputation was formed to draft the statement that Horn requested. Yet it seemed suitable to wait for the pending February 3, meeting between the Council and the Secret Committee. Another deputation was named to put together "some good arguments", with which to meet the Council's expected opposition on that occasion.[86]

When the Secret Committee convened at the *Riddarhus* the morning of February 3, the *lantmarskalk* asked the deputation to summarize their proposed arguments. The deputies' spokesman Conrad Ribbing reported that discussions had been dominated by "great confusion". Various arguments and opinions presented were contradictory. Different people had asserted that there was no great danger, as had been claimed; that the King had already begun to seek peace; that the Estates ought not to upset his efforts, and that, if the Council would only guarantee that the dangers was not so great and imminent, they ought to be patient.[87]

Then, according to Wibiörnsson, "the report that the deputies had put together to read to the Council, and which all had approved" was read. This report is obviously appendix 39 to the Secret Committee's minutes. It is presented in the name of the Estates and seems to be constructed to meet Council arguments. It appears as if the Committee's minutes were meant to avoid the Estates' responsibility for this report. "On the table in the

---

[84] *SU prot.*, February 1, 1714.
[85] Horn referred to the King's letter to the Council, from Timurtasch, October 26, 1713. The King wrote about the petition from the peasants in Södermanland, which the County Governor had submitted to the Council and which the government in its letter to the King had presented as representative of public opinion. For the Council's action on this petition, see Chapter II, p. 48 f.
[86] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 1, 1714.
[87] *Ibid.*, February 3, 1714.

Riddarhus lay an unsigned aide-mémoire, which members of the Estates looked at to see what it contained. They then said that it was all that the former earlier requested; thus, the Estates were satisfied that it be read, and appended to the records as number 39". It is unclear to whom the expression "the former" refers — perhaps the Council? The sentence seems to have been recorded out of context.[88] The report in question asked that the Councillors "both as Councillors of the Realm and Members of the Estates" enter a joint discussion with the Estates to find the means to clear the way for favorable peace. When the meeting opened, the Estates would "reveal their ideas on the subject". It was pointed out that the King has no power without land and subjects. The Estates felt sure the councillors would agree, since History provided no example of a people not trying to defend their land through peace when they could no longer wage war because their Christian King had been away in a heathen land for four years. Finally, it pointed out that the Council itself, through approval of the Estates' letter to the King on December 22, had already approved that the Estates, under the direction of the Council and with mediation from neutral states, seek peace.[89]

Then the entire Secret Committee marched to the castle and presented themselves before the Council. Wibiörnsson, who was present, describes the meeting. Horn opened the discussion and asked the wishes of the Committee. He was answered by a reading of the Committee's written report. Horn then observed that it would be desirable if no minutes were taken of the discussion. At that point the councillors withdrew and consulted with one another. When they returned, Horn said that they wanted to confer with the Secret Committee "not as Royal Councillors, but as members of the Nobility and the Estates General. We are now Estates and your secretary shall serve as our secretary and read the letters". Then Horn said that some letters from the King had arrived the day before. A letter from von Müllern to Horn of November 2, was read that reported that Charles XII was considering deserting Stanislaus, and this would hasten peace. Horn assured that this letter ought to be thought of as if "the King himself had written it". Then the King's letter concerning the petition from the Peasantry of Södermanland was read. After that, Horn asserted that the Estates ought to be satisfied with what had been reported. Then Conrad Ribbing took the floor and announced that the Estates were inclined to leave with the Council a paper, which would comply with the Council's request that they "must have free hands to make peace etc.", schould the necessity become too great or

[88] *SU prot.*, February 3, 1714, appendix 39. A copy of appendix 39 in R 2383, RA.
[89] *Ibid.*

should the King "find himself in a position" that he can not help himself or his subjects. The Council approved this. According to the report Archbishop Spegel gave to the clergy the following day, this suggestion came from the Council.[90] The Secret Committee's spokesman said that they intended to inform their colleagues in general terms, and then send a deputation to the Council to inform them of their view. Horn then adjourned the meeting and everybody left the room. While they were leaving Horn said: "We shall leave, not as Councillors of the Realm, but as members of the Estates".[91]

When the Secret Committee returned to the *Riddarhus* they discussed whether what was said at the castle ought to be interpreted as a sentence or as *res proposita ad deliberandum*. It was agreed that the Committee members would inform their colleagues in the estates what had happened at the castle. This information would support the decisions made within the separate estates. To insure that the reports were uniform, a committee would prepare a form that would be used to remind one another what took place.[92] The separate estates were assembled the following day to receive the information — though the Council's strangely formalized fiction was passed over — and it was also announced that the Council would allow members of the Estates other than those who were representatives in the Secret Committee to read the King's and von Müllern's letters.[93]

It becomes more apparent that the schism and uncertainty which had begun to show within the special deputation that prepared the arguments for the February 3 meeting, began to spread throughout the Estates and became stronger, damaging their ability to act. It is clear from the discussions, that it was von Müllern's information that the King had deserted Stanislaus and

---

[90] *Pr. P.*, February 4. "At last the Council suggested to the assembled estates, that they prepare a statement in moderate terms, thereby allowing Her Royal Highness and the Council to initiate peace, if

1. His Majesty were sick or otherwise hindered.
2. Foreign potentates were unresponsive or delayed or were odious to the King and ourselves.
3. The enemy had pressed close enough to cut us off from our neighbors.
4. If our defenses became weak and ineffective. So that the empire could not be described as other than a besieged, defenseless and starving city which is compelled to accept the terms which are the most favorable. Yet, the King's sovereignty must always be recognized."

Otherwise, Spegel reported only the main points in the letters Horn had allowed to be read aloud. See also Wibiörnsson's diary, February 4: "The Archbishop's account of what had taken place in the Council was read, and everybody thought that it agreed with what had been said".

[91] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 3, 1714. Wibiörnsson mistakenly says that von Müllerns letter to Horn was dated November 22 (Ibid.)

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *RAP*, February 4, 1714. *Bg. P.* and *Pr. P.*, same date.

prepared a separate peace which drove the wedge through the solid front. Grauers cleverly discerned a new factor which "in a surprisingly short time disintegrated the peace party".[94] Löwenheim's report to the Secret Committe on February 4, concerning the King's preparations to return home must have had a similar effect. At the same time it ought to be pointed out that the turning point occured when the contents of von Müllern's letter reached the Estates general. When the same information reached the Secret Committee on January 30, the result was simply that they argued against the Council in a sharper tone. It appears that the Secret Committee at times followed a more radical policy than their colleagues in the Estates.

On February 6, the decision of the Nobility was read in the Secret Committee. They expressed the opinion that the question of peace negotiations ought to be shelved in anticipation of word from the King. Therefore, the Estates ought to remain gathered in Stockholm[95] — the question of furloughs seems to have been broached in some connection. Hyltén was asked about the Burgher's decision, but he reported that they were unable to agree.[96] On February 4, the Burghers had a long discussion but couldn't reach a decision,[97] and Hyltén reported to the Secret Committee that the Burghers were very anxious and unable to decide.[98] By February 8, they managed to reach an agreement and reported to the Secret Committee: with regard to von Müllern's annoncement that the King intended to negotiate peace and that it was rumored that new information from the King was expected, the Estates ought to wait and see "what effect His Majesty's own endeavors for peace could have" and remain in Stockholm for a few weeks.[99] On February 4, the Clergy cast their votes.[100] They were divided — some wanted to send a mission to the Tsar, others relied on the Council and wanted to stay in Stockholm.[101] When Spegel reported the Clergy's decision to the Secret Committee on Feruary 8, he could only announce that he Clergy had expressed "several views". He was corrected by Leijonhufvud, who pointed out that Spegel provided a report but had not reported a decision, and by Dr L Molin, who, with the support of the Clergy present, stated that the Clergy "had conformed" with the decisions of the other estates.[102] The Peasants' views were not solicited. A deputation from the

---

[94] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 221.
[95] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 6, 1714. *SU prot.*, same date.
[96] *Ibid.*
[97] *Bg. P.*, February 4, 1714.
[98] Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.
[99] *SU prot.*, February 8, 1714, appendix 44. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.
[100] *Pr. P.*, February 4, 1714.
[101] *Ibid.*, February 6, 1714.
[102] *SU prot.*, February 8, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.

Fourth Estate was summoned to the Secret Committee on February 8, and informed of the decisions of the other estates. The *lantmarskalk* said that they didn't wish to bypass the Peasants and therefore would inform them of the decisions made concerning peace. The peasants thanked him for the information and declared themselves willing to remain in the capital a few weeks.[103] All were thus finally agreed that the Estates would wait to see how the situation developed.

A review of the events of these weeks reveals an element that reappears several times: the Council's demand for a declaration from the Estates, that would free the government's hands to conclude peace if the situation became very critical. This again brings to light Campredon's theory of conspiracy: the granting of a commission that would legitimize the Council's actions at home and abroad, and would provide a valid excuse for their actions to the King, ought to have been the major reason for Horn's calling a joint meeting. To set the stage Horn would have secretly fanned the flames of domestic uneasiness and strengthened the already strong desire for peace.[104]

Horn's conduct during these weeks might seem to be contradictory. He tried to subdue the enthusiasm for peace which he himself had tried to stimulate. At the same time he tried to use the same enthusiasm to convince the Estates to free the Council's hands by issuing a commission. But these contradictions are transparent in the light of Campredon's theory of conspiracy, which can be used as a working hypothesis: the purpose was to force the Estates to supply this commission while at the same time hold back all attempts by the Estates to take part in the Council's peace politics. The Estates' only role would be to provide the legal platform. Therefore, the peace proponents mustn't be strong enough or desperate enough to act on their own. Of course, the commission was meant to be used only in an acute crisis, but it was up to the Council to decide when the crisis had arrived. Possibly, Horn's opposition to the suggestions of the peace proponents could be interpreted as an attempt to create a double alibi before the King, whose return had become more likely. Horn bided his time and watched the development. Compredon's, theory of conspiracy, less plausible in December, is more believable in the light of the events of late January and early February. It cannot as yet be refuted.

How important this question of a commission was for all parties is illustrated by the fact that Horn's and the Council's eagerness to receive the

---

[103] *Ibid.*

[104] It is surprising that earlier research did not observe the Council's request for a commission (cf. S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 221 ff., *id.*, *Riksdagen under den karolinska tiden*, p. 136 ff., J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 74 ff., A. Fryxell, *op. cit.*, XXV, p. 191 ff., R. M. Bowallius, *op. cit.*, p. 259 ff.).

commission corresponded to the doubt and hesitation on the part of the Estates to grant it. They seem to have grasped the risks of such an act, whereby they would also lose control of the question of peace. The Estates' ability to influence the course of events lay in the Council's dependence on them. The Estates' proposal of a joint Council-Estates acting in solidarity was met by counter proposals that placed the ultimate responsibility on the Estates. At the same time it took away their power to intervene in the developing events.

Chapter VI The Question of the Regency 1713–1714

The Council had succeeded in fending off the first attempts by the Estates to control the peace issue but soon the peace proponents in the Estates would organize new efforts. These efforts resulted in the proposal that Princess Ulrika Eleonora assume full royal powers of government during Charles XII's continued sojourn in Turkey, a proposal which would revive old claims concerning the rights and authority of the Estates as well as the dynastic problem.

1. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSION

Proposals for the Princess' elevation to Regent during the King's absence were connected with dynastic problems since there was widespread uncertainty of who stood next in line to the throne. When he died Charles XI left two daughters in addition to his son. The oldest, Hedvig Sofia in 1698 married Duke Fredrik IV of Holstein-Gottorp. Duke Fredrik fell in the Battle of Klissow in 1702 and Hedvig Sofia died in Stockholm in 1708. Their only son Karl Fredrik was born in 1700 and was being brought up at the Swedish court. Charles XI's younger daughter, Princess Ulrika Eleonora, was twenty-six and unmarried. According to the Norrköping succession Charter of 1604, to which Charles XI referred in his will, the oldest, unmarried princess would ascend the throne if there were no male heirs. It was widely believed that Princess Ulrika Eleonora, according to that agreement, was next in line for succession. But there was also a group who supported young Duke Karl Fredrik as the rightful successor to the throne.

It is difficult to identify the persons in Sweden who comprised the circle of supporters for the Duke's claims. His great grandmother, the dowager Queen Hedvig Eleonora, tried her best to help his cause, and was reported to have protested bitterly when Princess Ulrika Eleonora took the seat in Council which, according to Hedvig Eleonora, belonged to the Duke as heir to the throne. Only with great difficulty could she be convinced to accept the new arrangement.[1] According to the French resident the Duke was

[1] Campredon to Torcy, November 15 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Rumpf to Heinsius, November 15 (N. S.), 1713.

brought up in an environment which corresponded very little with Sweden's real interests, and was surrounded with German companions.[2]

It is essential to try to ascertain Horn's position regarding these dynastic controversies. In 1707, Duchess Hedvig Sofia asked him to serve as the young Duke's governor, and he still held that reponsibility. The appointment made him an employee of Holstein and provided good income. The influence he as governor could have wielded over the young Duke meant, to quote Grauers, "unforseen possibilities during the succession crisis."[3] Earliest evidence regarding Horn's position concerning the succession places him in the Holstein camp. From this connection arose the first charges that Horn conspired to take power after the succession. The source of this information is Campredon, who recounted it in a letter, May 18 (N. S.) 1713 to his government. According to Campredon, the background and conditions for Horn's intrigues had been the uncertainty which prevailed concerning the King's person after reports of the Kalabalik in Bender reached Sweden. The Councillors had apparantly assumed that the King would never return, and looked foreward to a renascence of the Council's power under a new Regency government.[4] Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna were said to have prepared a coup. The latter was to take command over troops *"pour etre maitre des estats, s'ils sont une fois assemblées et mettre le jeume Duc d'Holstein sur le trone de Suéde"*. To insure their success they had reportedly tried to lure Princess Ulrika Eleonora from the capital. The Princess, whether or not she sensed the danger, had refused and answered that it would be time to leave the field to the Russians first when the threat to Stockholm became pressing. In order to destroy the Princess' claim to the throne, Campredon asserted that Horn enlisted two of her confidentes for his cause, and got them to try to interest her in a marriage with a Prince of Saxony.[5] Later, Campredon again refers to the question and asserts that negotiations concerning the Princess' marriage with Prince Fredrik of Hessen are carried on *"sous les auspices de M. le Comte Horn"* and points out that the Duke occasionally visits Horn at his country residence. All this should tie together.[6]

During the spring of 1713, according to Campredon, the Princess' participation in the Council was mentioned for the first time. Campredon states

---

[2] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[3] S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn*, I, p. 241. See also S. Grauers, *De politiska relationerna mellan Arvid Bernhard Horn och Georg Heinrich von Görtz åren 1707—1719* (KFÅ 1963), p. 160 f., 164 ff.
[4] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Campredon to Torcy, August 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.

that Charles XII, in a private letter to his sister the Princess, had declared her *"regente du royaume pendant son absence"*.[7] This information cannot be substantiated. Such a letter has not been found. That Charles XII, on the strength of a personal letter to his sister and without informing the Council, should have named her regent and empowered her to assume responsibility for governing the realm, seems unlikely. On April 30 (N. S.) Campredon reported that Horn had a long conference with the Princess on the subject. She was surprised and dismayed, and thus unable to make a decision.[8] Campredon charges that Horn, even in those circumstances, continued to scheme; Horn insinuated to the Princess that when the King returned she would have cause to regret a decision *"que ce Prince ne luy conseilloit apparament que pour eprouver ses sentimens a son egard". Horn was said to have tried* to frighten her by talking about the miserable condition of the realm, which would not lighten the burden of responsibility.[9]

It is thus unlikely that Charles XII (as Campredon claimed) had named Ulrika Eleonora regent in a private letter. But did Campredon snatch this claim from thin air? It appears that the King, even before the Princess took her seat in the Council, had entertained such thoughts. Feif wrote to one of the Princess' loyal servants, Court Councillor Barck from Demotica on August 30, 1714: "I cannot describe how grateful His Majesty is that Her Royal Highness was willing to take the pains to attend the Council. His Majesty wishes that this had taken place long ago, and it was not on my own initiative that I made such a suggestion through Chamberlain von Düben, but I had to do it the way I did."[10] This letter consequently demonstrates that the King may have considered supporting the Princess taking place in the council, or her becoming Regent before she took the seat and that Feif had mentioned it through von Düben.

On December 14, 1712, Chamberlain A. von Düben left the King's headquarters in Bender to journey to Sweden.[11] There are two pieces of evidence that he had with him an oral message from Feif. Ulrika Elenora wrote to Feif on April 13, 1713, that she had received an oral message via von Düben and had asked Barck to answer it for her.[12] In a letter of April 15 Barck answered the question von Düben posed, but the original form of

---

[7] Campredon to Torcy, April 30 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[10] Feif to Barck, August 30, 1714, published in E. G. Geijer, *Acta et litterae ad historiam Suecanam* (Uppsala 1817 ff.), p. 91 f.
[11] *von Kochens dagbok,* December 14, 1712. Cf. Fabrice to von Görtz, November 26, December 5 (N. S.), 1712, published in Fabrice, *Anecdotes,* p. 154.
[12] Ulrika Eleonora to Feif, April 13, 1713, D 841:1, KB.

this question remains unknown.[13] It must have offended the Princess. Feif assured Barck via a letter on June 13, that his "thought is not and never has been to suggest the slightest thing which would be contrary to the love which Her Royal Highness has for His Majesty. God forbid, but since his Majesty once spoke about it, I had thought to find out if it would displease Her Highness if it should be discussed". Feif thought that von Düben had hatched the mission or had misunderstood what he meant.[14]

A pattern emerges when this information is coupled with Campredon's assertions. Campredon's April 30 (N. S.) report of a private letter from the King to the Princess seems to derive from the message von Düben brought with him. Campredon's description of the Princess' reaction to this message — *"sa surprise fut aussi grande que sa tristesse"*[15] is supported by Feif's assurance that he would never suggest anything that could contravene the Princess' love for her brother and King. The Princess appears to have been truly surprised and dismayed. She has also found reason to consult Horn in the matter; according to Campredon she was determined to reject the proposal, and this determination was supported by Horn.[16] Feif's assurance that he did not wish to offend and that he spoke of the matter with the King, is explained through the assumption that von Düben asked if the Princess was prepared to take a place in Council as Regent, but phrased the question so that she thought it had originated with Feif and that the King did not suggest it, or had been completely ignorant of it. Ulrika Eleonora could have, in such a case, taken von Düben's question as a provocation, orchestrated by Holstein's supporters and thus, meant to compromise her before the King, thereby endangering her right of succession. Consequently, her interview with Horn could be viewed as an attempt to appraise him and test her suspicions. Campredon attests to the fact that such suspicions took hold of her when he during the autumn witnessed her efforts to avoid everything that could offend her brother.[17] She might have feared new attempts of the same kind.

Why, then, had Charles XII, if he lay behind all this, chosen to send oral messages to the Princess via Feif and von Düben? Would it not have been easier to write a letter? The answer is entangled with the fact that even he had to beware of the Holstein's faction. To take the initiative and openly name his sister the Princess Regent would have been tantamount to deciding the question of succession in her favor. That would have meant immediate

[13] Feif to Barck, June 13, 1713, published in E. G. Geijer, *Acta et litterae*, p. 41 f.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Campredon to Torcy, April 30 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Campredon to Torcy, December 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.

loss of Holstein support for Charles XII's foreign policy, perhaps of his own crown. The importance to Charles XII's of not giving the Holstein faction such an impression is illustrated in one episode. Shortly after the *Kalabalik* in Bender a rumor circulated that Charles XII had, in a written order, named Ulrika Eleonora his successor. Such a document with the King's signature was said to have been discovered in the confusion after the *Kalabalik*.[18] Feif later denied the substance of the rumor to Barck: Feif had only asked the King to think about the succession, and for that purpose he had composed an introduction, nothing more. According to Feif, this introduction had been recovered and it was generally believed that the entire will must be signed and dispatched home with von Düben.[19] Charles XII denied any leanings toward the Princess to Fabrice and commented that the succession was prescribed by the laws of the realm. When Fabrice tried to argue that such vague laws were in need of more detailed explanation, the King changed the topic of conversation.[20] If such consideration for the Holstein faction really guided the King's actions, some kind of arrangement whereby the Princess, at the behest of the Council and supposedly without the knowledge of Charles XII, would take her seat in Council as Regent, was necessary. In that way the succession, from the point of view of the King and for the reassurance of the Holstein faction, would remain undecided. This arrangement, however, would have required the cooperation of the Council and especially Horn. Therefore, von Düben's question could have been directed to Horn as well. This would also explain his discussion of the proposal with the Princess.

The position Charles XII intended his sister to hold in the Council is revealed in a letter he wrote her on September 2, 1714, from Demotica, in which he, among other things, explains why he had not addressed her in the letter he sent to the Council: "Since mon coeur and the Council are not one and the same and mon coeur cannot be considered a member of the Council but as one who is superior to the Council, and in the same way as I, oversees the business and decisions delegated to the Council ... And

---

18 Sten Arvidsson to Frederick of Hesse, December 4, 1718, published in Floderus, *Handlingar till Carl XII:s Historia* (Stockholm 1824) III, p. 287 f. See also E. Hjärne, *op. cit.*, p. 172 f.

19 Feif to Barck, June 13, 1713, published in E. G. Geijer, *Acta et litterae,* p. 42.

20 H. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 207. The rumor of a letter from the King appears in another variation in Gustaf Benzelstierna's notes, *Nordinska samlingen,* 782, UUB, partially in code but just the same, scarcely possible to misunderstand. "That the Council of the Realm asked Her Royal Highness to attend their session, according to one person, happened because *Öfverste Lieutenant* de la Valle had found at Fabricius in Turkey 6099 1793 own letter in which H. was declared closest heir to L". This third hand and much later report does not seem convincing in the light of the King's necessity to have consideration for Holstein.

consequently, in the matter of correspondence between me and the Council, can mon coeur and I be considered as one person, divided between two places, and the Council as a single entity or college. In other words my letters to the Council cannot be addressed to include mon coeur, since that would be the same as corresponding with myself whenever I wrote to the Council. Furthermore, I often hold a completely different opinion from the Council, and can much less write in the same letter to mon coeur, since both of us, who are one, cannot have other than one will."[21] It seems to be clear that Charles XII expected his sister to be his Regent and proxy and not a voting member of Council. Had the question been broached in that way to the Princess and to Horn, it would be less surprising that the latter opposed the suggestion. It would have put the Council under the thumb of an absolute ruler, not a monarch isolated far away in a foreign land, but one who was at home in the capital. From this perspective, the Council's October initiative to give the Princess a seat in the Council as a voting member could be interpreted as an attempt to anticipate further attempts by the King to get Ulrika Eleonora to make herself available as absolute Regent during his absence. The Princess' admission to the Council as a voting member would in such case have been the result of Horn's countermeasures.

Meanwhile, it is intrinsic that this hypothetical explanation proceeds from a document dated after the described events — Charles XII's letter to his sister. Theoretically, it is possible that the King took a position regarding a *fait accompli,* his sister's admission to the Council without his knowledge, and hesitated to forbid her after the fact. Instead, he would, in his description of the Princess' position as the sovereign's proxy, have destroyed Horn's scheme to degrade the royal power via a voting Regent, and even to take away the King's sovereignty. It follows that Charles XII, in order to avoid disavowring his sister, would have accept the Regency, but on the only terms he could consider — the Regent's complete sovereignty as the King's substitute.

The first interpretation is undoubtedly better. Of decisive importance is the image of Charles XII's personality provided by documents from the period. These suggest that the King, if he really wanted to annul the Princess' decision to be admitted to membership in the Council, would not have hesitated to do it through a ban. At the same time it seems likely that the captive monarch, after the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish peace carefully considered what resources were available to him at home, and of these his

[21] Charles XII to Ulrika Eleonora, September 2, 1714, published in *Konung Karl XII:s egenhändiga bref,* ed. E. Carlson (Stockholm 1893), p. 129.

sister was among the most important. On the other hand, it must be noted that every link in this chain of hypotheses is based on minimal evidence which is difficult to interpret. No proof is available.

Not even if one accepts the idea that during the autumn of 1712 Charles XII considered the possibility of making his sister Regent and put out feelers, could one arrive at a clear motivation for his actions. Perhaps they had been the outgrowth of his dissatisfaction with what he thought to be laziness, inefficiency and lack of good will on the part of the Council. Then his gesture could be seen as a measure complementary to his action of October 26, 1712, when he sent a letter relieving the Council of its responsibility for equipping the fleet and transporting troops to Pomerania. More uncertain is the possibility of seeking an explanation in the rumors that Horn and the Council schemed against the absolute authority of the crown, some sources report that such schemes existed as early as 1709, and in 1710 in connection with the committee meeting. It is possible that such rumors had reached the King in Bender.[22] Von Düben's message could in such a case have been intended to ascertain if the Princess was prepared to serve him by, in a given situation assume control, and take over the nominal leadership of the Council.

Knowledge of the discussions between Horn and the Princess concerning the Regency seemed to spread quickly, even abroad. The news that the governing Council in Stockholm decided to reach a peace agreement with the Allies and entrust the Princess with an interim Regency appeared in continental newspapers.[23] A decision regarding Ulrika Eleonora's position would, however, take several months and Campredon asserted that the Princess refused to agree to the proposal because she thought that those who appeared to encourage her really opposed the whole idea.[24]

Even as a supporter of Holstein, Horn ought to have opposed the idea of a Regency. According to Campredon, he had continued to conspire in favor of Duke Karl Fredrik's succession as late as August 1713.[25] But then he began to change his mind. Horn had reason to be dissatisfied with the Holstein politics, and his suspicion of Görtz grew. Görtz' attempt to procure the surrender of Hedvig Sofia's estate was thwarted by Horn, who was further disturbed by reports from Magnus Stenbock of intrigues between Görtz and the Danish government. At Stenbock's suggestion, the Council discussed the possibility of declaring the thirteen year old Duke of age, in order to con-

22 A. Fryxell, *op. cit.*, XXIV, p. 190, 193 f. HSH 7, p. 215.
23 Vellingk to Gyllenborg, August 11, 1713, Anglica 222. von Friesendorf to von Müllern, August 2, 1713, and enclosure, Borussica 52.
24 Campredon to Torcy, June 17 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
25 Campredon to Torcy, August 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suùde/127.

vince him to fire Görtz and surround himself with new advisers. Horn and Tessin favored this proposal, but hesitated to do anything on their own and reserved the decision for the King.[26] By then, November 2, Horn's conversion to the other side was a fact. He became one of those who pressed for the Princess' participation in the government and talked the Duke out of his "mistaken notions", whereupon the dowager Queen was forced to accept Ulrika Eleonora's new status. Campredon judged that Horn's break with the Holstein clique was an example of *realpolitik*.[27] The Princess' biographer, W. Holst, has asserted that the disagreement between Horn and Görtz "doubtlessly contributed to Horn's preparedness to allow the Princess to take her place in the Council and assume her station."[28]

On October 27, the Council sent a written request to the Princess to take her seat in the Council. This message did not specify what authority she would possess. It did not mention her two votes but placed importance only on her presence, which alone would endow the Councils deliberations and decisions with "solid authority".[29] Ulrika Eleonora on October 30, dated her written agreement.[30] That same day the Councillors discussed her status and their remarks are recorded in the minutes. The discussion which took place the day before the Council's audience with the Princess centered on a set of issues composed by Secretary Ehrenstrahl including "the way in which Her Royal Highness will assume her place" and "the number of votes Her Royal Highness should have, whether it should be two as held by Her Majesty the Queen until the King came of age, or whether the Princess should have the deciding vote in case of a tie."[31] Tessin reported that he ordered a table wide enough so that two arm chairs could be placed at equal height at one end. The Princess would sit in one of them. The discussion of the number of votes the Princess would have, resulted in an agreement to find out through Barck what the Princess thought. Horn had suggested that the Princess have two votes, and Carl Gyllenstierna had expressed the view that when voting resulted in a six-four split, the Princess would cast the decisive votes.[32] Barck appeared at the October 31, meeting to deliver the Princess' message that she expected the Council that day at three

---

[26] S. Grauers, *De politiska relationerna*, p. 178 f.
[27] Campredon to Torcy, November 15 (N. S.), 1713. Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[28] W. Holst, *Ulrika Eleonora d. y.* (Stockholm 1956), p. 106.
[29] The Council to Ulrika Eleonora, October 27, 1713, copies in *Engeströmska samlingen* B IV 1.8., KB and D 831:2, KB.
[30] Ulrika Eleonora to the Council, October 30, 1713, Rådets handlingar och brev 73, RA, copies in *Engeströmska samlingen* B IV 1.8., KB and D 831:2, KB.
[31] *Rådsprotokoll*, October 30, 1713, appendix.
[32] *Rådsprotokoll*, October 30, 1713.

o'clock.[33] No record of the audience seems to have been kept. The only first-hand information which describes the authority the Princess came to wield in the Council is Horn's statement of March 15, 1714, in Council: "We have respectfully requested Her Royal Highness to attend the Council, and Her Royal Highness has two votes."[34] The Princess' own understanding of her position is revealed most clearly in the statement she made in Council on November 3, that all the decisions ought to be reached in the King's name. "There is no *minorennité* here, I am a member."[35]

There is no doubt that the Princess' entry into the governing Council brought her a step closer to the throne in front of Duke Karl Fredrik. This was the way the dowager Queen and Holstein's supporters understod the situation, and from it developed their resistance.[36] In addition the measure ought to have been popular with the majority of Swedes who strongly sympathized with Ulrika Eleonora, while they considered the Duke a foreigner.[37] The Princess' right of succession was soon officially approved. The government bill as well as the summons to the *Riksdag* stated that the Princess, as first heir to the throne, had taken her place in the Council.[38] In his speech to the Estates at the opening of the *Riksdag* on December 14, Horn stated that the Council had respectfully requested the Princess "as the first heir of the realm" to attend the Council deliberations.[39] Thus it had been made clear that the basis for Ulrika Eleonora's membership in the Council was her position as first heir to the throne.

It seems obvious that the Princess' entry in the Council gave that divided and incapacitated corporation new purpose and energy. The decision to summon the *Riksdag* was made without delay, and the commissioning of Vellingk followed within a few weeks. This revived decisiveness had some connection with the possibility for the Councillors to hide behind the Princess. The Council minutes clearly reveal their undue concern for obtaining the Princess' signature on reports to the King concerning the state of the realm and on their decision to convene the *Riksdag*.[40] In addition, Campredon observed that the Princess behaved with more authority than expected, and that she signed nothing without consulting Barck, her confident, who

---

[33] *Rådsprotokoll,* October 31, 1713.
[34] *Rådsprotokoll,* March 15, 1714.
[35] *Rådsprotokoll,* November 3, 1713.
[36] Campredon to Torcy, November 15 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Rumpf to Heinsius, November 15 (N. S.), 1713. W. Holst, *op. cit.,* p. 92.
[37] Campredon to Torcy, November 15 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Rumpf to Heinsius, November 15 (N. S.), 1713.
[38] *Riksdagsacta* 1713—1714:1, R 4877.
[39] F 109, UUB.
[40] *Rådsprotokoll,* November 3, 20, 22, 1713.

admitted to Campredon that the Princess was afraid of becoming involved in actions that would be contrary to the King's interests or, at least, his intent.[41]

Campredon relates that before the *Riksdag* convened a small group, which he dubbed *"tous les amis de la Princesse"*, organized themselves behind a plan to effect the Princess' assumption of the Regency *"ayant seule voix decisive sur le conseil et les senateurs seulement déliberative"*. This would implement *"en sorte que les membres des Estats qui seront choisis pour les deliberations secrètes soient dans le meme parti."*[42] The information that a group of the Princess' supporters, by influencing the choice of persons to serve on the Secret Committee, tried to elevate her to absolute regent in the King's absence — thereby uniting their efforts against the Council as well as the Holstein faction is not corroborated in any other source. On the other hand it appears that the Council influenced and that the Princess tried to influence the selection of the Secret Committee members.

In conformity with established practice,[43] a preliminary list of Secret Committee members would have been presented by the Estates for approval by the Council. It is likely that these are the lists which are included in Ulrika Eleonora's archive. The Princess apparantly has numbered the lists and included them with her own papers.[44] The title of the Clergy's list indicates that it contained the names proposed by the Bishops. On December 14, a "list of those nominated to the Secret Committee" was read in Council. Additions were made, and it was agreed that General Lybecker, Judge Gustaf Funck and Chamberlain Falkenberg be added to the nobility's list.[45] All of the lists were approved by the Council on December 16,[46] whereupon the persons nominated became official members of the Committee. Jackson reports that the nobility accepted the Council's adjustments of this list without reservation. Jackson continues: "tho that Method be contrary to the ancient custom, which it was expected they would have been for struggling to resume on this occasion",[47] Doubtless Jackson refers here to the right which the nobility enjoyed periodically during the seventeenth century to name its own representatives to the Secret Committee, a right which seems to have

---

41 Campredon to Torcy, December 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
42 Campredon to Torcy, December 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
43 S. Grauers, *Den svenska riksdagen,* p. 169.
44 K 207, RA.
45 *Rådsprotokoll,* December 14, 1713. The names Lars Silliestrom and Lars Croning had been written in the margins of the Clergy's list. Who made these notations remains unknown. Ulrika Eleonora had written Vice Admiral Lillie's name on the Burghers' list. He did not take a seat in the Secret Committee (K 207, RA).
46 *Rådsprotokoll,* December 16, 1713.
47 Jackson to Bromley, December 23, 1713.

been taken permanently from the estate during the last decades of the century.[48] It is possible to speculate that "les amis de la Princesse" attempted to work toward the first Estate's regaining of its old right, in order to obtain more possibility to influence the membership of the Secret Committee.[49]

The Council had influenced the membership of the nobility's contingent in the Secret Committee, but the additions they made seems to have had no effect on the policy of the majority of the Committee. The members the Council placed on the Committee did not distinguish themselves in any way by playing an important or even active role. Perhaps the Council wanted some dependable reporters on the Committee.

Another attempt, though not by the Council, was made to place an outsider on the committee. At the December 21, meeting some members pointed out that those who were not members of the Secret Committee or had not signed the oath must leave, whereupon Colonel Coyet, who was not listed as a member of the Committee, was directed to obtain and present the Council's order that he take part in the discussions. Before he did that, he would not be allowed to attend Secret Committee meetings. Coyet retorted that, while his name did not appear on the list, Her Royal Highness had commanded him to sit in the Committee; he had not come on his own accord. He refused to leave and pointed out that if they sent a message to the Chancery they would find out that he was telling the truth. But after a time he was forced to leave the room because of the universal clamor of voices telling him to get out.[50] That was the last the Committee heard from him. It seems, therefore, unlikely that he had been commissioned by the Council.

This Colonel Coyet must have been Gustaf Wilhelm Coyet, Colonel for Uppland's reserve infantry regiment.[51] He claimed that the Princess had tried to place him on the Committee. She might have done this without the Council's knowledge or against its will. Information about Coyet's politics would help to reveal the policies Ulrika Eleonora wanted to champion in the Secret Committee. Evidence of Coyet's politics can be found in two documents. The first is an undated memorandum titled: "Respectful notes of one thing and another worth considering before the convening of the *Riksdag,* respectfully and with a faithful heart submitted to her Royal

---

[48] W. Carlgren, *Riksdagsutskott före 1680* (Uppsala 1909), p. 135 ff. Here it should be noted that, before the Council's rights were firmly established, their instructions concerned not the membership but only the number (W. Carlgren, *op. cit.,* pp. 135, 138).

[49] Evidence of such agitation is a pamphlet written for the opening of the Riksdag, which demands that the Nobility regain "their former freedom to name members to the Committee" (D 831, KB).

[50] *SU prot.,* December 21, 1713.

[51] G. Elgenstierna, *Den introducerade svenska adelns ättartavlor,* II, p. 45 f.

Highness, hereditary Princess". The Princess wrote "for my eyes only" on the first page and "Carl Coyet" on the last, apparantly mistakenly substituting "Carl" for "Gustaf".[52] The second is a memo in which Coyet more specifically describes how his peace proposal can be implemented, and on which the Princess noted "December, 1713".[53] The first document is the most interesting.

Coyet's "Respectful Notes" comprise a program for what ought to be accomplished during the coming *Riksdag*. Coyet makes a case against possible attempts to abolish absolutism as well as against intrigues by Holstein's supporters to steal the Princess' right of succession. He writes as if it were fact about "our enemies' decision to change the government" whereby the King would lose his Crown and the royal family their right to succession, while the subjects would come under the rule of other lords. With amazement and vexation he had listened to talk that the Estates would demand the abolishment of absolutism during the coming *Riksdag* and warned the Princess that those who decried absolutism in private conversation but recorded their support of the King's ultimate power in the minutes were "the most treasherous". Coyet pleaded instead for the maintenance of absolutism, at least during the King's lifetime, since all proposals for constituting a new system of government would mean that valuable time would be lost during endless disputes. "Two parties" would emerge and with them "hundreds of aberrations". He could imagine limiting sovereignty, but only if the King died without heirs and the succession followed the female line, and only in matters of war, peace and alliances. The Estates ought to declare publically that the Princess stood next in line to the throne and consider all other "suggestions — intrigues or beliefs" rebellious. Furthermore, the Estates and the subjects ought to empower the Princess, together with the Council, to conclude peace without consulting the King. The Estates together with the Maritime Powers, who were the likely mediators, would guarantee the Peace that would be concluded. His report ended with several practical suggestions, including how to carry out peace negotiations, what terms could be offered, and how money could be collected via contributions and credits.

It would be presumptuous to identify this program with the politics the Princess wished to pursue without subjecting it to closer analysis. When Coyet was expelled from the Secret Committee the memo was at least four weeks old since it mentions the qualities desired in the person of the *lant-*

---

[52] F 109, UUB. The Princess' mistake is noted by Hans Järta on the last page of the memorandum. Compare C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.*, p. 17, footnote 1, which draws attention to this memorandum. Compare G. Elgenstierna, *op. cit.*, articles on the Coyets.

[53] *Betänkanden och memorial i utrikesärenden*, 22, RA.

marskalk, and on November 19, County Governor Creutz was named to that post.[54] Furthermore, even if Ulrika Eleonora tried to place Coyet in the Committee, this does not necessarily mean that she shared all of his views. A consensus seems likely, since there was no apparent reason for any radical change of views during the intervening weeks. The most probable interpretation would be that the Princess used roundabout methods to gain recognition from the Estates that she stood next in line of succession to the throne. Horn's statement in his opening speech, could have been considered insufficient, while the Holstein claim continued to pose a threat. That she was eager to begin negotiating peace can be demonstrated through her statements in other contexts,[55] but that she agreed with Coyet's proposal that the Estates, together with the mediating states, guarantee a peace treaty, even against Charles XII, seems unlikely, considering the care that she took to avoid anything that could be against the King's will.[56]

The group which Campredon called *"les amis de la Princesse"* seems to have exerted itself to have the Princess named Regent during the first weeks of the *Riksdag.* No evidence of this activity appears in the minutes of the *Riksdag,* but the foreign residents agree that it existed.[57] According to Jackson, who was usually well informed, such a suggestion was made to the Secret Committee on January 13, but had been rejected. None of the Committee members had supported it.[58]

THE ESTATES' PROPOSAL, FEBRUARY 25

On February 11, the Secret Committtee received three new memoranda, which altered the activities of the peace proponents. One of these notes simply elaborated the familiar theme that "necessity has no law" and advocated peace negotiations parallel with new defense efforts,[59] but the other two ventured to propose that the Pincess assume the Regency during the King's absence.[60] The authors of these last two memoranda presented such widely divergent plans for this new arrangement, that they can be justly described as two completely different interpretations of the constitution. One, numbered 48, is based essentially on the principles of absolutism: the Princess would "with her assembled Councillors function as an absolute

---

54 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 19, 1713.
55 *Rådsprotokoll,* November 6, 1713.
56 Campredon to Torcy, December 23 (N. S.), 1714, Corr. Suède/127. See also W. Holst, *op. cit.,* p. 94 ff.
57 Campredon to Torcy, December 23 (N. S.), 1713. Rumpf to Heinsius, January 3 (N. S.), 1714. Jackson to Bromley, January 16, 1714.
58 Jackson to Bromley, January 16, 1714.
59 *SU prot.,* February 11, 1714, appendix 47.
60 *Ibid.,* appendix 48, 49.

monarch, i. e., with all justice and reason, she would cast the decisive vote, and she alone would authorize all government actions." The other, numbered 49, proposed that the Estates ask the Princess, as heir to the throne, to assume the leadership of the Realm "according to Sweden's fundamental laws and King Gustaf's Form of Government." Number 49 was aimed also at the Council, stating in effect that its demand for the Estates' authorization to negotiate peace was "inadvisable, tantamount to usurping the King's sovereignty."[61]

Wibiörnsson noted that these three anonymous memoranda were approved and "considered good".[62] The minutes, on the other hand, register no reaction to them at the time they were read. Wibiörnsson's information is, however, indirectly supported by the information recorded in the minutes that the Secret Committee agreed that all three memoranda be incorporated in a single document which would be read to the assembled Estates.[63]

On February 16, the Secret Committee received more petitions concerning the Princess' Regency, this time from the Peasants. A deputation from the Fourth Estate was given the floor and allowed to read two memoranda addressed to the Council. These demanded "1. that peace must be sought 2. that Her Royal Highness assume the powers of government, become the King's substitute and alone rule, with the advice of the Council etc. 3. Count Gustaf Leijonhufwud should lead the army in Finland against the enemy etc.". The peasants' spokesman added, that they did not intend to appear before the Council with the petitions. They had wanted only to present them to the Secret Committee, in order that "their memoranda be considered, along with the other Estates in concurring and participating in various matters."[64] He said that the entire Estate discussed the memoranda and hoped that the other Estates would agree with them.[65]

On February 17, the previously requested summary prepared from the three anonymous memoranda received on February 11, was read to the Secret Committee.[66] This summary referred to the fact that no information which could confirm that the King had entered peace negotiations had arrived, hostile intrigues seemed to be underway to usurp the King's realm; and, the King would lose all of his privileges and rights if the enemy invaded the

---

61 *Ibid.*
62 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 11, 1714.
63 *SU prot.*, February 11, 1714.
64 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 16, 1714. *SU prot.* same date.
65 *SU prot.*, February 16, 1714.
66 *SU prot.*, February 17, 1714. The deputation named to produce the synthesis included: Creutz, Conrad Ribbing, Tegner, Hillebrand from the Nobility, Steuch, Molin, Barchius from the Clergy, Hyltén, Brehmer, Leyel from the Burghers (*SU prot.*, February 12, 1714).

Swedish mainland. Therefore, it was proposed that the Council, together with the Princess and the Estates, request those states which were friendly toward Sweden to procure for her a reasonable peace. All mention of the Princess' Regency disappeared from this summary.[67]

On February 18, the Secret Committee discussed whether or not to submit the summary to the Council, in which case the entire committee ought to go up to the Palace to deliver it.[68] That same day a deputation was appointed to work out a memorandum concerning "the procedure for obtaining peace." This memorandum, which would provide more details about how the suggestions in the summarized memoranda would be carried out, was promised for the following day.[69] On February 20, the committee was informed that the memorandum still was incomplete and that the deputies needed more time to work over the text.[70] On February 23, the deputies had reached agreement and the completed text was read. It repeated the demand which was deleted in the summary: the Princess would be requested "according to Sweden's fundamental laws and form of Government, to assume the government of the Realm as *administratrix* with Your Excellencies counsel and the Estates' knowledge during His Majesty's, God willing, short absence, govern the empire, conclude peace, and preserve the realm in faithful hands." The text also suggested that foreign powers would have all the securities and guarantees they wanted if they could negotiate directly with the Princess, greater security than if the Estates themselves provided such guarantees of peace.[71] Then it was decided, that all the memoranda, the summary as well as those recently presented, would be remitted to the several Estates in assembly.[72]

The minutes from the Estates describe how these memoranda were received. The Clergy's minutes state that the texts were discussed, but that no decision was reached.[73] Wibiörnsson, on the other hand, provides a completely different version; the Clergy, according to him, reached a unanimous decision: "It was unanimously decided that 1. the Council would be asked to cooperate with the Estates to obtain Peace. If they agreed, then we should 2. present the means, the Princess etc. 3. ask, with good reason, the Princess to take over the government for her brother's sake. 4. If the Council refused to cooperate with the Estates, the Estates would use their power." This last

---

67 *SU prot.*, appendix 53.
68 *SU prot.*, February 18, 1714.
69 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 18, 1714.
70 *Ibid.*, February 20, 1714.
71 *SU prot.*, February 23, 1714, appendix 57.
72 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 23, 1714.
73 *Pr. P.*, February 25, 1714.

point, however, had been the subject of much discussion, since it was not clear how much power the Council really had, or how the Estates, without the Council's agreement, could do anything.[74]

The Burgher's position was, judging by its minutes, much more cautious. The majority agreed that the Secret Committee should only request a conference with the Council, and without reading any memoranda ask to see the latest letters, whereupon the Estates could express themselves as the situation directed.[75]

According to the Secret Committee's minutes, when the Nobility had voted, all its classes agreed that the summarized memoranda, numbered 53, would be read to the Council and that they would wait with the memorandum concerning the Princess' regency and present it only if the summary were approved.[76] The Secret Committee's minutes provide no information concerning its final decision. Wibiörnsson records the decisions of the Clergy and the Burghers and remarks in connection with his report on the Nobility's vote, which, according to him, recommended that both memoranda be read to the Council: "whose decision agreed with those of the other Estates". It was agreed that the Secret Committee in its entirety should apply to appear before the Council and the secretary for the Nobility was sent to the Council Chambers and there was told that the Council would hear the Committee the following day.[77] Wibiörnsson's information that the Secret Committee actually agreed that day to submit a proposal that the Princess become Regent ought to be accepted instead of the version reported in the minutes, because this information is partially substantiated in a note in Jackson's papers,[78] and because a motive for the recorder to alter the text on this point could have resulted from reasons earlier discussed. Wibiörnsson himself noted that Leijonmarck's memorandum, which later that day was read in the Committee, and which urged that the Princess be named Regent during the King's absence, "confirmed the Estates' decision on Peace and the Princess' Regency."[79]

HORN'S THREAT OF CENSURE

It is very likely that by the end of January, the Council received the King's letter of August 11, 1713,[80] with his orders to disband the *Riksdag* should

[74] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 25, 1714.
[75] *Bg. P.*, February 25, 1714.
[76] *SU prot.*, February 25, 1714. The Nobility's voting on February 25 has been recorded in the *SU prot.*
[77] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 25, 1714.
[78] Jackson to Bromley, February 27, 1714.
[79] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 25, 1714.
[80] For this letter, see Chapter I, p. 24.

it have convened. They thought it inadvisable to effect these orders too hastily, and kept them secret from the Estates.[81] But this information quickly reached the foreign residents, and on January 23, Jackson reported that the Council had received letters from the King's headquarters in Demotica, and that he had forbidden the Estates to convene, or if they already had assembled, ordered that they be immediately disbanded.[82] According to Jackson, these letters had so upset the Councillors that they were unable to conceal their agitation, and the Princess, pleading illness, had not attended the Council, after the letters were read.[83] The record of Council's discussion concerning how the orders should be obeyed seem to be incomplete. On February 15, Horn pointed out that the King's letter containing the order for dispersal was read three times for the Princess and the Council but not into the minutes, and that this ought to be done. He was then told that Court Councillor Barck and Secretary Höpken took the minutes when the order was read.[84] These minutes have not been found. On February 15, Cronhielm brought up the issue of the King's order and in this context it was pointed out that it was already "as good as decided" that the Estates would leave the capital.[85]

While the Council's discussions concerning compliance with the King's letter cannot be followed, its attitude toward the Estates is clear. Reenstierna's statement in the Council Chambers on January 30, suggests that at least he wanted to inform the *Riksdag* of the King's order,[86] but his point of view obviously gained little support. When the Secret Committee's deputation appeared in Council the same day, Horn adamantly denied that any letters had arrived from the King.[87] The Estates were to be kept ignorant of the King's ban. It is, of course, possible, as has been suggested, that the Council would have considered it too risky, given the possibility of domestic strife — to immediately place this information before the *Riksdag*.[88] But at the same time, the Council pressured the Estates to empower the Council to negotiate and conclude peace.[89] The majority of the Councillors apparantly

---

[81] C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[82] Jackson to Bromley, January 23, 1714. The same information was reported at that time by the French and Dutch Residents (Campredon to Torcy, February 3 N. S. 1714. Rumpf to Heinsius, February 3 N. S. 1714).
[83] Jackson to Bromley, January 23, 1714.
[84] *Rådsprotokoll,* February 15, 1714.
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] *Rådsprotokoll,* January 30, 1714: "Baron Reenstierna pointed out that it was time to tell them (sc. the Estates) of His Majesty's letters that arrived with the last postal delivery".
[87] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 1, 1714.
[88] A. Fryxell, *op. cit.*, XXV, p. 188.
[89] See Chapter V, pp. 136, 138 ff.

thought that the Estates could be of use. It must have been considered essential that they remained assembled.

By the middle of February, a new factor emerged that clearly disturbed the Councillors and threatened to compromise their position; they had obviously learned of the ongoing efforts in the *Riksdag* to establish the Princess as Regent. As early as February 12, it was recorded in the minutes that "since many questionable papers are being circulated in the Estates, they ought to be anticipated and stopped through the eventual dispersal of the Estates when the Generals, the County Governors and the bishops return home, and the civil servants take up their tasks. In this manner, the work of the *Riksdag* will cease."[90] It is evident that the Council viewed the efforts to elevate Ulrika Eleonora to Regent as a threat that must be foiled. This could be accomplished by recalling government employees to their duties and giving everyone else permission to leave the *Riksdag*. Generals, County Governors and Commanders of regiments were also recalled to their stations, and the members of the *Riksdag* who wished, received permission to return home.[91] This was the state of affairs when the Secret Committee was granted the right to appear in Council on February 26, in order to present the Estates' demands for peace negotiations and the establishment of Ulrika Eleonora's regency.

Wibiörnsson, who was present at the February 26 meeting, described the proceedings on this occasion, and his description partially complements the Council's minutes. The proceedings are not recorded in the minutes of the Secret Committee. The atmosphere of the meeting was apparently chillier than normal and the Councillors were not as gracious as usual. The *lantmarskalk* began by asking if the Council had received further information concerning the King and his negotiations. Horn answered loftily that if any news had arrived the Council would have informed the Estates, whereupon the *lantmarskalk* asked permisssion to read the Estates' memorandum. He was told he could, but only if it were signed. The *lantmarskalk* answered that it was not signed but that it was approved by all. When Horn asked if that were true, County Governor Falzberg rose, said that he had been absent and went toward the door. Major General Hamilton said that his view was recorded in the minutes and Bishop Lang "said a few words".

---

[90] *Rådsprotokoll,* February 12, 1714, vol. 118. According to another keeper of minutes: "The tracts which came into the House of Nobility, and were not to be read, were discussed" *(Rådsprotokoll,* same date, vol. 119 a).

[91] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 26, 1714. C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.,* p. 24 f. Rumpf to Heinsius, March 12 (N. S.), 1714. Within the Estates efforts were made to parry these measures by requiring those returning home to leave a proxy in the *Riksdag* (Wibiörnsson's diary, February 17, 26).

Horn continued: "Your minutes must be presented here so that we may review their contents". The *lantmarskalk* rejoined that the minutes had not yet been approved. After reassurances from members of the Committee that the memorandum was only a "proposal", Secretary Wulfenstierna was allowed to read it.

It emerges from the discussion which followed that it was the summary, number 53, which was read. The memorandum *"de modo procedendi"*, with the Estates' proposal for the Princess' regency, was not read.[92] When the memorandum had been read, its demands and the remarks made by the committee members were parried by Horn: in the face of enemy powers it was necessary to maintain internal unity; no invasion by sea was likely at the moment. In the meantime, the Estates ought to console themselves by waiting for news from the King and from Vellingk, and work to strengthen the defense and to obtain money to equip the fleet. When the news arrived, nothing would be kept from the Estates. The *lantmarskalk* stated that the Estates would remain in the capital and not return home, as individual members had already begun to do. He received no reply. The Councillors left the room to confer in private and when they returned, Horn told all who were not members of the Secret Committee to leave, even those who kept the minutes.[93] Wibiörnsson is the only source of information for the events which followed.

Horn launched streams of sharp reprimands against the attending committee members. He opened by expressing his hope that what he was to say would be kept secret. Then, he claimed that it had not been the Council's intention to send home all of the members of the *Riksdag*, but that Generals, County Governors and civil servants must attend their duties and that it was adequate if fewer representatives of the Four Estates remained. The Council's purpose for convening the *Riksdag* had, of course, been to obtain peace, but this could not be done as fast as the Estates would like. When the time came and necessity required, it would, with God's help, be done. When that time came, the Council would confer with the remaining Estates and those at home would be recalled. Then he changed the subject. He said that even though "many things were said to be recorded" in the Estates' minutes, he would just the same not demand to see them. He warned them "that they all should be careful" and pointed out that the Council found out that many memoranda "which are very dangerous and inde-

---

92 *SU prot.*, February 26, 1714, Wibiörnsson's diary, same date. See also the notes on the memorandum concerning the Princess' regency: "this memorandum was not presented in Council" (*SU prot.*, appendix 57).

93 *SU prot.*, February 26, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same date. The keeper of the Council's minutes noted: "interrupted".

fensible" were submitted during the *Riksdag*. He wanted to warn them against accepting further unsigned memoranda or listening to those who wished to support "troublemaking".[94]

It is evident, that Horn's speech must have intimidated many of the members of the Secret Committee. Their reactions are recorded in the Secret Committee's minutes, also in Wibiörnsson's diary. *Lantmarskalk* Creutz delivered an emotional speech in the Riddarhus, the next day. He asserted that someone from the Secret Committee must have informed the Council, that: "something unsuitable" had been recorded in the Estates' minutes and "indefensible" memoranda, including anonymous examples, had been submitted. He emphasized the Estates' loyalty and good will and labelled the committee member who informed the Council "a swindler, a liar, a gossipmonger and a perjurer."[95] Some of the speakers assured that their memoranda were written with the best intentions, and Bishop Lang, who seemed to have born the brunt of Creutz's tirade, protested that he had eaten dinner with Horn four or five weeks earlier, and on the same occasion, had conversed with Nils Gyllenstierna, but had not been a guest of any other Councillors.[96] His anxiety is clearly revealed in this statement. Then the summary, which had been read to the Council the preceding day,[97] was signed and a deputation delivered it to the Council.

Thus, by means of his resolute performance, Horn had parried the thrust of the peace proponents. The committee's assault was stopped, it moderated the description of the memorandum it presented to "only a discourse with Their Excellencies."[98] In addition, they did not present their proposal regarding the Princess' regency. Insecurity within the Secret Committee must have increased by suspicions that one of them was Horn's informer. Horn's threat to demand to see the Estates' minutes and to hold the Secret Committee responsible for receiving anonymous and criminal memoranda obviously had effect. It is likely that the Estates' clearly understood Horn's indirect threat; the intention to prosecute those responsible for statements contrary to the King's prerogatives and authority. The latent threat of a Royal *subpoena duces tecum* followed by censure and blame, which the Councillors themselves must have feared, had been used by Horn against the Estates.

---

[94] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 26, 1714.
[95] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 27, 1714.
[96] *SU prot.*, February 27, 1714.
[97] Wibiörnsson states that Creutz, Hyltén and Svedberg signed. Bishop Lang, the *preses* of the Clergy while the Archbishop was absent, refused to sign (Wibiörnsson, February 27). The example now found as appendix 53 to the Secret Committee minutes lacks signatures.
[98] *SU prot.*, February 27, 1714.

Why then, did the group that tried earlier to effect the takeover of the government by the Princess this time have such success? Did the group's membership increase? Benzelius asserts that it all began on February 10, when the English Resident let it be known that Charles XII had rejected the English mediation proposal. The Estates, according to Benzelius, began to discuss whether they, in spite of everything, ought to seek the help of foreign powers or, if that couldn't be done, declare the throne vacant.[99] At the same time, Archbishop Spegel, who was a determined opponent of all opposition to the King, became ill.[100] He left the *Riksdag* on February 23, went home without asking to be dismissed, and took the Clergy's minutes with him.[101] But the significance of his absence ought not to be exaggerated, since he had found it difficult to exert authority during the debates in the *Riksdag* and had been isolated and unpopular in his own Estate.[102]

At the beginning of February, Görtz had sent von Hagen, Holstein Court Councellor, to Stockholm to present a scheme for an alliance against the Tsar. This would be accomplished by a Swedish cession of Bremen-Verden to the Ducal family, while Denmark would receive the Holstein-Gottorp lands in return for support for Duke Karl Fredrik's right to the Swedish throne if Charles XII died without heirs. This proposal was indignantly rejected by the Council.[103] Reports of von Hagen's mission leaked out and caused alarm.[104] The need to forestall Holstein's plans by entrusting the Princess with a regency, thereby further strengthening her claim to the throne, was asserted in Committee debates as well as in memoranda and anonymous pamphlets.[105] Considering the Princess' popularity and the public's estrangement from Duke Karl Fredrik and his German entourage, rumors of the Holstein intrigue must have made it easier for the Princess' supporters. In addition, a rumor circulated that Russia, Denmark and Preussia intended to support the succession of the Duke with force.[106] The anti-

---

99 *Anecdota Benzeliana,* p. 39.
100 *Ibid.*
101 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 23, March 1, 3, 1714.
102 Anecdota Benzeliana, p. 40.
103 C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.,* p. 23, H. Almquist, *op. cit.,* p, 235 ff. S. Jägerskiöld, *Den hessiska politiken och den svenska tronföljdsfrågan 1713—1718* (KFÅ 1934), p. 114.
104 C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.,* p. 23. The Dutch Resident repeats the rumor that von Hagen had during his stay in Stockholm offered several officials a good deal of money to aid Duke Karl Fredrik's cause. He was reported to have paid large sums (Rumpf to Heinsius, April 21 N. S., 1714).
105 *SU prot.,* appendix 49. Leijonmarck in debate on February 23. Two anonymous pamphlets, published in the name of Haquinus Tilaesius, *Rålamska samlingen* fol. 71, KB. See also S. Grauers, *Några bidrag,* p. 224.
106 Rumpf to Heinsius, April 21 (N. S.), 1714. Campredon to Torcy, February 9 (N. S.), 1714, Corr. pol. Suède/128.

Holstein party could thereby appeal to the people's patriotism by identifying the Holstein party with their nation's enemies.

It has been pointed out before, that the two anonymous memoranda of February 11, which proposed a regency, presented divergent constitutional programs.[107] Because they were submitted the same day, it can be supposed that they were a co-ordinated effort by two groups with the same goal — the installation of the Princess as regent — but with different concepts of the constitution. The supporters of the regency plan seem to have put hard pressure on the Peasants to support their point of view. The Peasants were reported to have been persuaded by "one or another, enticed and tricked" into presenting the February 16, memoranda, and therefore, they did not want it to be "charged against" them.[108] Since one of their memoranda asked that Major General Gustaf Lewenhaupt be given command of the army which would confront the enemy in Finland,[109] and because the same Lewenhaupt who during the nobility's debates was among the most anxious supporters of the plans for the regency, he was likely the person, or one of the persons, who prompted the peasants to action.[110] Furthermore, it seems that the spokesmen for the regency within the delegation that worked out the Estates' memorandum which proposed the Princess' assumption of the regency — the same memorandum that was supposed to have been presented during the Secret Committee's meeting with the Council on February 26, but was at that time suppressed — by means of a coup controlled the final version of the memorandum. When it was read in the Secret Committee, Conrad Ribbing protested that the memorandum differed completely from the draft that had been approved by the deputation. According to Ribbing, when they met with the Council they would argue only *pro et contra* and select "the safest alternatives".[111] The delegation needed more time than was planned. It leaked out that the first draft was "too severe", and introduced the threat that the Estates would no longer "listen to the Council" if the Councillors refused to agree.[112]

---

[107] The difference have already been noted by E. Hjärne *(op. cit.*, p. 104 f). The memorandum which would give the Princess "an absolute government" and a decisive vote does not need, according to Hjärne, "to have a further aim" than to be "based on pure *realpolitik*", since its purpose was to create a strong governmental authority to replace the Council's weak leadership. The reference in the second memorandum to "Sweden's fundamental laws and King Gustaf's form of government" arouses his interest: it is "a significant symptom".

[108] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 23, 1714.

[109] *SU prot.*, appendix 52.

[110] See also S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 228, who has no doubt in this case. During an audience in the Secret Committee on January 13 the Peasants had however proposed that Count Bielke command the army in Finland (*SU prot.*, January 13, 1714).

[111] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 23, 1714.

[112] Wibiörnsson's diary, February 20, 1714.

The spokesmen for the Regency identify themselves in the Secret Committee debates of February 25, and in the First Estate during the first half of March. On February 25, an anonymous memorandum was read in the Secret Committee — one the committee deemed "unusually well presented and worth serious consideration."[113] This favorable reception led Leijonmarck to admit his authorship, and provoked a demand that the memorandum be read once again on March 1, for the First Estate.[114] Leijonmarck's program, as he expressed it here, was: with reference to the forms of government of 1634 and 1660, the Princess ought, as heir to the throne, with the "councel of the Council" assume the government. Referring to earlier forms of government, he also asserted the Estates' right to appoint a government when the King, because of his minority, illness, or absence was unable to govern. The Princess would become regent, not only on the strength of her place in the line of succession, but also, and above all, on the strength of the Estates' authorization. Such authorization could not be given "without public declaration and appointment by the Estates, who represent the whole community and people, as well as, according to the laws of God and Nature, especially *in casu summae necessitatis*". He also sought precedent in Duke Charles' Regency during King Sigismund's absence in Poland and in the Estates' authorization of the 1660 Regency government.[115] Viewed in the extreme, this suggests, as E. Hjärne pointed out, "the sovereignty of the people." The opposite view was represented by Gustaf Lewenhaupt, who concisely formulated his argument to the First Estate regarding empowering the representatives of the Estates who would share responsibility with the Council for peace negotiations: "We cannot give them the authority, since this is a *status monarchicus* but now another form of government is being suggested."[116] Hjärne underscored the conflict between Lewenhaupt's assertion of a "monarchial regency" and Leijonmarck's proposal for the Estates' participation, based on his general concept of the Estates' prerogatives and authority.

The early proponents of peace, Hyltén, Svedberg and Molin, were still active, but they did not agree how much the question ought to be pursued.[117]

---

113 *SU prot.*, February 25, 1714.
114 *RAP*, March 1, 1714. Wibiörnsson noted a "long, learned, cautious and splendid memorandum" (Wibiörnsson's diary, February 25, 1714), Published in HSH 28, p. 331 ff. Published also in a french version in Lamberty, *Mémoires*, VIII, p. 806 ff.
115 *SU prot.*, append. 60. See also E. Hjärne *op. cit.*, p. 103 ff., who places Leijonmarck's memorandum in the wider context of history of ideas and constitutional law. See also P. Renvall, *Finsk representation i Sveriges riksdag* (Stockholm 1967), p. 192 ff. and S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 225.
116 RAP, March 12, 1714. See also E. Hjärne, *op. cit.* p. 106.
117 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 12, 25, 1714.

Realpolitik seems to have entered the debate, above all the necessity to increase the authority of the Council, thereby providing it with a solid basis on which to seek contact with foreign powers and initiate peace talks.

Thus, the group which supported a Regency for the Princess apparently included a wide variety of members. The movement was definitely anti-Holstein and should have included Campredon's *"amis de la Princesse."* It also attracted the Council's opponents and those who feared aristocratic dictatorship and domination by the Council, judging from some anonymous pamphlets, which also campaigned for the Princess' regency.[118] Persons with widely differing constitutional philosophies, such as Leijonmarck and Lewenhaupt co-operated toward a common goal. Finally, the old peace party joined the larger group.

The result of the Secret Committee's meeting with the Council on February 26, dampened the peace proponents' activity, but only for a few days. The center of activity gravitated to the First Estate. On March 1, Leijonmarck's memorandum was read to the assembled nobility. It was received with shouts of approval, and in a poll, that same day, all three classes agreed that a proposal that she assume the Regency should be made directly to the Princess. But it was considered necessary to obtain the support of the other Estates. A deputation led by Gustaf Lewenhaupt was directed to obtain the views of the other Estates.[119]

The Peasant's concurred wholeheartedly.[120] The Clergy told the deputies that they would report their decision following a private discussion.[121] After the deputation left an overwhelming majority of the clergymen expressed themselves in favor of the nobility's proposal, but that a definite view would be reached only after the contents of letters (said to be newly arrived from the King), could be evaluated regarding the King's own peace plans.[122] When the deputation of Nobles visited the Burghers two days later, they received a reserved welcome. Hyltén argued that it was not certain that the Princess would really agree to govern the Realm, suggested that it was uncertain how the Council would react, and finally said that the Burghers would report their decision after a private discussion.[123]

The Estates waited for several days for the Council to report the contents of some letters, which had arrived in the last post, from Stralsund. On

---

[118] *Rålamska samlingen* fol. 71, KB. See also E. Benzelius to J. G. Werwing, March 23, 1714, *Bergshammarsamlingen,* RA.
[119] *RAP,* March 1, 1714.
[120] *RAP,* March 4, 1714.
[121] *Pr P,* March 2, 1714.
[122] *Pr P,* March 2, 1714. Wibiörsson's diary, same date.
[123] *Bg P,* March 4, 1714.

February 27, Tessin had informed the Secret Committee of their arrival.[124] When the Estates on March 5, expressed their wish to know what they contained, they were told that the letters had not yet been decoded.[125] The same day, the news of General Armfelts defeat at Storkyro in Finland spread through the Secret Committee. Armfelt was said to be dead. Emotions which ran high were further agitated by a rumor the Tsar had written to Prince Trubetskoy — one of the Russian prisoners of war — promising to eat dinner with him in Stockholm on Easter Sunday.[126] The Russian menace seemed closer than ever.

Wibiörnsson reports that the Secret Committee decided the same day that "since it has been such a long time and the Estates cannot wait any longer" a provisional statement would be composed containing the "Estates view" in case the newly arrived letters contained no news of peace. A deputation composed of six members from each Estate including several representatives in the *Riksdag,* who were not members of the Secret Committee, were appointed to work it out.[127] According to Wibiörnsson, their proposed text was read on March 9, in the Secret Committee. This text stated that "the basis for obtaining peace was to elevate Her Royal Highness to Regent *cum voto decisivo*". Thus, the enemy would "be obliged to negotiate", conspiracies to subject the Realm to foreign rule —, taking it away from the Royal family — would be destroyed, and the peasants could be convinced to willingly pay the assessed contributions. Finally, it was asked "if this were not in accord with the Estates' view?" But an answer to that question "would come at another time".[128] There is no trace in the minutes of the decision to create a provisional statement by the Estates, of the naming of the deputies or of the text of their draft proposal. Given the earlier differences between the minutes and the diary, there is reason to assume that the same motives once more led those in charge of the minutes to delete a decision from the text.

THE COUNCIL DECIDES TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

On March 8, came the awaited decision. That morning the entire Secret Committee responded to the Council's invitation and went to the Castle, where Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna greeted them and ushered them directly into the Council Chambers. Horn opened the meeting with a speech in which

---

124 Wibiörnsson's diary, February 27, 1714.
125 *SU prot.,* March 5, 1714, Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.
126 Wibiörnsson's diary, same date.
127 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 5, 1714.
128 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 9, 1714.

he reminded the Committee members that the Council, as well as, the Estates had been unable to deal with the problem of peace, but that just the other day news had arrived which might possibly allow them to take action without further delay. He then read a series of originals or copies of originals or copies of letters, which he had recently received: in letters to the Princess, the Council and *Kanslikollegium* Vellingk referred to his poor health and refused on that ground to begin peace negotiations, recommending Sparre, Palmquist and Gyllenborg for the mission. Horn also read Vellingk's letter to Palmquist on February 10, and Palmquist's answering letter of February 20, suggesting that the neutral powers be awarded *cartes blanches* "to bargain us to that peace which is possible". Finally, Horn read the King's letters to Vellingk and the other ministers, in which he rejected the mediation of the Emperor and the King of France while those two powers were at war with each other. When he finished reading these letters, Horn asserted that it had been necessary to delay the project, that they now "without doubt" must commence. He asked the Estates to consider the suggestion that instead of depending on the neutrals as mediators, use them as arbitrators. Both Sweden and the allies would give the neutrals *cartes blanches* and wait for their judgement.[129]

After the Committee returned to the *Riddarhus* Hyltén suggested that now, when all "the obstacles, which we heard at the Castle, are out of the way" the answer to the Council must be discussed. The Peasants were summoned, given a general report of what had taken place at the Palace, and told not to leave the capital.[130] On March 10, Secretary Brehmer was named to compose the answer, which was read and approved by the Committee the following day.[131] It expressed gratitude for the information the Committee had been given and suggested that some committee members be delegated to help the Council and the Princess to set about obtaining peace. It further remarked that any foreseeable difficulties would be overcome through the power and authority of the Princess, who, as the King's sister and heir-apparent to the Realm, acting jointly with the Council and Estates, would engage in peace negotiations.[132]

When the Secret Committee and the Council met on March 10, Horn annouced, after the Councillors had taken time to talk among themselves, that they thought the Secret Committee's proposal was a good one, but because of the need for secrecy, emphasized that the number of deputies

---

[129] Wibiörnsson's diary, March 8, 1714. Bowallius, *op. cit.*, p. 272 f.
[130] *Ibid.*
[131] *SU prot.*, March 9, 10, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary, same dates.
[132] *SU prot.*, appendix 67.

from the Secret Committee who would join the Council's preliminary talks must be held to a minimum. That same day the Secret Committee, according to Horn's suggestion, made a list of twelve persons from each of the three highest Estates, and the Council chose from this list four persons from each Estate to take part in the peace efforts.[133] On the morning of March 12, those who were chosen from the list went to the Palace to begin their work. They would not be allowed to discuss anything at all of their efforts with colleagues in the Secret Committee.[134] Earlier, Horn had stipulated that the Estates would be informed about the co-operation of the Princess, the Council and the Secret Committee for obtaining peace only in general terms.[135]

The Council had changed its position abruptly. Earlier rejection of the Estates' demand for immediate contact with the proposed mediators and for participation in the leadership of such negotiations was unexpectedly transformed to agreement on both points. The Council no longer referred to the King's order as an obstacle. Horn himself pressed the issue. During the joint meeting on March 8, he appealed to the Secret Committee to provide suggestions "as soon as possible",[136] and on March 10, he sent Secretary Palmskiöld to the committee to remind them that the matter was urgent.[137] He also sent a message to Hagen, Holstein's emissary, who had recently appeared in Stockholm with von Görtz's proposal for changing Swedish foreign policy.[138] The peace proposal which Hagen had presented was now to be the object of closer scrutiny.[139]

The Council's new policy did not quiet the demand for the Princess to assume the Regency, though the Burghers thought the issue could be pidgeonholed. A deputation from the Burghers, to the First Estate on March 11 expressed the wish that the question of a request to the Princess remain untreated so as not to disturb the peace efforts that the Council had decided to begin.[140] The next day Brehmer and Mayor Starling from the Burghers called on the Clergy to try to obtain their support. The Burghers' attitude is clearly defined in Brehmer's speech on that occasion: considering the agreement finally reached, between the Princess, the Council, and the Estates, the issue ought to rest so that it does not cause any delay.[141] The

---

133 *SU prot.*, March 10, 1714. Wibiörnsson's diary and *rådsprotokoll*, same dates.
134 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 12, 1714.
135 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 10, 1714.
136 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 8, 1714.
137 *SU prot.* and *rådsprotokoll*, March 10, 1714.
138 Rumpf to Heinsius, March 24 (N. S.), 1714. Jackson to Bromley, March 13, 1714.
139 H. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 242. When the government courier reached Ystad, von Hagens last stop in Sweden, he found that Hagen had already left *(Ibid.)*
140 *RAP*, March 11, 1714.
141 *Pr P*, March 12, 1714.

Burghers did not oppose the issue, and considered it "very necessary" to support the decision the Nobility made regarding an appeal to the Princess.[142] All they wanted was a postponement.

After the representatives of the Burghers left, the Clergy, after a short discussion decided to "conform with the Burgers".[143] The same day a deputation from the Clergy went to meet with the Nobility, and the Clergy's spokesman, Bishop Svedberg, told them that they decided to "fully support" the written and oral claims of the Nobility and the Peasants. These claims, however, should not be pursued hastily "but when the decision to negotiate peace is reached, the proposal should be presented to Her Royal Highness and the Councillors, and the Estates should not disperse before this takes place."[144]

Thus, general agreement to make a direct appeal to the Princess to assume the regency had been reached in the *Riksdag*. Disagreement occurred only over when such an appeal would be most suitable. The decision made by the Clergy and the Burghers to bide their time, did not satisfy the opponents within the Nobility. At Gustaf Lewenhaupt's suggestion on March 12, a voting list was drawn, and each member would cast his lot either with the Nobility's view that the Princess would immediately be asked to take over the government, or with the suggestion from the Clergy and the Burghers that they wait and see. These lists would then be circulated in the other Estates, so that all members would be given a chance to sign and express their views.[145] A vast majority of those present in the first Estate

---

[142] Wibiörnsson's diary, March 12, 1714.
[143] *Pr P*, March 12, 1714.
[144] RAP, March 12, 1714. In this connection a divergency between two sources needs to be noted. The Burghers' decision was presented to the Nobility on March 11 by Mayor Starling. According to the Nobility's minutes, he had, among other things, stated that they wanted to wait with the question of the Princess' regency "not to reject the Nobility's good proposal, but to wait until peace negotiations have been established . . . then they will make a definite statement" (RAP, March 11, 1714). Starling's speech is also recorded in an appendix to the minutes of the Nobility, on which it is noted: "this was submitted later by Mayor Starling, who spoke, to be appended to the minutes". In it is recorded "Thus have the representatives of all the cities and the Burghers, after careful deliberation . . . reached today the unassailable idea and decision, that they are unable to give a positive reply to the proposition given them by the Nobility, but will, for special and good reason let the matter wait a while" (R 52, fol. 393, RA). Considering that the formulation in the Nobility's minutes is corroborated in Wibiörnsson's notes from March 12, and by Svedberg's agreement with the Burghers' statement to the Nobility the same day, confidence ought to placed with the recorder of the Nobility's minutes, especially since Starling submitted his written report "later". R. M. Bowallius (*op. cit.*, p. 280 f.) has accepted Starling's written report as the Burghers' statement. He has noted that the Clergy "conformed" with it, and is therefore surprised by Svedberg's speech to the Nobility on March 12 and describes it as "a singular lurching from one point of view to another!".
[145] *RAP*, March 12, 1714.

indicated their support of the first view, though some added *"ut in protocollo"*.[146] The Peasants as well signed the lists in support of the Nobility's point of view.[147]

At the same time, it appears that meetings took place between the spokesmen for the regency proponents within the Estates and the Princess. No record of such contacts have been found in Swedish sources, but the correspondence of the foreign Residents agree on this point. The Princess was reported to have been doubtful, even completely unwilling to acquiesce to exhortions to take the reins of government. She had feared to get on the wrong side of the King and risk that he would decide to act in favor of the Duke of Holstein's claims to the throne.[148] Supporters of the Regency plan had subjected her to intensive arguments designed to persuade her to give in to their demands. Their opponents also tried to influence her. Some members of the Clergy reportedly tried to frighten her by describing the fate of the Tsar's sister.[149] On March 11, the Dutch resident reported that he had been assured by some of the Princess' companions that she would never agree to the demand that she accept a regency, especially since she was convinced that the Estates had nothing to gain by it, and that the foreign powers still would turn to Charles XII.[150]

DISBANDMENT

Horn and the other Councillors must have viewed with uneasiness the growing support that the proponents of the Regency were winning in the Estates. The threat to subpoena the minutes of the *Riksdag* had only bought time. The Dutch Resident reports that the Council spread the false information that he and his English colleague had assured some members of the *Riksdag* that foreign powers would not recognize any special authority of the Princess if she as Regent, together with the Council and the Estates, should decide to open peace negotiations. In order to check the peace proponents, the Council supposedly gave the wrong date for the letters from the King's headquarters and elsewhere that informed them of the King's decision to return home.[151] The Councillors even seem to have threatened to resign if the supporters of a Regency continued to press the issue.[152]

---

146 *RAP* 1714, appendix 22. R 52, appendix 38.
147 *RAP*, March 13, 1714. R 52, appendix 38.
148 Rumpf to Heinsius, March 3 (N. S.), 1714. Jackson to Bromley, February 27, 1714.
149 Rumpf to Heinsius, March 3, 17 (N. S.), 1714. Tsar Peter's half-sister, the Grand Duchess Sofia Alexsejevna (1657—1704), had been confined to a cloister in Moscow after her plan to murder Peter was discovered in 1689.
150 Rumpf to Heinsius, March 24 (N. S.), 1714. See also W. Holst, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
151 Rumpf to Heinsius, March 3 (N. S.), 1714.
152 Jackson to Bromley, February 27, 1714.

On March 15, the turning point occured. During the Council meeting that day, Horn surprised the Princess and exhorted her to disavow the Council's opponents who worked in her favor. Then the leaders of the opposition, led by Gustaf Lewenhaupt and Sven Leijonmarck, were summoned, and they received a sharp reprimand from Horn for their presumptuous attempts to meddle in the governing of the Realm. The Princess herself pointed out that they forced her into a difficult situation, since she could not act contrary to the King's orders. Then the letter containing the prohibition of the *Riksdag* and order for its dispersal was read. Finally, the Peasants were summoned, and they also were criticized for their actions though in milder terms.[153]

As Malmström expressed it, "the *Riksdag* was drained of its vitality"[154] at this March 15, audience in the Council Chambers. The plans to elevate the Princess to a Regency failed, and knowledge of the King's prohibition prevented any independent initiative. The business of the *Riksdag* diminished to nothing, and its members dispersed to their homes. There was no formal adjournment or prorogation. On June 18 ,the Secret Committee decided that the *lantmarskalk* would call no more committee meetings until further notice.[155] But the *lantmarskalk* had the *jus convocandi,* and he could summon the committee if he found it necessary. Later the Council recalled the *lantmarskalk's* staff of office and the right to convene was thus transferred to the Council. Because the *Riksdag* was not formally adjourned, and the Council held the right to convene, a basis was created for the fiction that the *Riksdag,* which met in January, 1719, really was an extension of the one which met in 1713—1714. This has been interpreted so, that the plans which were realized in 1719 had been structured in 1714, and only extenuating circumstances prevented them from being effected at that time.[156]

The Council's actions on March 15, can be thought to contradict its March 8, decision to begin peace negotiations and to allow representatives from the Estates to take part in their deliberations. At first glance it can give the impression of a compromise between the Council's desire to handle the coming negotiations alone and the Estates' demand to participate with the Princess and the Council. But it can also be interpreted as the Council's attempt to prevent the demand for a Regency to gain widespread support in the Estates. This could have been based on the Council's unfounded hope

---

153 *Rådsprotokoll,* March 15, 1714. Published in E. G. Geijer, *Acta et litterae,* p. 9 ff. See also Bowallius, *op. cit.,* p. 286 ff., Fryxell, *op. cit.* XXV, p. 208 ff., Malmström, *op. cit.,* p. 29 f.
154 Malmström, *op. cit.,* p. 30.
155 *SU prot.,* June 18, 1714.
156 E. Hjärne, *op. cit.,* p. 110.

that its opponents did not consider a Regency an end in itself, but only a safe means to secure a quick peace.

The plans for a Regency can scarcely be interpreted primarily as evidence of a tendency within the Estates to revolt against the King. Its proponents could call on precedent — Duke Karl's Regency during King Sigismund's sojourn in Poland — and to the extent it was directed against real or assumed Holstein intrigues, it was directly supportive of Charles XII's monarchy and his *jura majestatis*. The careful defense and the thorough, at times far-fetched and legal arguments developed by the spokesmen for the plan demonstrate that they understood that it was a sensitive issue and that they rished the King's displeasure. First when events had gone so for that the Regent in liaison with the Council and the Estates had negotiated and — in even greater degree — concluded peace, would a revolt, perhaps out of control, be at hand. The prime responsibility would then be born by the Princess. She seems to have understood that it was impossible to become Regent without simultaneously assuming responsibility for the peace negotiations that were demanded. When faced with such a situation her anxiety seems bolstered by her fear that the King would order the succession in favor of Holstein.

A good many things, then, suggest that the Council's purpose for convening the *Riksdag* was to obtain authority from the Estates to negotiate and conclude peace. When they had not succeeded by mid-March, the *Riksdag*, from that point of view, had served no purpose. From the beginning, the Council kept its distance from and worked against the Regency plan and its supporters. In this respect, the Council's actions can be interpreted in two ways. They could have feared the King's displeasure it they supported the Regency, and this suggests that they counted on him returning soon, or at least that he remained a power to reckon with. On the other hand had the Council designed to increase its own power, it would also have opposed the project. A position which favored the Princess as Regent, based on the Council's admitted attitude toward the succession, could not have furthered such a purpose. When the voting lists circulated, and the signatures indicated the risk of a confederation within the Estates and the Council's loss of control over the situation, Horn's March 15, show-down with the leaders of the opposition appears to be a logical and necessary move.

Chapter VII The Theory of Conspiracy

CRITIQUE OF THE SOURCES

So far, the question of whether or not Horn conspired to strengthen the Council and build up his own power in the face of a possible succession to the throne has not been resolved. Conversely, the thesis that this was the case has not been proved wrong. Several sources make such accusations. These sources need to be critically scrutinized.

The accusations against Horn are rather detailed and intensive in Campredon's the French Resident, dispatches. Campredon became the *Theory of Conspiracy's* main witness. When earlier scholars used this source, they either accepted it uncritically (Fryxell, Tengberg) or completely rejected it (Malmström, Grauers). E. Hjärne's more cautious approach, in any case, leaves the question open.[1] Rosén described "the rumor-mongering, on which Campredon's reports were founded", without saying how he could prove that assertion.[2] Rosén was interested only in the accusations against Horn in their guise as propaganda — the extent to which they reveal real conditions is left open.

There is no doubt that Horn and the Council were vulnerable to the "rumor-mongering" that Rosén describes. Evidence is found in the minutes of the Council, as well as in the reports of the foreign residents, of vexed and dejected reactions to what the Councillors viewed as unfair and malicious lies directed at them.[3] The anonymous pamphlets in circulation also attacked the Council, and especially Horn, as power-hungry adventurers and close confidants of the Duke. The pamphlets obviously originated in circles which opposed both the Council and Holstein. The essential problem, therefore, must be: what was Campredon's relationship to the anti-Council agitation and its perpetrators? Is there reason to suspect that he was influenced by the propagandistic charges against Horn and served as their spokesmen to Torcy? If such is the case, it is impossible to speak of two groups of

---

[1] E. Hjärne, *Från Vasatiden till Frihetstiden,* p. 112 ff.
[2] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* p. 75.
[3] See for example *rådsprotokoll,* July 1 and September 5, 1713. Among other things, there appears complaints that the clergy in Stockholm had given "disgraceful" sermons. The rumor-mongering was not completely free of risks for its perpetrators — a clerk fled and was searched for all over the realm after he "uttered hard words" and called Horn a "traitor" (Wibiörnsson, March 14, 1714).

sources that support each other. Does he provide first hand information? If not, where did he fetch his assertions?

First of all, an attempt must be made to describe Campredon's position, the sympathies or antipathies he entertained, and how he intended to promote France's interests. This is not difficult. It is clear that Campredon thought that Holstein's aspirations were contrary to France's interests. On May 18, (N. S.) he wrote in a letter that the Duke was surrounded by persons who "boded ill for France". Campredon wrote in the same letter: *"si Dieu disposoit du Roy de Suède, je ne voyois aucune raison qui pût engager S M:té* (sc. Ludvig XIV) *a desirer sur le trone de Suède un jeune Prince incapable de longtems de gouverner par luy meme plustost qu'une Princesse deja majeure et dont Sa M:té connoit la capacité et les bonnes intentions"*.[4] In his answer, Torcy confirmed that Louis XIV would view a plot which took away the Princess' rights with regret and displeasure.[5] The Holstein faction and its activities were reported with negatively weighted terms, such as *"les cabales des Holsteinois"*.[6] Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna were described as the leaders of the Holstein faction.[7]

The next question is: from where does Campredon's information emanate? Seldom did Campredon directly report with whom he had spoken or where his information originated. But he does provide some clues. On May 18 (N. S.), he reported that through one of the Princess' confidants — *"une personne bien intentionné et qui a accès auprès d'Elle"* — he told her that those who tried to marry her off and to convince her to reject a Regency did not act in her interest, and that they provided her with *"faux sentimens"* regarding France. He also asserted that he had *"assez d'accès auprès de cette princesse pour luy faire entendre ce qui seroient du bien"*. He should have been able to cripple the Holstein intrigues by using indirect methods to persuade the Princess not to leave the Capital.[8] Even assuming that Campredon overestimated his own importance, or consciously enlarged his own role, in order to impress his government, there is not the same reason to doubt his information concerning relatively intimate contacts with groups of people who felt threatened by Holstein's aspirations. In addition, he does not report any comparably close contacts with Horn or the supporters of the Duke. This silence points to the likelihood that he had no such contacts.

---

[4] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[5] Torcy to Campredon, June 29 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[6] Campredon to Torcy, April 30 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[7] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[8] Campredon to Torcy, May 18 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127. Cf. C. G. Malmström, *Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia under åren 1713—1720* (Uppsala 1854), p. 3 f.

The one-sided contacts and relationships evidenced in Campredon's despatches suggest the possibility that he received extremely tendentious information from persons who were enemies of Holstein's supporters and of Horn. This information remained unbalanced by the other side's version. His only protection against being led down a primrose path was his own ability to distinguish and criticize. Do his despatches bear witness to such independent judgment?

The answer is no. They reveal instead serious weaknesses. Campredon was led by his own antipathies to give a tendentious interpretation of certain events, which though in themselves innocent or irrelevant, were linked in the chain of charges against Horn. On August 23 (N. S.), when he described the Holstein manipulations, he used as a final confirmation the fact that the Duke occasionally visited Horn at his country home — hardly surprising in view of the fact that Horn was the Duke's tutor and governor.[9]

A systematic evaluation of Campredon's despatches reveals him to have been an uncritical observer, often susceptible to prevailing moods and impressions. Thus, in a letter of June 17 (N. S.) he wrote about *"les peuples desesperez et disposés à la sedition"*,[10] an expression which reappeared in a letter on July 29, (N. S.), concerning the new burden of taxation: *"les peuples disposés à la sedition en plusieurs provinces où ils refusent absolument de payer le second centième"*.[11] On August 12, he related how the commaners were *"remplis de courage et de bonne volonté"*, and how they accepted the new taxes without grumbling.[12] Such a complete change of opinion — reported by the Frenchman without the slightest reflection or question — is not corroborated anywhere. Now and then, he gave quite incorrect information or demonstrated that he misunderstood what happened. On August 19, (N. S.) he confused the exchange between Cronhielm and Wachtmeister with the Councillors in Stockholm regarding Jackson's oral message of July 21, with the controversy centering on the Council's decision in June to convene the *Riksdag*.[13] On May 18, he reported that the Princess planned to marry a Saxon prince, not Fredrik of Hessen. His November 15 (N. S.) despatch, revealed that he misunderstood completely Ulrika Eleonora's new position in the Council, by putting her at the head of that corporation as Regent.[14]

A thorough analysis of Campredon's despatches provides the following

---

[9] Campredon to Torcy, August 23 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[10] Campredon to Torcy, June 17 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[11] Campredon to Torcy, June 29 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[12] Campredon to Torcy, August 12 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[13] Campredon to Torcy, August 19 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/127.
[14] Campredon to Chateauneuf, November 15 (N. S.), 1713, Corr. pol. Suède/125.

sketch of the author: he had a strongly expressed antipathy toward the Holstein faction and its leaders, Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna; a probably one-sided set of connections with the anti-Holstein group at court; now and then a tendentious overemphasis of everyday or innocent events; a lack of ability to make distinctions. He was often poorly informed.[15] His accusations against Horn are concentrated to the point in time when he thought him to be leader of the Holstein party. In addition, none of his colleagues — the English or the Dutch residents — reported to their respective government Horn's alleged intrigues and lust for power. Rumors of Horn's dealings ought to have reached the ears of the other foreign ministers as well, since Campredon described the accusations as generally known. To the extent that the information was judged to be reliable, the other residents ought to have found it important enough to include in their reports — they did not. Reasonably interpreted, this would mean that Jackson and Rumpf discounted it for unreliable propaganda.

Campredon's antipathies, one-sided connections, lack of critical ability, and unreliability suggests that his accusations against Horn are extremely tendentious, resulting from his impressions of a domestic propaganda campaign initiated by persons who, for different reasons, opposed Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna. It seems very likely that there is a direct interdependency between the despatches and the propaganda. The despatches seem to be dependent on the propaganda material.

Both the despatches and the propaganda contain reckless statements, charges and rumors, but no first hand information, no direct evidence. This alone leads to an obvious question: if Horn and Nils Gyllenstierna were guilty as accused, would they have acted so nonchalant, indiscret and rash that they allowed knowledge of the plot to be spread and become known before they could act? That would have been against Horn's nature, and therefore, it seems unlikely that he acted in such a manner. Apparently, no defector from a plot appeared. The whole affair could be written off as the

---

[15] S. Grauers, who used Campredon's despatches in his biography of Horn, reveals no systematic analysis of them but yet made similar observations — "He (Campredon) gives out all kinds of information, truth and lies in a complacent mixture. What he one day finds true and immutable, he finds completely unbelievable the next... The fact is that he is no witness to the truth, as one quickly learns. His interests are directed to persons rather than to issues, his descriptions are quite subjective, he weaves fantasy and reality in such a way, that he does not always make it easy for the reader to distinguish the truth" (S. Grauers, *Arvid Bernhard Horn,* I, p. IX f.). Grauers dated the origin of Campredon's suspicion of Horn to the summer of 1709 when Horn consented to an English demand to place an embargo on Pomeranian grain shipments to France. Campredon, who earlier considered Horn to be a friend of France, felt himself duped and thereafter saw him as "the great intriguer and conspirator; treachery and fraud followed in his footsteps" (*Ibid.,* p. 155).

product of domestic propaganda spread when emotions were high pitched, if it were not for the existence of additional sources which cannot be so easily dismissed.

It has been noted that no first hand information or direct evidence was given to corroborate such a conspiracy. No written evidence was preserved. But Axel von Fersen, the Elder, bears wit ness to the existence of a written piece of evidence. His account — which is worth repeating *in extenso* — is as follows: "that this abusive and unlawful 1714 *Riksdag,* which was a product of Count Horn's intrigues and Princess Ulrika's consultation, was widely approved and was directed at King Charles' crown, is evidenced in a document which contains Count Horn's and the Council's schemes for that *Riksdag,* I found this document at Mälsåker castle among the papers of my stepmother's father, Councillor of the Realm, Count Carl Gyllenstierna. The goal of that scheme was briefly: that the Realm be saved and peace concluded, and if the King refused to do that, the Estates of the Realm would secure themselves and the Realm, whatever the cost might be. This was signed by most of the Councillors who served at that time under the heading: One for all and all for one. The document was copied in Count Gyllenstierna's own hand. In 1757 I donated it to Councillor Anders Höpken's collection."[16]

As has been shown by S. U. Palme[17] and which is also evidenced by the many mistakes and misunderstandings in the text, at least two decades separate von Fersen's account from the event. Because so much time had elapsed, there is great risk that he forgot some of the details, or misjudged his recollections. But one aspect of the matter is quite clear: the document could scarcely have been an original. In such case, it is less likely that von Fersen would have donated it. Von Fersen asserts that it was copied in Carl Gyllenstierna's handwriting, i. e., it was a copy. This is one point on which von Fersen could have been mistaken after so many years. Moreover, it could have represented the written remains of an alternative plan which was rejected, or never even seriously considered. Even the "signatures" could have been part of the draft. There is little value in von Fersen's account and his assertions indict neither Horn nor his colleagues in the Council.

Accusations against Horn reappear, however, in a later narrative source, *Facta till Revolutions-Historien under Carl XII:s regering,* printed in HSH 7. After learning of the defeat at Poltava and during the King's sojourn in Turkey, the Swedes at home, according to the anonymous author of *Facta,*

---

[16] *Fredrik Axel von Fersens Historiska Skrifter,* 1, p. 24. Fersen's manuscript in *Stafsundsarkivet, A. von Fersens d. ä. arkiv,* vol. 3, RA. Cf. Thanner, *op. cit.,* p. 40.
[17] S. U. Palme, *Fredrik Axel von Fersens memoarer* (PHT 1936).

began to entertain "far-reaching designs" and to "consider a new constitution". In this connection, he mentions Per and Conrad Ribbing, Leijonmarck, Lars Molin, Eric Benzelius and J. Wulfenstierna. He describes their program as being "the model for that which *taliter qualiter* was born, and in 1719 approved". This anonymous writer claims that Horn had not been ignorant of the plans. He continues: "That man, in spite of the fact that he had been the King's favorite comrade, indulged in all sorts of machinations during the King's absence in Turkey, but covered his tracks, was very careful in all his doings, and was bold. From the time that the defeat at Poltava and the King's flight to Turkey became known in Sweden 1709, secret meetings regarding the above mentioned plot were held".[18] Horn appeared "those days no more often than he chose, thus, long hiding his thoughts and aspirations."[19]

Facta appeared decades after the events it describes.[20] The author claims to have been a contempory to these events. Yet the source showed not to be especially valuable concerning information which dates from many years before it was written and which cannot be corroborated in other sources. In the meantime it appears, as will be shown, that an oral tradition developed surrounding these events. Spokesmen for such an oral tradition, whether or not they claim to have been eyewitnesses, must be viewed with strong reservation. They could have discussed the situation with others, and the distinction between their own experiences and the impressions left by others' accounts could have been erased, providing opportunity for confusion and misunderstanding. One must also have the insight to see that a successful revolution could tempt some people to, after the fact, exaggerate their own contributions for the cause of freedom, and that rationalizations and recollections after the events mark the quality of the oral tradition that emerges. Between the events of 1713 and 1714, and the time at which this account is dated, occured the Great Changes of 1719.

Carl Gustaf Tessin's writings represent the same oral tradition as that found in *Facta*. His account is also written several decades after the events in question. Tessin relates the contents of an anonymous pamphlet which circulated during the *Riksdag* of 1714 "which demonstrates that the idea to depose absolute monarchy was current at that time." The first point

---

18 HSH 7, pp. 214 ff.
19 HSH 7, p. 218.
20 E. Hjärne in *"Från Vasatiden till Frihetstiden"* (Stockholm 1929), p. 234, note 68, referred to an unpublished research from 1911 which would show that A. L. Stierneld was the author, and that it was written during the 1790's at the earliest. In Hjärne's papers in UUB, which still have not been organized and catalogued, no completed research could be found — only some loose pages on which evidence of Stierneld's authorship are noted.

reportedly was that the Princess be asked to ascend the throne, and that by an act of the *Riksdag* "the authority of the Royal Councillors and the freedom of the Estates be granted." According to Tessin it had been thought that the brothers Per and Conrad Ribbing took part in these plans.[21] Tessin's statements appear to agree with certain assertions in *Facta*. Assuming that *Facta* was written during the 1790's, it is likely based on oral tradition, of which Tessin's notes, several decades earlier, are an example. But it ought to be pointed out that Tessin does not mention any participation by Horn in these projects, and in another connection, his characterization of Horn, if anything, refutes the possibility that he — at least, on that occasion — considered it. During the reigns of Charles XII and Queen Ulrika Eleonora Horn had reportedly not been free from trouble, "but his honor was inclined to increase rather than diminish, who, in such an office, can consider himself faultless."[22] If Horn's participation in the alleged plots during the 1713—1714 *Riksdag* is deleted from *Facta*, it agrees with Tessin. Perharps the reason for this was that tales of Horn's participation originated elsewhere.

An example of the development of the oral tradition is found in A. J. Höpken's publications. Writing about Horn, Höpken asserts that when the question of licensing the Councillors was discussed in the 1738—39 *Riksdag*, Eric Benzelius the younger excused Horn "for the outspokenness with which the Count sought to obtain freedom for the Realm as early as 1713".[23] In reality, Benzelius had only — according to the minutes — spoken of "what he (Horn) did in 1714, when, during the reign of a sovereign King managed to convene the *Riksdag*. This shows a big heart."[24] Horn's attempt to "obtain freedom" is thus something which occured during the recounting of Benzelius, speech.

Another source ought to be mentioned in this context. *Journal de Pierre le Grand* asserts that the Council intended to conclude peace without regard for the King, and establish "un gouvernement republicain" in Sweden. Here again, the cited information is not contemporary with the events. The author is said to have received his information several years later.[25]

---

[21] *Tessin och Tessiniana*, p. 395. The pamphlet in question was considered to be "The well meant views of a simple-minded Uppland Peasant" (E. Hjärne, *op. cit.*, p. 118 f, note 77). Fryxell repeats Campredon's report that the work was written by a "premier medecin du roi", i. e. either by Riben or Urban Hjärne (Fryxell, *op. cit.*, p. 159 f.). On Hjärne's purported participation in the groundwork for 1719's constitutional reform, see Thanner, *op. cit.*, p. 374, note 152.

[22] L 82:1:8 *Åkerödagboken*, pag. 1734 f., KB.

[23] *Anders Johan von Höpkens skrifter*, I (Stockholm 1890), p. 20.

[24] *SU protokoll*, February 20, 1739.

[25] *Journal de Pierre le Grand* (Stockholm, 1774), p. 446. Hjärne thinks this is "a somewhat suspect source" (E. Hjärne, *op. cit.*, p. 113). See also *Anmärkningar i Swenska Historien, Samlade af et Sälskap*, I:2 (Stockholm, no date), p. 162.

Thus, it appears that an oral tradition, developed during the decades after the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714. It asserted that secret preparations were under way in 1713—14 to prepare for a change of government and a reform of the constitution for the purpose of abolishing the absolute monarchy. Per and Conrad Ribbing, S. Leijonmarck, E. Benzelius the younger, L. Molin and J. Wulfvenstierna reportedly were the leaders. Horn was also said to have been involved, and to have clandestinely co-operated with certain of the spokesmen for the peace proponents in the Estates. The sources based on oral tradition have already been evaluated. But the time lapse factor is not the only one which ought to be considered. There is also the risk that all of the assertions rising from the oral tradition have in reality the same origin, and that they therefore, do not corroborate one another. Traditional assertions are not necessarily more dependable because they are made by several people. This does not completely preclude the possibility that the oral tradition of 1713—1714, originate in the anti-Holstein and anti-Council propaganda. As long as this remains a possibility these sources must be rejected as potentially tendentious.

So far, only the statements arising from oral tradition which include Horn in the alleged 1713—1714 *Riksdag* preparations for a new regime have been considered. In this sense, an artificial distinction has been made, since other statements of the same or similar traditions place Horn's contribution in the entire or parts of the decade before the death of Charles XII.[26] Two of the spokesmen for the oral tradition give A. J. von Höpken as their source, but differ on what they thought Höpken actually said.[27]

The only known first-hand account of the preparations for the new constitution of 1719, is A. Fredenstierna's memorandum on the carrying out of the laws *(memorial om lagarnas verkställighet),* a very apologetic report submitted to the 1766 *Riksdag* — half a century after the events under discussion. The purpose of the report was to refute the criticism against the authors of the Constitution. Fredenstierna participated in framing the new constitution, though only as secretary to Per Ribbing and C. G. Gyllencreutz.[28] The aide-mémoire provides no sure *terminus post quem* in the matter of the first preparations, even though 1716, seems most likely in the indication of such a limit.[29] It should be noted that the years 1713

---

[26] See, for example, Serenius' statement in the Secret Committee on Nov. 28, 1738, that Horn had born "the keystone of our freedom", and Schönberg to Bergius, March 31, 1778, cited by Thanner, *op. cit.,* p. 374, note 153.
[27] E. Hjärne, *op. cit.,* p. 122.
[28] L. Thanner, *op. cit.,* p. 42 f., E. Hjärne, *op. cit.,* p. 123.
[29] E. Hjärne, *op. cit.,* p. 235, note 85.

and 1714 are not mentioned in the aide-mémoire. The oral tradition, which places the first preparations during these years, could not have been based on Fredenstierna's aide-mémoire — the only known first hand information. The oral tradition tied to these years seems to have existed before the aide-mémoire was presented. It is possible to venture an interpretation that asserts that the better grounded tradition regarding the constitutional discussions of 1716—1718 was coupled with the remaining propagandistic accusations of 1713—1714, against Horn so that the *terminus post quem* in the oral tradition that developed was shifted to the earlier years.

The extent to which 19th century research depended on the tradition's extremely dubious information describing the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714 and the events connected with it is remarkable. Geijer bases his account partly on Schönberg and partly — it seems obvious — on *Facta*. He refers generally to those "who were more familiar with that age".[30] Bowallius specifically refers to *Facta* in his description of the opposition party in the Estates which reportedly prepared a revision of the Constitution, and he took over the assertion in *Facta* that Horn was involved.[31] Even Fryxell based his work on *Facta*.[32] In the same uncritical manner, Fryxell and then Tengberg described the policies of Horn and the Council on the basis of Campredon's despatches.[33]

As has been noted, Campredon's despatches must be suspected of having been influenced by propaganda hostile to the Council and the Holstein faction. Neither can it be precluded that the later oral tradition regarding the events of 1713—14, originated in the propaganda which, for various reasons, attacked Horn and questioned his honor, his intentions and his politics.

THE ALLIANCE PROJECT

Meanwhile the *Theory of Conspiracy* might appear to be more useful when examined in the light of the surviving documentary evidence describing the work of the *Riksdag*. A curious and repeated theme in connection with that *Riksdag* is the fiction that the Councillors, on certain occasions, were said to have functioned as members of the First Estate instead of as Councillors. As early as December 29, Tessin suggested that the Councillors, as representatives for the First Estate, participate in the Estates' committee of banking.[34]

---

[30] E. G. Geijer, *Teckning af Sveriges tillstånd*, p. 50.
[31] Bowallius, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
[32] A. Fryxell, *op. cit.* XXV, p. 261.
[33] A. Fryxell, *op. cit.* XXV, pp. 157 ff. N. Tengberg, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[34] See Chapter IV, p. 103.

The memorandum which was produced within the Secret Committee before the committee's meeting with the Council on February 3, appealed to the Councillors that they "both as Councillors of the Realm and members of the Estates General" attend joint discussions with the committee.[35] The February 3 meeting, began with a reading of that appeal, whereupon Horn, after a private discussion with his colleagues — this appears to be a direct reply — announced that the Councillors then and there would confer with the committee, not in their role as Councillors, but as members of the Estates. It was in that capacity — according to his own understanding — that he later during the meeting demanded that the Estates' authority to negotiate peace should be giwen to the Council.[36]

These observations must be compared with the copy of the document of conspiracy which Axel von Fersen claims to have seen. Von Fersen asserted that this conspiracy had as its goal, the preservation of the Realm and the conclusion of peace, and if the King refused to do that, the Estates of the Realm would secure themselves and the Realm, whatever the cost might be. Most of the Councillors reportedly signed the document under the slogan "One for all and all for one".[37] It is remarkable that the Councillors of the Realm committed themselves to the Estates' conduct. Such a plan for common action by the Estates under the motto "one for all and all for one" brings to mind Duke Karl's conflicts with King Sigismund during the 1590's — and in its extention, of a precedent — Sigismund's dethronement in 1599 by the *Riksdag* in Stockholm. Here looms the possibility that Horn, following Duke Karl's example, could have tried to provoke statements from the Estates and use propaganda to manipulate popular opinion to obtain peace and — possibly — the eventual dethronement of the King.

Which prerogatives have the Councillors assigned to the Estates and themselves in their capacity as representatives of the Estates? Naturally, the answer is not to be sought in the Council's minutes. But a private source provides an answer. Wibiörnsson reports that the Councillors who, as has been shown, at the dramatic March 15 meeting, disassociated themselves from Leijonmarck's memo — in fact expressed their approval earlier. They were "very pleased with it and praised it highly".[38] Leijonmarck writes in his memorandum about the Estates as representatives of "the whole community and *populum* . . . of whose power and right on such occasions are all the less in doubt, as *Acta publica,* especially *Carolina* and *Sigismundiana*

---

35 See Chapter V, p. 138.
36 See Chapter V, p. 138.
37 See Chapter VII, p. 178.
38 Wibiörnsson's diary, March 5, 1714.

as many more examples demonstrate." Furthermore, he refers to the Estates' confirmation of the 1634 Form of Government, and to their authorization of the 1660 regency government.[39] On the other hand, he does not mention the Estates' declarations of 1680 and 1682, which ratified the absolute monarchy. Reference to earlier forms of government and historical precedents while ignoring later declarations by the Estates, could above all be interpreted as an expression of the belief that these, in the prevailing situation, could be rescinded or suspended.[40] However, the point of Leijonmarck's memorandum is plain enough: the Estates are considered to be the source of the sovereignty of the people.

In its acts the Council supported Leijonmarck's thesis concerning the Estates' power and authority. In its repeated attempts before and during the *Riksdag* to provoke or to solicit directly the authority to negotiate before the coming peace talks rests an indirect recognition of the Estates' power and authority. A relegation of authority must in principle mean that the body which relegates transfers its own powers to the recipient. In its demand the Council admitted the Estates' right, during the absence of the King to exercise a *jus regii:* the right to conclude peace. This acknowledgment by the Council could, of course, have been halfhearted and determined by the political necessity to attain legitimacy in the eyes of foreign statesmen as peace negotiator. It might also have represented necessary pressure on the King for the purpose of achieving peace. But the result remains the same. The Councils' indirect acknowledgment of the authority of the Estates and their attempt to share that authority must in the end, be seen as determined by foreign policy considerations.

The evidence is too fragmentary and undependable — especially von Fersen's account — to from the basis for a sound hypothesis that a plan for common action won support. But at least it appears that such a plan could have been the object of discussion between councillors and representatives of the Estates, and that the copy described by von Fersen is a relic of such contacts. But it does not follow that preparations were made, or even that the issue was seriously considered. But it is likely that eventual plots — if there were such — took place within the proposed framework of an alliance of the Estates.

---

[39] *SU prot.*, appendix 60.

[40] Compare P. Renvall: "since the absolute monarchy had risen from the Estates' proclamations, it was, according to Leijonmarck, nothing revolutionary when the Estates decided the issue in this case as well" *(Finsk representation i Sveriges riksdag*, p. 193). It is also worth observing that when in his memorandum on May 30, 1713, Tessin proposed the convening of the Estates he referred to the 1634 Form of Government as the legal basis.

Chapter VIII Review of the Work of the riksdag

No Swedish *Riksdag* had been convened since 1697 — in 1710, there was only a committee meeting. In December, 1713, when the Estates were again assembled, the conditions were very different from the prevailing situation in 1697. Therefore, there is reason to, on the basis of the preceding account, collect and organize certain observations regarding the work of the *Riksdag* which could denote new tendencies.

It has been remarked that the Swedish *Riksdag,* when it was assembled in 1713—1714, "was on the way out of the passiveness, to which it was assigned by the absolute monarchy. The demand to share responsibility was again — if only in tentative and uncertain forms — voiced by the Estates. The *Riksdag* was on the way to regain its status as an independent source of political power".[1] The observation is confirmed, but it remains uncertain whether the official *Riksdag* papers fully reflect the *Riksdag's* new role and strengthened self-esteem. The Estates' demands in their most far-reaching manifestations, are reported in committee proposals and noted in a private *Riksdag* diary, but are not recorded in the minutes. According to this diary, it appears that radical statements and radical suggestions materialized primarily within the smaller deputations named to work out Estates' proposals, memoranda for the Council, or other such statements. Apparently, no minutes were kept at these meetings. The demand that the Nobility regain its ancient right to name its own representatives to the Secret Committee was another demonstration of increased self-esteem.

A review of the work of the *Riksdag* clearly reveals the dominant role of the Secret Committee. The most important discussions took place in the Committee, and it represented the assembled Estates to the Council. That is not surprising, since the issues on which the *Riksdag* was to take a stand were expressed in the secret proposition and then presented at the Council's joint, closed meetings with the Secret Committee. It could, however, seem curious that the Secret Committee, whose members were named by the Council, opposed the Council's restrained peace policies more vigorously than the separate Estates. This could support the assumption that the Council could have wanted such opposition.

[1] S. Grauers, *Riksdagen under den karolinska tiden,* p. 143.

Different views regarding the policy that ought to be carried out were manifested in the *Riksdag*. Persons with the same or similar views seem to have co-operated, but this does not lead to the conclusion that political parties in the modern sense existed, much less party discipline. Factions emerged in connection with three questions: the question of taxation, where there existed common economic interest; the peace question; and the questions regarding a regency. In the latter case, there seem to have been fundamental differencies of opinion, which were so great, and interpretations of the constitution so varied, that there was only temporary unity in order to reach specific and immediate goals. Even considering the broader definition of the word "party" current at that time, the term is almost never used in descriptions of the parliamentary situation or in the minutes. When it is used, it is used dispariginly, as when Coyet warned about the emergence of two parties that would only cause division. Nevertheless, it is necessary to realize that contemporary sources do not reveal everything. The Dutch Resident, basing his reports on the efforts made within the *Riksdag* to convince Ulrika Eleonora to accept the Regency, wrote about royalists — those who demonstrated their loyalty to the King in his absence, and recommended unqualified obedience to his orders — and their opponents, who would facilitate the Princess' Regency:

Les dits Royalistes, qui ne ressemblent pas mal aux Toris d'Angleterre, puisqu'ils ne sont pas moins ardents, que ceux-ci, à soutenir l'obeissance passive et la non-resistance . . .

are set against

les Principaux du Parti contraire, qu'on peut mettre en pareille avec les Whigs Anglois.[2]

It is difficult to judge how solid his analogies are — the point of departure seems to have been the different attitudes toward a more or less unqualified obedience to the absolute monarch.

An item in Jackson's papers also deserves mention — his assertion that the Councillors thereatened to resign if the sponsors of the Princess' regency continued to press their demands.[3] The threat seems to be a harbinger of a modern parliamentary system in which a government resigns when it no longer holds the confidence of the *Riksdag* or represents the policies of the majority. Such an interpretation would be too much influenced by twen-

[2] Rumpf to Heinsius, March 3 (N.S.), 1714. In his letter of March 24 he again writes about *"Les whigs"*.
[3] Jackson to Bromley, February 27, 1714.

tieth-century conceptions. The actual situation could have been that the Council's threat was a pure means of blackmail, forcing a seemingly desperate and divided *Riksdag* to discipline and good sense, in view of a development of a revolutionary situation in which the Council could be set aside. After such an extorted resignation, the Councillors could however continue to play a part, though only as members of the First Estate.

When Charles XII returned to Sweden, it was confirmed that the cautious formulation of the minutes of the *Riksdag* was justified — in fact, more caution should have been exercised. On November 24 (N. S.), 1714, Rumpf reported a rumor that the King prepared an inspection of *"les discours qui ont été faits à la dernière Diette contre les droits et l'autorité Royale"*.[4] On February 19, 1715, after the King left Turkey and established his headquarters in Stralsund, the last Swedish fortress on the Continent, Horn, in a letter to the King promised to comply with the order delivered by Feif to submit the texts of the general and the secret propositions, the Estates' decisions, and the minutes kept in the Secret Committee and the *Riddarhus*. In addition, Horn himself decided to include the minutes kept by the Clergy and the Burghers. He made the request for these documents through the chief prosecutor, Chancery Councillor A. Leijonstedt.[5] According to another source — Axel von Fersen, who recorded a remark by Secretary of the First Estate, J. Wulfvenstierna, who was also the secretary of the Secret Committee in 1713—1714 — after the King arrived in Sweden he commanded Wulfvenstierna to bring the minutes of the *Riksdag* to his headquarters in Lund. When Wulfvenstierna was about to surrender them, he pointed out that "His Majesty ought to find many unpleasant items in them, so that he would be tempted to vengeance, and, thus, mark the happy homecoming with misfortune and punishment. The King listened to him patiently, and did not open the minutes but ordered him to return with his papers".[6] There seem to have been no additional measures against the Estates.[7]

However, it seemed at the beginning as if the Council would be more adversely affected by the King's displeasure. After Charles XII's arrival in Stralsund in November, 1714, he communicated to the Council the reasons for his dissatisfaction with their way of giving orders,[8] and through the

---

[4] Rumpf to Heinsius, November 24 (N. S.), 1714.
[5] Horn to Charles XII, February 19, 1715, Skrivelser till Konungen, Karl XII:s tid, ser. II, RA.
[6] *F. A. von Fersens Historiska Skrifter* I, p. 24.
[7] C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[8] Campredon to Torcy, December 8 (N. S.), 1714. See also Rumpf to Heinsius, December 8 (N. S.), 1714.

Chief Prosecutor, A. Leijonstedt, sealed the minutes that were kept in the Council chambers during his absence.[9] On February 19, 1715, Horn acknowledged receipt of the King's order to render the minutes of the Council, and stated that he, in order to avoid suspicion asked the Chief Prosecutor to make extracts from the minutes.[10] According to what the Dutch Resident reports, Leijonstedt, who received Charles XII's order to read the minutes and prosecute violations of the King's orders, confronted each of the Councillors (with the exception of Meijerfelt) with the charges raised against them. The Councillors would submit a written reply to the charges.[11] But the issue dragged on,[12] and the inquisition was never pursued.[13] Only in one case, did the action follow through; in February 1716, Jacob Reenstierna was convicted by the Svea High Court of Appeals of contradicting the King's order by allowing a breaking of the blockade of the ports in Livonia, Estonia and Ingria, now being held by the enemy.[14]

---

[9] Campredon to Torcy, December 15 (N. S.), 1714.
[10] Horn to Charles XII, February 19, 1715. *Skrivelser till Konungen, Karl XII:s tid*, ser. II, RA. The copies to which Horn refers are presumably those collected in vol. *rådsprotokoll 112*, concerning the 1713—1714 *Riksdag*, most of them copied by Secretary Carlson (See S. Bergh, *Rådsprotokoll och därmed jämförliga i riksarkivet förvarade protokoll*, MRA NF I:30, p. 306, note 2).
[11] Rumpf to Heinsius, May 14 (N. S.), 1715.
[12] Rumpf to Heinsius, May 20 and June 11 (N. S.), 1715.
[13] C. G. Malmström, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
[14] See also S. Jägerskiöld, *Juridik och politik. Studier i karolinsk straffrätt* (KFÅ 1963), pp. 82 ff.

Excursus "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates"

"THE SPEECH OF THE FOUR FINNISH ESTATES"

The problem of who was the anonymous author of "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates" has been the object of debate. Because the tract is discussed in this thesis as a link in the chain of circumstances, a discussion of the authorship is appropriate here. The discussion was launched when Rosén published his *"Det engelska anbudet om fredsmedling 1713"*. His theory is largely accepted in the context of this paper, but will be argued from a different point of view.[1]

Rosén proceeds from the essential factor of the problem — that of the sequence of events. Knowledge of the English offer spread so quickly, and the pamphlet circulated so soon that it is impossible that it was a statement of the will of the Finnish Estates. It is therefore "meaningless to search for its origin in Finland". In addition, Rosén points out the pamphlet's demand for the dictatorship of the Council before the Riksdag convened, and that the Estates of Stockholm would protect the Council from unpleasant consequences by guaranteeing "one for all and all for one", "that it, in the future would not be blamed for usurpation of the King's power". Rosén views the words "as a direct answer to the fear of the King's retribution, expressed by Horn and the Council to Jackson, if they opened peace negotiations", and asserts that the origin of the tract could be found "at the center".[2]

W. Ahlström in *"Alla fyra ständernas i Finland tal"* (in *Festskrift till Gottfrid Carlsson,* Lund, 1952) wrote a polemic against Rosén. But he does not directly refute the above mentioned points. He asserts, however, that the Council was not responsible for the appearance of the pamphlet and cites the following three arguments: 1. The tract presented a program for the defense of Finland that partially conflicts with the Council's intentions and policies. 2. If the tract originated in the Council and was meant to work for it, it is hard to understand why all the specifically Finnish material was included. 3. Ahlström found information that some drafts of reports, in

---

1 The copy of the pamphlet cited is found in D 831:2, KB.
2 J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet,* pp. 48—52.

which some of the pamphlet's demands were presented, were in the possession of the person he considers to be the author.[3]

Ahlström asserts that the pamphlet's demand for reinforcements to Finland contradicted the Council's war plans. To support this assertion he uses some quotations from the Council's minutes for the period March—May, 1713, which state the necessity to give priority to the defense of the capital at the expense of efforts to defend Finland.[4] But if these attitudes existed during the spring, it does not necessarily mean that they also existed during the summer. On August 11 and 12, the Council, when faced with the prospect that Åbo might fall, planned to send troops to Finland.[5]

Ahlström cannot understand why the tract presents Finnish demands if the Council actually was behind it, and asks why "all that material was included" if the originators really wanted to say other things. The answer is simply that the tract presents Finnish demands because it purports to be of Finnish origin. It has been previously established that the pamphlet must have been produced in Stockholm during the month of July. It was disguised as a declaration by the Finnish Estates. On that basis, the Finnish demands were possibly added to give the pamphlet credibility and authenticity.

Because the tract is not actually a declaration by the Finnish Estates, it does not mean that its perpetrator was not Finnish. The only way to proceed is to ask the question: who did it help? The tract presents two groups of demands: demands regarding the realm's government and politics, and special Finnish demands. Because of the tract's established *alleged* origin, the Finnish demands are less useful if an answer is sought to that question. The expressed demands concerning the future of the realm are the following: the dictatorship of the Council for the remainder of the year, the Stockholm Estates' guarantee of the Council against the King, the summons of a *Riksdag* and peace negotiations. The first two points are remarkable. Considering evidence of the Council's poor reputation, tottering authority, and the general lack of confidence from the public it experienced; it is difficult to imagine such demands originating any place but in the Council.

Ahlström asserts that the author was Johannes Gezelius, the Bishop of Åbo. He points out that Gezelius travelled to Stockholm at the beginning of June to obtain the dismissal of General Lybecker, the commander in Finland, and the reinforcement of Finland's defenses. Thus far, the pamphlet's program concurs with some of Gezelius' known views.

---

[3] W. Ahlström, *"Alla fyra ständernas i Finland tal"* (in *Festskrift till Gottfrid Carlsson*, Lund 1952), pp. 258 ff., 266 f.
[4] W. Ahlström, *op. cit.*, p. 258 f.
[5] *Rådsprotokoll*, August 11 and 12, 1713.

Finally, Ahlström refers to I. Tengström — the author of a biography of Gezelius — who, among the bishop's papers (which shortly thereafter were lost in a fire), found three drafts of reports written in Gezelius' hand. These drafts do not, however, indicate how they would be used. They proposed that the Estates request the Council to govern the realm as a dictator during the King's absence, accept the English Queen's offer to mediate peace and send an army to Finland. With them, according to Ahlström, the "evidence is complete" and the pamphlet's contents "could lead back to" Gezelius. "It can therefore be considered proven, that the Speech of the Four Finnish Estates was written by the Bishop of Åbo, Johannes Gezelius the Younger".[6] This is certainly a poorly thought out method of establishing a causal connection: *because* three such drafts were found among the Bishop's papers, his authorship is "proven". Ahlström himself has never seen the drafts, and he does not know when or in what connection they originated. It is possible that Gezelius wrote them, *influenced* by "The Speech of the Four Finnish Estates". They could have been copies that Gezelius made of the pamphlet after he received a copy. As proof, the report of Tengström's discovery is worthless.

Actually, certain circumstances support Gezelius' authorship: he was in Stockholm during the summer and was in contact with members of the Council, to whom he submitted some memoranda concerning various problems.[7] The pamphlet expresses certain views that Gezelius expressed in other contexts (Finland's defense, the firing of Lybecker) and which were expressed in the papers he left. Yet, it seems unlikely that Gezelius, independently and on his own initiative, wrote the pamphlet in order to pressure the Council to act on his proposal and carry out the policies he found right. During his stay in Stockholm he maintained contact with members of the Council. Why did he not then simply present his views and proposals to the Council, verbally or in a memorandum? Would it not have been much simplier — a surer and quicker way to influence the Council than to write and distribute an anonymous pamphlet? The pamphlet is not directed *exclusively* to the Stockholm Estates; many of its proposals could only be acted on by the Council. Gezelius scarcely needed to fear that a string of demands that would greatly increase the Council's power and authority would be so unwelcome in its midst that he felt himself forced to appear anonymously. However, it is possible that the Council used Gezelius as its tool, since it was known that their views partially concurred on certain

---

[6] W. Ahlström, *op. cit.*, p. 266 ff.
[7] *Rådsprotokoll*, June 10, July 14, 28, 1713.

points. The problem is brought back to the point of departure: the pamphlet was apparently inspired by the Council.[8]

Earlier, the author was assumed to have been the Vice-President of the Åbo Court of Appeals Sven Leijonmarck.[9] This possibility is firmly rejected by Rosén, who points out the discrepancy between the pamphlet's program and the position Leijonmarck reportedly took during the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714.[10] Some hitherto unremarked circumstances suggest that Leijonmarck really was the author.

In the pamphlet's *pro et contra* discussion (objectio 1:ma) there is a reference to the *kassationsakt* of 1689's confirmation that the Council was not *mediatores* between the King and the Estates. The statement that the Royal Councillors had that position was struck from the minutes taken during Charles XI's minority.[11] The author deals with this argument by referring to "the contents of the *Riksdag* papers concerning this issue" and "history itself *eius facti*", which were supposed to indicate that that time it concerned the realm's "flourishing condition" during the King's presence. Reference to point 5 in the *kassationsakt* was therefore irrelevant in the realm's prevailing necessity. Naturally, many people must have had knowledge of the *kassationsakt* in 1713, as has been previously pointed out. But Leijonmarck must have been especially knowledgeable, since he was the official in the royal chancery who went through the Council's minutes and extracted the parts that formed the basis for the drawing up of the act.[12]

Among the pamphlets various suggestions to improve the budget, there is a proposal to mortgage the Avesta copper smelter to the Master of the Mint for 60,000 riksdalers. The author refers to the fact that it had been done once before, to the Master of the Mint Abraham Cronström for 80,000 daler. The author reveals he is well informed. The transaction took place in December 1667, when Abraham Cronström and his brother Isak accepted Avesta from the Crown against a loan of 82,000 riksdalers specie. It was bought back in February, 1668, by the Vice-President of the *Bergs-*

---

[8] It can be mentioned that one of Eric Benzelius' correspondents, Carl Serlachius, wrote from Stockholm on June 18 about the reverses in Finland and the displeasure there with General Lybecker: "How much His Excellency Bishop Gezelius, who *as the deputy of all of Finland* (authors' italics) has arrived here to submit an appeal, shall accomplish remains to be seen" (Br. 10:4, LSB). It is impossible in any source to show that Gezelius, in his journey to Stockholm, represented anyone other than himself. Serlachius' expression ought to be taken figuratively.
[9] S. Grauers, *Några bidrag*, p. 212 f., A. Fryxell, *op. cit.* XXV. p. 156 f.
[10] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 49, note 114.
[11] G. Hasselberg, *op. cit.*, chapter 14. Statements collected in the *kassationsakt*'s point 5.
[12] *Ibid.*

kollegium (College of Mines), Lorentz Creutz the Elder, for the same amount.[13]

This event, which took place more than a half century earlier, could not have been nearly as well known as the contents of the 1689 *kassationsakt* and its origins. It must be assumed that someone familiar with Avesta's history made the suggestion. Sven Leijonmarck became Creutz' secretary in 1675, and received in his name the minted copper and used it to pay the expenses of the fleet and for payments to the bank.[14] Leijonmarck was, therefore, familiar with Avesta's history.

Another, more obvious reason to suspect that Leijonmarck was the author, is that he, as vice-president of the Åbo Court of Appeals, served in Finland and was familiar with its special conditions and needs. The special Finnish requests would then not have been a disguise. The decisive question must be: Was Leijonmarck in Stockholm in July, 1713? As previously established, the pamphlet originated in Stockholm in July, 1713.

One section of the Council functioned as the highest Court of Appeals in the Kingdom. According to this section's minutes for July 7, Leijonmarck requested that it adress to the Svea Court of Appeals a *promotorial* — i. e., in this case a directive presumably requesting a prompt decision — concerning a litigation to which he was a party. His request was granted.[15] His letter has not been found — its place and date would have been useful. But it seems likely that Leijonmarck in connection with a visit in Stockholm asked for the appeals' *promotorial* to the Court of Appeals regarding a case to which he was a party. He could have wished to be present when it was discussed. His presence in Stockholm seems likely.

Rosén's rejection of the thesis that Leijonmarck was the author as "incongruous",[16] on the basis of the difference between the pamphlet's program and the position Leijonmarck took during the *Riksdag* of 1713—1714, deserves to be examined closer. Leijonmarck's position during the *Riksdag* appears most clearly in his memorandum of February 25, 1714. The program in this should be compared with the *pro et contra* discussion in the pamphlet.

The pamphlet presents the demand that the Stockholm Estates appeal to the Council to govern the Realm and as a dictator, *absolutely direct* the

---

[13] G. Wittrock, *Lorentz Creutz d. ä.* (SBL IX).
[14] S. Bring, *Bidrag till Sven Leijonmarcks biografi* (Uppsala 1916), p. 14 f., 40 f.
[15] *Justitierevisionens protokoll*, July 7, 1713.
[16] J. Rosén, *Det engelska anbudet*, p. 49, note 114.

war according to the forms of government of 1635 and 1661,[17] and guarantee and insure one for all and all for one that it would not be attacked as an usurpation of the King's sovereignty. Thus, the Council would govern the realm on the strength of the Estates' petition and previous forms of government. These forms of government are repeated as legal grounds in the memorandum. In the pamphlet a series of arguments are presented to show that they were in force in the prevailing situation. The anonymous author, of course, admits that the 1634 form of government with its *additament* was never approved by a reigning King and could not bind one. But the lack of approbation could not pertain to clearly defined cases: the King's minority, the King's long and incapacitating illness, and the King's sojourn in a foreign land. Even less could the anonymous author understand that the form of government would be completely annulled regarding *salutem Regis, populi et regni* which was *suprema lex*. He points out that Charles XI in his will referred to the form of government and thereby confirmed it. The argument reveals great likenesses to the one in the memorandum: there earlier forms of government are also referred to as legal grounds for the recommended course of action, the Estates' declarations of 1680 and 1682 are not discussed or are suggested to be out of force because of the desperate situation and the King's absence. The similarities of the pamphlet and the memorandum are fundamental. In both cases the recommended measures — the Council's investiture with dictatorial powers and the Princess' appointment as regent — find their legal basis in earlier forms of government and in the Estates' request. In both cases, the purpose was to create a strong executive power, legitimized by the Estates, which — in contrast to the King — approved the 1634 Form of Government with its later *additament*. In both cases the government receives its ultimate power from the representatives of the sovereignty of the people — the Estates.

If Leijonmarck is assumed to be the author, it should also be assumed that the pamphlet originated in co-operation with Horn and his cronies. Nothing contradicts this assumption. The conflict between Horn and Leijonmarck is first established when Leijonmark began to press his demands for Ulrika Eleonora's regency — demands that Horn was forced to oppose for purely political reasons. But in July, 1713, this conflict had not yet begun. Their conflict during the first months of 1714 cannot be used to reject

[17] It could seem less likely that a person such as Leijonmarck could, as happened here, assign the wrong dates to the forms of government. This could argue against the proposed hypothesis that he was the author. But such errors could be made in transcriptions, and then the error is repeated in new transcriptions. According to W. Ahlström, *Vem författade "En redlig prästmans betänkande"?* (KFÅ 1971), the wrong dates confirm his thesis that Leijonmarck could not have been the author.

the hypothesis of Leijonmarck's authorship. On the contrary, assuming that Horn secretly and against the King's will attempted to elicit demands that the Estates convene and delegate to the Council their alleged authority to conclude peace, he may have found it advantageous to co-operate with Leijonmarck in his propaganda efforts — under the rule of the absolute monarch, Leijonmarck was the most eloquent spakesman for the Estates' rights and prerogatives. A condition of the Estates' authorization of the Council must have been that they were convinced of their right to exercise that authority.

What has been discussed here — the knowledge of the pamphlet's author regarding the *kassationsakt* of 1689 and the history of Avesta, the record in the appeals minutes, and certain fundamental similarities in the views and programs of the authors of the pamphlet and memorandum — is no more than a chain of circumstantial evidence. No proof is available. But it is likely that Leijonmarck was the author, possibly in collaboration with Gezelius.

Summary

There is a double purpose to this thesis. The first is to reexamine the *theory of conspiracy*, i. e., the theory that in 1713 Chancery President Arvid Horn and his closest colleagues in the Council attempted to increase the unrest and dissatisfaction within the Realm for the purpose of eliciting petitions for the convocation of a *Riksdag*. This *Riksdag* would then be able to increase the authority of the Council during the King's absence abroad, or even pave the way to leadership in Swedish politics in view of the impending accession of a new monarch. The second purpose is to study the Estates' relationship to the King and the Council, concentrating on tendencies that could lead to the new constitutional order of 1719. Here follows a short summary of the results.

Chapter I treats the circumstances surrounding the Council's decision in early summer, 1713, to summon the Estates. Horn appears to have used the refusal of the Bank's Board of Governors to allocate new credit to the Crown, to facilitate a decision to convene a *Riksdag*. He misled colleagues who were absent from the discussions by referring to the Board of Governors' refusal when it no longer was an issue, and repudiated proposals for relieving the lack of money that did not necessitate a *Riksdag*. The decision to summon the Estates was annulled because three Councillors opposed it. The real reason was probably that the Council received fresh reports that caused it to fear that Charles XII, who was sojourning in Turkey, would soon return home. The King's prohibition of a *Riksdag* in 1713, was likely a response to warnings, in the form of a verbal message, from one of the Councillors who opposed the decision to summon the Estates. These warnings could have suggested that plots against the King's throne and power were planned or under way.

Chapter II. During the summer of 1713, there was an extensive propaganda campaign centered in Stockholm that presented demands for a *Riksdag*, which would authorize the Council to conclude peace with the enemies of the Realm. This propaganda referred directly to the offer of mediation supposedly delivered by the English Resident in Stockholm, which reportedly required that the Swedish negotiators possess unlimited authority to negotiate — authority that Charles XII would be expected not to delegate. The propaganda called for measures that were directly contrary to the will of

Charles XII, ultimately signifying a breach with the King. It seems probable that this propaganda originated from within the Council, principally from Horn. This is supported by the fact that information about the alleged English offer of mediation reached the public before it was officially presented to the Council. Therefore, the tidings probably were spread when someone in the Council with advance information deliberately leaked the news. The supposition that Horn was responsible for the propaganda is supported by the fact that the English offer of mediation was only a distortion of the message that the English Resident delivered, and Horn, having officially accepted the message, referred to the false information when he spoke to his fellow Councillors and, later, to Princess Ulrika Eleonora.

Since Horn had previously succeeded in facilitating a decision to summon the Estates by supporting his views with misleading information, it is natural to assume that his purpose really was to obtain the Estates' authorization of the Council to negotiate peace. This assumption is also supported by the fact that, during the spring, Horn sent a courier with a verbal message to the chief English negotiator at the Peace Congress in Utrecht, claiming that the Council in Stockholm was prepared to conclude peace with the Allies without waiting for the King's permission. Horn also sought a means to effect his plans without breaking with the King and causing an uproar, and asked that a Peace Treaty be forced on Sweden. It is obvious that Horn expected the English to confront the Swedish Council with an ultimatum concerning peace or mediation, which would increase the possibilities for the Council to conclude peace and still be able to defend its actions to the King. The domestic political propaganda during the summer was a result of England — against all expectations — not delivering a peace ultimatum; the mediation offer spread by the propaganda was, therefore, a substitute. The propaganda demanded a convocation of the Estates, and sought to elicit and create expressions of public opinion before the *Riksdag* convened. Horn obviously tried to give the King the impression that the Council acted under pressure from the Estates and public opinion.

Chapter III treats the English policy regarding Sweden during the spring and summer of 1713, as a condition for the Swedish Council's activities, and the circumstances surrounding the Council's authorization of the Governor General of Bremen-Verden, Mauritz Vellingk, to open peace negotiations with the Allies in the autumn of 1713. The English government — driven, it seems, by the logic inherent in the situation — arrived at the same solution that the Council in Stockholm formulated: a peace ultimatum from England and the Dutch republic, that would threaten the Swedes, to force the conditions offered on Sweden, in the event that they refused to accept

them. Ironically, when the English government received an appeal from the Swedes for such an ultimatum, they did not dare to comply, probably, because they feared that the Dutch would take advantage of the situation to strengthen their trade in the Baltic at England's expense. Perhaps they also feared that the Swedish offer might be a provocation, meant to compromise England with Charles XII. The common element of the views in London and Stockholm was the anticipation of a peace agreement in which Charles XII would be kept on the sidelines.

When on November 28, 1713, the Council authorized Mauritz Vellingk to negotiate peace with the Allies, it supported its action on the news that the King had already empowered Vellingk to conclude an armistice agreement, and asserted that the peace negotiations it wished to initiate were only meant to lead to such a cease-fire. These negotiations would be just a simulation. Yet, the King seemed not to have granted Vellingk authority to conclude a cease-fire agreement — this was confirmed in Vellingk's own information. Instead, there is reason to suppose that the Council reached its decision on the basis of Vellingk's misleading reports, which originated in an agreement between Horn and Vellingk, and were repeated to the dissenting members of the Council for the purpose of facilitating the authorization. That such an agreement existed is supported by the fact the King was told about the authorization before the decision was reached, and before any discussion of the issue appears in the Council's minutes.

In November, the Council decided to summon the Estates and to invite Princess Ulrika Eleonora to join the Council. After the Estates convened, and the Council enjoyed greater international authority (after the Princess took a seat in the Council), the planned peace negotiations could be opened. Through revised instructions for Vellingk, peace could be concluded. The situation that the Council's propaganda attempted to elicit — materialized.

Chapter IV discusses the 1713—1714 negotiations between the Council and the Estates on matters of taxation. Among other things, it points out the Council's difficulties in effecting the King's order regarding taxation of savings deposits in the Estates' Bank, when written evidence of his will was lacking, and how it considered itself forced to rely on the information in private letters concerning what the King's will might have been. The thesis is that the ruthless measures against the Estates' Bank — the withdrawal of securities the Crown gave — were based on the Council's ignorance of the Bank's actual situation, which was greatly overestimated. The secrecy meant to protect the Bank and its depositors nearly caused its fall. In addition, the negotiations between the Council and the Estates over the extraordinary levy of 1714 is discussed, as well as the Council's concession to the *Riksdag*

that was expressed in the Council's decision to deviate from the King's newly-arrived orders, and in 1714, apply the previous system of taxation. This concession could likely be connected with the Crown's double dependency on the Estates for appropriations and as trustees of the Bank — in the existing situation the Crown's only conceivable creditor. In addition, the Estates' more or less veiled threats that it would be difficult to collect taxes, if the Estates' methods of taxation were not facilitated, could have played a part.

Chapter V treats the negotiations between the Council and the Estates over the question of peace. It will appear that peace proponents in the *Riksdag* pushed through a more radical and far-reaching policy in the Estates than has been known previously, with its ignoring of the King's prohibition against peace negotiations and demand that the Estates step in and conclude peace. The Council did not expressly dissociate itself from these far-reaching demands, but, instead members of the Council asked the Estates to submit them in writing. The Council asked the Estates for authority to negotiate and conclude peace, while at the same time it attempted to dampen the enthusiasm of the peace proponents by referring to letters from persons in the King's entourage, which asserted the King' was preparing to open peace negotiations. Thus, the Council simultaneously egged on and dampened the enthusiasm in the Estates. The Council solicited the Estates' authorization to serve as peace negotiator, but at the same time it seemed to want to leave the ultimate responsibility with the Estates, while taking away their power to control or influence negotiations.

Chapter VI discusses the Estates' demand that Princess Ulrika Eleonora accede to the Regency, while it ignored the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp to the throne. An energetic lobby within the Estates pushed through its demand. This group consisted of men who were anti-Holstein and anti-Council, and who had varying constitutional attitudes and programs. As early as February 25, 1714, the Estates agreed to submit a memorandum to the Council which stated that the Princess should be asked to accede to the Regency. This memorandum was never presented, because Horn frightened the Secret Committee with reprimands and threats that the Estates' minutes could be examined and those who uttered injurious and criminal statements of any kind would be held responsible. Horn's threats gained nothing more than a little time. When the united Estates, after circulating a voting list to consolidate opinion, posed a new threat, Horn intervened at the March 15, 1714, Council meeting and appealed to the Princess to disavow her supporters, reproached the leaders of the opposition who had been summoned for the occasion, and read a letter from the King that arrived some time before,

which prohibited a *Riksdag* and demanded that it be dissolved if it had already convened. Whether Horn anticipated the King's arrival, or intended to widen the Council's powers, his measures seem logical and necessary.

Chapter VII discusses the *theory of conspiracy*. It is shown here that the *theory of conspiracy* is founded on information from the French Resident in Stockholm and on a later-developed oral tradition, but not on any primary sources. It is very likely, or could be strongly suspected, that the Frenchman's as well as the traditional information ultimately stem from the anti-Council propaganda of 1713—1714, which, for various reasons, attacked Horn and questioned his policies and intentions. It seems more profitable to test the *theory of conspiracy* against the evidence preserved from the *Riksdag*, and testimony of such evidence. Then it appears that preparations for a coup could actually have existed or — more likely — could have been discussed and rejected. But this reportedly took place within the framework for a planned alliance of the Estates. This framework became necessary for the Council for purely diplomatic reasons. The necessary recognition of the Estates as the bearer of popular sovereignty was ultimately conditioned by the current need to obtain the necessary authority for the Council to be accepted abroad as the Swedish peace negotiator. At the same time, it was advantageous to keep the Princess as a voting member of the council — not Regent. Because the succession remained undecided, this must have provided possibilities for the Council to sell its support for the price of a strengthened position in the government of the Realm.

Some explanatory notes

A text largely dealing with characteristic Swedish institutions necessarily contains a number of consepts and terms which require clarification for the non-Swedish reader. Short, explanatory definitions of those Swedish concepts and terms not explained in the text follow below.

Daler sm — Sweden had a double monetary standard of silver and copper, in which the units of each standard were designated *daler,* i. e., *daler sm (silvermynt)* and *daler km (kopparmynt).* Three *daler km* corresponded to one *daler sm,* and 100,000 *daler sm* were referred to as one *tunna guld* (barrel of gold).

Kanslikollegium — A collegial civil service department led by the *kanslipresident* (Chancery President). This college's function within the Chancery was to prepare and present to the King certain matters, primarily those concerning foreign affairs, and to carry out the King's decisions.

Kungl. Maj:t — The designation for the King in his constitutional capacity as the supreme executive and judicial organ in the realm. On July 7, 1713, the Council issued a directive stating that all documents addressed to the Council should in future be addressed to *Kungl. Maj:t.*

Lagman — County judge.

Lantmarskalk — The Speaker of the Estate of Nobility. He was appointed by *Kungl. Maj:t* and functioned *ex officio* as chairman of the Secret Committee (see below).

Lektor — Teacher in a secondary school.

Reduktion — During the reign of Charles XI, the Crown had revised the legal situation of its creditors. In many cases the Crown demanded the return of estates which had been granted as security for loans during the minority of Charles XI, arguing that the favorable terms of the original transactions had already more than sufficiently reimbursed the Crown's creditors. This often meant that proprietors not only had to surrender their estates, but also had to reimburse the Crown with cash payments.

Riddarhus — The House of Nobility, i. e., the building where both the Estate of Nobility and the Secret Committee held their deliberations.

Rotar and *rusthållare* — Swedish army officers were salaried at this time in the form of housing and rents. The infantry was conscripted from groups of homesteads or *rotar,* each of which was to provide one man. The cavalry was recruited via *rusthåll,* i. e., certain homesteads were required to provide

and outfit a horse and rider, in return for which the homesteader in charge *(rusthållare)* was freed from certain taxes and sometimes entitled to incomes from other properties.

Secret Committee — A committee of the *Riksdag* composed of representatives of the first three estates, the Estate of Peasants lacking representation. The Secret Committee dealt with foreign policy and other questions of a confidential nature.

Further orientation in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Swedish history may be obtained, *inter alia,* from:

Ingvar Andersson, *A History of Sweden,* 2nd ed., (Stockholm 1970). Claude Nordmann, *Grandeur et liberté de la Suède* (1660—1792), Publications de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Paris-Sorbonne. Sér. "Recherches", tome 63, (Paris et Louvain 1971). Michael Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History,* (London 1953).

The dating used in the text is that employed in the sources quoted, i. e., according to the Julian calendar unless otherwise stated. Sweden and England both used the Julian calendar at this time, although diplomats stationed abroad often adapted their dating to the system followed at their posts.

Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Riksarkivet, Stockholm (RA)

Rådsprotokoll
- 108b—108g Carlsons konceptprotokoll maj—december 1713
- 110c Salins konceptprotokoll mars—maj 1713
- 111 Adlerbergs konceptprotokoll oktober—december 1713
- 112 Utdrag ur rådsprotokoll ang. riksdagen 1713—14, renskrift
- 113 Renskrift januari—februari 1714
- 114 Renskrift mars 1714
- 118 Renskrift juni—juli 1714

Justitierevisionens protokoll 1713
Senatens registratur
- mars—oktober 1713
- januari—mars 1714

Utrikes registratur 1713

Skrivelser till konungen
- Karl XII:s tid, ser. I, B—C
- ser. II, Arv. Horn 1703—1718

Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t
- Amiralitetskollegium 1713
- Bankofullmäktige 1708—1714

Kanslikollegium
- Renskrivna protokoll 1709—1714

Traktatsamlingen
- England nr 14 A

Betänkanden och memorial i utrikesärenden
- 22 1711—1718

Diplomatica, Anglica

C. Gyllenborg

201 C. Gyllenborg till Kungl. Maj:t och von Müllern
207 Brev till von Müllern
212 C. Gyllenborgs registratur juni 1711—september 1713
213 Brev från Kungl. Maj:t och rådet 1710—1716
216 Brev från svenska beskickningar i Berlin, Frankfurt, Hannover, Konstantinopel och Utrecht
222 Brev från M. Vellingk 1710—1715

Diplomatica, Borussica

C. G. von Friesendorf

52 Brev till Kungl. Maj:t 1713
55 Brev till kanslipresidenten och kanslikollegium 1712—1715
57 Registratur 1713

Diplomatica, Hollandica

J. Palmquist

237 Brev till Kungl. Maj:t 1710—1714
281 J. Palmquists koncept 1713
282 J. Palmquists koncept 1713
294 Brev från Kungl. Maj:t 1698, 1703—1707, 1710—1715
306 Brev från M. Vellingk 1713—1715
325 Brev från svenska beskickningen i Utrecht 1712—1714
331 Brev från utländska diplomater 1703—1715

Diplomatica, Allmänna fredskongresser

Kongresserna i Utrecht och Baden 1712—1714. G. B. von Engelbrechten

59 Brev till Kungl. Maj:t 1712—1714

Riksbankens arkiv (Rb)

Sekreta bankoprotokoll 1713
Bankoprotokoll 1713
Bankens Acter 39 (1713)
F. Silverstolpes avskrifter "Handlingar angående Banco-Wärket"

1713 års kontributionsränteri

Registratur 1712—1713

Riksdagsarkiv

R 52 Ridderskapets och adelns protokoll 1713—1714
R 2382 Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1713—1714
R 2383 Avskrifter av vissa allegater ur R 2382
R 4877—78 Riksdagsacta 1713—1714: 1—2
R 2650—51 Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1738—39

Kungliga arkiv, Ulrika Eleonora d. y.

K 207 Egenhändiga historiska anteckningar, avskrifter av brev
K 258 Handlingar ang. Ulrika Eleonoras levnadsförhållanden och egendom

Rådets handlingar och brev

45 Rådets brev till konungen 1713
58 Konungens brev till rådet 1713
Skrivelser till rådet under Karl XII:s tid.
65 G. Cronhielm
73 St-Ö samt från myndigheter och korporationer
76 M. Vellingk 1713

Strödda historiska handlingar

30 Strödda historiska handlingar från Karl XII:s tid

Bergshammarsamlingen, Brev till J. G. Werwing

Cronhielmska samlingen

E 3441 Kanslipresidenten Gustaf Cronhielms brevväxling m. m. 1710—1714

Arvid Horns samling

E 4282 Skrivelser till Arvid Horn, ser. I A—Ö
E 4284 Skrivelser från enskilda och myndigheter J—Ö

von Müllernska samlingen

E 4841 Brev från M. Vellingk 1709—1719

Sjöholmssamlingen

Dagbok vid riksdagarna 1714, 1720 (cit. "Wibiörnsson's diary")

Skoklostersamlingen

E 8735 Fol. 100: 3 Manuscripta miscellanea tom. 3

Stafsundsarkivet

Axel von Fersen d. ä.:s arkiv, vol. 3

M. Vellingks samling

E 5965—67 Koncept C-Ho
E 5969 Koncept L-P (utom Müllern och Preis)
E 5977 Kungl. Maj:ts instruktioner
E 5978 Brev från Kungl. Maj:t
E 5981 Inkomna brev D—E
E 5985 Inkomna brev Friesendorf juni—december 1713
E 5987—88 Inkomna brev G—Gyllenborg
E 5991 Inkomna brev Horn—K
E 5995 Inkomna brev Müllern

Avskriftssamlingen

196 C. G. Malmströms avskriftssamling. 1. Fransyska ministerberättelser 1713—1772

H. Almquists manuskript- och avskriftssamling

E 6806 Holstein-Gottorp. Sverige och den nordiska krisen 1706—1714

Kungl. Biblioteket, Stockholm (KB)

Rålambska samlingen fol. 71

D 831:2 Strödda handlingar och uppsatser rör. Sveriges historia under Karl XII
D 841:1 Brev från Ulrika Eleonora d. y.

Engeströmska samlingen B IV 1.8.

L 82:1:8 Akerödagboken

Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, Uppsala (UUB)

F 105 K. Rådet N. Tessins memorial till senatens protokoll 1713, dels originaler, dels avskrifter
F 109 Handlingar till Sveriges politiska historia 1710—1714
F 147o Handlingar rör. kungl. rådet, presidenten greve Jacob Reenstierna
F 469 Gustavianska samlingen, vol. 60 fol., äldre svenska originalhandlingar 1638—1714
X 370 Eric von Roland "Journal ou Relation de mes Voyages dans les Pays etrangers"

Nordinska samlingen

782 Gustaf Benzelstiernas anteckningar

Erland Hjärnes papper (okatalogiserade)

Krigsarkivet, Stockholm (KrA)
Ängsöarkivet
Manuskriptsamlingen I:48

Landsarkivet, Göteborg
Göteborgs stadsarkiv
Gc:3 Riksdagshandlingar 1713—1714

Landsarkivet, Uppsala
Landskansliet, Södermanlands län A III:10

Linköpings Stifts- och Landsbibliotek, Linköping
Br 10:4 Brev till Eric Benzelius d. y. 1713—1714
Rolandianska handskrifter, vol. 6

Public Record Office, London (PRO)
SP 84/246—247 State Papers Foreign, Holland (Dispatches from and instrutions to Strafford and Robinson)
SP 95/ 19— 20 State Papers Foreign, Sweden (Dispatches from and instructions to R. Jackson)
SP 100/ 61 Foreign ministers in England. Letters from Swedish envoys in London to the secretaries of state
SP 104/154 Foreign Entry Books. Secretary's letter-book

British Museum, London (BM)
Add MSS 22206 Strafford papers
Add MSS 37273 Official dispatches to the English plenipotentiairies at Utrecht vol. II, jan. 1713—jan. 1714

Archives Nationales, Paris (AN)
Affaires étrangères
B I:1071 Correspondence consulaire, Stockholm

Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris (AAE)
Correspondence politique, Suède/125, 127—130

Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag
Het archief van Anthonie Heinsius
1766 J. P. Borssele van der Hooghe 1713
1806 W. Rumpf 1713
1864 W. Rumpf 1714
1923 W. Rumpf 1715.

Published sources

Acta et litterae ad historiam Suecanam, ed. E. G. Geijer (Uppsala 1817 ff.)

Anmärkningar I Swenska Historien Samlade af Et Sälskap (Stockholm sine dato)

(Benzelius d. y., E.) Anecdota Benzeliana. Eric Benzelius d. y.:s anteckningar i svensk historia, utg. Hj. Lundgren (Stockholm 1914)

(Bolingbroke, H. St John) Letters and Correspondence, public and private, of the Right Honourable Henry St John, Lord Visc. Bolingbroke during the time he was secretary of state to Queen Anne, ed. G. Parke, III—IV (London 1798)

Handlingar ur *Brinkmanska Archivet* I, utg. G. Andersson (Örebro 1859)

British diplomatic instructions, vol. I Sweden 1689—1727, ed. J. Chance, Camden Society (London 1922)

(Fabrice, F. E. von) Anecdotes du sejour du Roi de Suède à Bender, ou lettres de M. le Baron de Fabrice pour servir d'eclaircissement à l'histoire de Charles XII (Hamburg 1761)

Facta till Revolutions-Historien under Konung Carl XII:s Regering, Drottning Ulrika Eleonoras samt början af Konung Fredrics; med teckning af diverse tillhörande personers lynnen (HSH 7, Stockholm 1819)

(Fersen, F. A. von) Riksrådet och fältmarskalken m. m. Fredrik Axel von Fersens Historiska Skrifter I, Utg. R. M. Klinckowström (Stockholm 1867)

Handlingar hörande till Konung Carl XII:s Historia III, utg. G. Floderus (Stockholm 1824)

Handlingar rör. Skandinaviens historia
7 (Stockholm 1819), see Facta
28 (Stockholm 1847)

Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia under åren 1713—1720, utg. C. G. Malmström (Uppsala 1854)

Handlingar, Historiska, utg. Kongl. Samfundet för utgifvande af handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia
7 (Stockholm 1870)
9 (Stockholm 1874)
11 (Stockholm 1889)

(Höpken, A. J. von) Riksrådet Grefve Anders Johan von Höpkens skrifter I, utg. C. Silfverstolpe (Stockholm 1890)

Konung *Karl XII:s* egenhändiga bref, samlade och utgifna af E. Carlson (Stockholm 1893)

(Kochen, J. H. von) Kanslidagbok från Turkiet till största delen förd af J. H. von Kochen 1709—1714. Karolinska krigares dagböcker jämte andra samtida skrifter IV, utg. A. Quennerstedt (Lund 1908)
Lamberty, G. de, Memoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII. siècle, tome VIII (Haag 1730)
Pierre le Grand, Journal depuis l'année 1698 jusqu'a l'année 1714 inclusivement. Nouvelle éd. avec des notes par un officier Suédois (Stockholm 1774)
Post Tidender, Ordinarie Stockholmiske, 1713 (KB, rar.)
Riksdagsprotokoll, Sveriges ridderskaps och adels, 17 (1710, 1713—1714), utg. S. Bergh (Stockholm 1902)
Riksdagsprotokoll, Prästeståndets, IV (1680—1714), utg. L. Thanner (Norrköping 1962)
Riksdagsprotokoll, Borgarståndets, före frihetstiden, utg. Stadshistoriska institutet gm N. Ahnlund (Uppsala 1933)
(Schmedeman, J. J.) Kongl. Stadgar, förordningar, Bref och Resolutioner Angående Justitiae och Exekutions-Ährenden, utg. Joh. Schmedeman (Stockholm 1706)
(Stiernman, A. A. von) Samling Utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och Förordningar angående Sweriges Rikes Commerce, Politie och Oeconomie, utg. A. A. von Stiernman, III—IV (Stockholm 1753, 1760)
Tessin d. y., N., Memorial och anteckningar för åren 1702—1713, utg. S. Bring. Historiskt arkiv 5 (Uppsala 1955)
Tessin och Tessiniana, see Literature, Ehrenheim.

Literature

Ahlström, W., "Alla fyra ständernas i Finland tal". Festskrift till Gottfrid Carlsson (Lund 1952)

— Arvid Horn och Karl XII 1710—1713 (Lund 1959)

— Vem författade "En redlig prästmans betänkande"? (KFÅ 1971)

Almquist, H., Holstein-Gottorp, Sverige och den nordiska ligan i den politiska krisen 1713—1714 (Skrifter utgifna af K. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala 21:1, Uppsala 1918)

Almquist, J. E., Om kontributionsränteriet. Dess organisation och första verksamhet med särskild hänsyn till 1713 års nya beskattningsmetod (KFÅ 1917)

Axelson, G. E., Bidrag till kännedomen om Sveriges tillstånd på Karl XII:s tid (Visby 1888)

Bergh, S., Rådsprotokoll och därmed jämförliga i riksarkivet förvarade protokoll (MRA NF I:30, Stockholm 1912)

Beskow, B. von, Minne af landshöfdingen, vice presidenten och förste arkiatern Urban Hjärne (Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrån år 1796 XXIX, Stockholm 1857)

Bowallius, R. M., Berättelse om riksdagen i Stockholm 1713—1714 (Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrån år 1796 XXI, Stockholm 1847)

Bring, S., Bidrag till Sven Leijonmarcks biografi (Uppsala 1916)

Brisman, S., Den Palmstruchska banken och riksens ständers bank under den karolinska tiden (Sveriges Riksbank 1668—1918 I, Stockholm 1918)

Carlgren, W., Riksdagsutskott före 1680 (Uppsala 1909)

Carlson, F. F., Om fredsunderhandlingarne. Åren 1709—1718 (Stockholm 1857)

Carlsson, S.—Rosén, J., Svensk historia I, Andra upplagan, (Stockholm 1964)

Chance, J. F., England and Sweden in the time of William III and Queen Anne (Engl. Hist. Review, London 1901)

Ehrenheim, F. V. von, Tessin och Tessiniana. Biographie med anecdoter och reflexioner, samlade utur ... C. G. Tessins egenhändiga manuskripter (Stockholm 1819)

Elgenstierna, G., Den introducerade svenska adelns ättartavlor II (Stockholm 1926)

Fryxell, A., Berättelser ur svenska historien XXIV—XXV (Stockholm 1857)

Geijer, E. G., Teckning af Sveriges tillstånd och af de förnämsta handlande personerne under tiden från konung Carl XII:s död till konung Gustaf III:s anträde af regeringen (Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrån år 1796 XVIII, Stockholm 1838)
Grauers, S., Arvid Bernhard Horn. Biografisk studie I 1664—1713 (Göteborg 1920)
— Några bidrag till oppositionens historia under Karl XII (KFÅ 1921)
— Den svenska riksdagen under den karolinska tiden (Sveriges riksdag I:4, Stockholm 1932)
— De politiska relationerna mellan Arvid Bernhard Horn och Georg Heinrich von Görtz åren 1707—1719 (KFÅ 1963)
— Georg Heinrich von Goertz (SBL XVII, Stockholm 1967—1969)
Hasselberg, G., De karolinska kassationsakterna (Skrifter utgivna av Institutet för Rättshistorisk Forskning ser. I, Rättshistoriskt Bibliotek 13, Stockholm 1968)
Hatton, R., Charles XII of Sweden (London 1968)
Heckscher, E., De europeiska staternas finanser på Karl XII:s tid (KFÅ 1921)
Hjärne, E., Från Vasatiden till Frihetstiden (Stockholm 1929)
Holst, W., Ulrika Eleonora d. y. Karl XII:s syster (Stockholm 1956)
Jägerskiöld, S., Den hessiska politiken och den svenska tronföljdsfrågan 1713—1718. Några bidrag (KFÅ 1934)
— Juridik och politik. Studier i karolinsk straffrätt (KFÅ 1963)
Lagerroth, F., Den svenska monarkin inför rätta. En författningshistorisk exposé (Lund 1972)
Lindeberg, G., Svensk ekonomisk politik under den görtzka perioden (Lund 1941)
Malmström, C. G., Sveriges politiska historia från Konung Karl XII:s död till statshvälfningen 1772 I. Andra upplagan (Stockholm 1893)
— Ständernas utskottsmöte 1710. Smärre skrifter rörande sjuttonhundratalets historia (Stockholm 1889)
Murray, J. J., Robert Jackson's mission to Sweden (1709—1717) (The Journal of Modern History XXV, March 1949)
— George I, The Baltic and the Whig split of 1717 (London 1969)
Normann, C. E., Prästerskapet och det karolinska enväldet. Studier över det svenska prästerskapets statsuppfattning under stormaktstidens slutskede (Samlingar och studier till svenska kyrkans historia 17, Lund 1948)
Palme, S. U., Fredrik Axel von Fersens memoarer. Ett meddelande rörande deras tillkomsttid och tillkomstsätt (PHT 1936)
Renvall, P., Finsk representation i Sveriges riksdag (Stockholm 1967)

Rosén, J., Det engelska anbudet om fredsmedling 1713. En studie i politisk propaganda (LUÅ NF 1, Bd 43:6, Lund 1946)
— Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia II:1 (Stockholm 1952)
Stille, A., Karl XII och Porten 1709—1714 (Karl XII. Till 200-årsdagen av hans död. Stockholm 1918)
Tengberg, N., Om frihetstiden (Stockholm 1867)
Thanner, L., Revolutionen i Sverige efter Karl XII:s död (Uppsala 1953)
Trevelyan, G. M., England under Queen Anne, III (London 1934)
Wittrock, G., Lorentz Creutz d. ä. (SBL IX, Stockholm 1931).

Index

Names of authors, and names referred to in footnotes are excluded.

Adlerberg, J., secretary, 84.
Anne, Queen of England, 34, 36, 38—39, 43, 47, 52, 60, 62, 67—69, 71, 118—119, 121.
Armfelt, C. G., General, 167.
Augustus, King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, 76—77, 89.

Banér, A., 129.
Barchius, A., *rådman*, 156.
Barck, S., Court Councillor, 145—147, 150—151, 159.
Benzelius, E. (the Younger), university librarian, 44, 53—55, 100, 163, 179—181.
Berner, Holstein General, 83.
Bielke, N., 164.
Bilberg, J., Bishop, 109.
Bolingbroke, H. St John, viscount, state secretary, 31—41, 44—46, 51—52, 58, 60—62, 64—67, 69, 80, 118.
Brehmer, O., City secretary, 108, 122, 129, 156, 168, 169.
Breton, W., English minister in Berlin, 79, 83, 90.
Bromley, W., state secretary, 118—119.

Campredon, J. de, French resident in Stockholm, 2—4, 8, 14, 16, 22—23, 36, 41—42, 45—46, 48—51, 53, 55—56, 58, 92, 121, 124—126, 128, 141, 144—146, 149—152, 155, 166, 174, 175—177, 200.
Carlson, C., secretary, 84, 188.
Cederhielm, G., *lagman*, 113.
Charles XI, king of Sweden, 7—8, 100, 105, 134, 143, 192, 194.
Charles XII, king of Sweden, 1—3, 11, 16, 23—29, 32, 35—36, 42—43, 48, 51—52, 54—55, 58, 61, 63—67, 69—75, 77—87, 89—92, 94, 96—97, 99, 102, 104—105, 107, 111—112, 114, 116, 119—120, 122—127, 129, 136, 137—138, 140, 143—149, 155—159, 163, 168, 171, 173, 180—181, 186—188, 190, 196—199.
Charles (Karl), Duke of Södermanland, 165, 173, 183.
Charles VI, German emperor, 120, 168.
Coyet, G. W., Colonel, 153—155, 186.
Creutz, E. J., *lantmarskalk*, 109, 114, 120, 130, 136—137, 141, 155—156, 160—162, 172.
Creutz, L., Vice-President, 193.
Cronhielm, G., Councillor of the Realm, 13—15, 19—20, 23, 25—26, 31, 49—50, 86, 88, 90, 99, 104, 159, 176.
Croning, L., 152.
Cronström, A., Master of the Mint, 192.
Cronström, D., Swedish envoyé in Paris, 40.

De la Gardie, M. J., colonel, 30—32.
De Geer, C., 129, 131—133, 135.
Dernath, G. G. von, *Geheimrat*, 61—62, 65.
Düben, A. von, chamberlain, 145—147, 149.

Ehrenpreus, H., director, 101.
Ehrenstrahl, F. J., secretary, 14, 31, 88, 106—107, 150.
Engelbrechten, B. G. von, envoy, 44, 66, 69, 72, 74, 78, 80—84, 91, 121.
Fabrice, W. L. von, envoy, 76, 81, 147.
Falkenberg, G., chamberlain, 152.
Falkenberg, H., Councillor of the Realm, 13, 15, 19, 87.
Falzburg, A., County Governor, 160.
Feif, C., state secretary, 98—99, 100, 125—126, 145, 146.
Feif, P., captain, 24, 25, 26, 126.
Fersen, A., von, Field Marshal, 178, 183—184, 187.
Fersen, H. von, Councillor of the Realm, 38.
Flemming, J. H. von, Field Marshal, 79, 83.
Franc, P., County Governor, 43, 48—49.
Fredenstierna, A., 181—182.
Fredrik IV, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1, 143—144, 163, 175—176.
Fredrik, prince of Hessen, 144.
Fredrik Wilhelm I, king of Prussia, 76.
Fribach, secretary, 126.
Friesendorf, C. G. von, Swedish minister in Berlin, 25, 75, 77, 79, 83, 90.
Frölich, C. G., Councillor of the Realm, 13—14, 20, 22—23, 56.
Funck, G., judge, 152.

Gezelius, G., bishop, 114, 190—191, 195.
Gyllenborg, C., Swedish minister in London, 30—34, 37, 40, 44—46, 51—52, 60—62, 70—72, 74—75, 80—81, 83—84, 118—119, 168.
Gyllencreutz, C., 115, 136, 181.
Gyllenstierna, C., Councillor of the Realm, 13, 49, 150, 178.
Gyllenstierna, N., Councillor of the Realm, 3, 30, 41, 53, 86, 98, 135, 144, 162, 167, 175, 177.
Görtz, G. H. von, Holstein *Geheimrat*, 76—81, 83—84, 90, 149, 150, 163, 169.
Hagen, Holstein Court Councillor, 163, 169.
Hamilton, H., Major General, 160.
Hedvig Eleonora, dowager Queen of Sweden, 143, 151.
Hedvig Sofia, Duchess of Holstein-Gottorp, 143—144, 149.
Heinsius, A., Grand Pensionary of Holland, 51, 69.
Horn, A., Councillor of the Realm, Chancery President, 2—3, 5, 7, 11—12, 15, 17—23, 28, 31—32, 34—38, 42, 44—53, 56, 58, 72, 75, 84—88, 90—94, 97, 99, 103, 112, 114, 117, 120—122, 124—125, 128, 130, 135—138, 141, 144, 148—151, 155, 159—162, 167—169, 171—183, 187—189, 194—200.
d'Huxelles, French marshal, ambassador, 65.
Hjärne, U., physician, 54, 55, 180.
Hyltén, A., mayor, 106, 108, 128—132, 140, 156, 162, 165—166, 168.
Höpken, A. J. von, 178, 180—181.
Höpken, D. N. von, secretary, 49, 84, 88, 91—92, 121, 159.
Iser, M., bishop, 109.
Jackson, R., English resident in Stockholm, 14, 16, 30—32, 34—39, 41—42, 44—46, 50, 54—56, 58, 60, 67—68, 74, 92, 119, 121, 123, 125—126, 152, 155, 158—159, 163, 171, 176—177, 186, 189, 196.
Karl Fredrik, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1, 65, 76, 143, 149—151, 163, 171, 175.
Lang, J., bishop, 109, 129, 160, 162.
Leyel, J., 156.
Leijonhufvud (Lewenhaupt), A. J., vice admiral, 106.
Leijonhufvud, G., see Lewenhaupt.
Leijonmarck, S., Vice-President, 57, 158, 163, 165—166, 172, 179, 181, 183—184, 192—195.
Leijonstedt, A., Chancery Councillor, 13, 31, 54, 187, 188.
Lewenhaupt, G., Major General (Colonel), 115, 129, 140, 164, 166, 170, 172.
Liewen, H. H. von, general, 126, 136.
Lillie, E., vice admiral, 152.
Lilliehöök, M., 129.
Lillienstedt, J., 129.
Louis XIV, king of France, 60, 65, 68, 168.
Lund, D., bishop, 120.
Lybecker, G., general, 152, 190—191.
Löwenheim, C. L., secretary, 24, 126—128, 140.
Meijerfelt, J. A. von, Governor General, Councillor of the Realm, 76, 125—126, 188.
Menschikow, A. Danilovitj, Russian Field Marshal, 79, 83.
Molin, L., 109, 129, 140, 156, 165, 179, 181.
Müllern, G. H. von, Chancellor of the Court, 71—74, 76, 78—84, 90, 114, 126, 133, 135—136, 138—139, 140.
Mörner, C. G. County Governor, 58.
Otter, S. von, Deputy County Governor, 111.
Oxford, R. Harley, earl of, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 61, 64—66, 69.
Peter I, tsar of Russia, 27, 62, 73, 77, 140, 163, 167.
Palmquist, J., Swedish minister in the Hague, 44, 66, 69, 71—72, 74, 79—84, 90—92, 168.
Palmskiöld, E., secretary, 113, 169.
Reenstierna, J., Councillor of the Realm, 13, 14—15, 18—19, 38, 49—50, 56, 86—91, 93, 96, 98—100, 111, 117, 159, 188.
Robinson, J., bishop of Bristol, ambassador, 32—33, 44, 50, 52, 63, 66, 68—69, 74, 81—82, 92, 93, 197.
Ribbing, C., 107, 109—110, 133, 137—138, 164, 179, 180—181.
Ribbing, P., *kammarråd*, 137, 179, 180—181.
Roland, E., secretary, 30—32, 34, 36—38, 43—48, 50—52, 63—64.
Schlippenbach, C. R. von, colonel, 126.
Shrewsbury, John Talbot, duke of, ambassador, 40, 52, 60, 68.
Sigismund, king of Sweden and Poland, 165, 173, 183.
Silentz, V, mayor, 108.
Sillieström, L., 152.
Sofia Alexsejevna, Grand Duchess, 171.
Sparre, E., general, 168.
Sparrfelt, A., County Governor, 111, 136.
Spegel, H., archbishop, 54, 108—109, 128—129, 139—140, 163.

Stanislaus (Leszczynski), king of Poland, 73, 90, 136, 138—139.
Starling, J., mayor, 169—170.
Stenbock, M., Field Marshal, 1, 12, 17, 30—31, 34, 62, 149.
Steuch, 156.
Strafford, Thomas Wentworth, earl of, 63—66, 68—70, 79, 80, 83.
Stromberg, N., Councillor of the Realm, 24.
Svedberg, J., bishop, 57, 113—114, 129, 165, 170.
Tessin, N. (the Younger), Councillor of the Realm, 13—14, 17—19, 21—23, 31, 35, 38, 41, 50, 86—91, 93, 103—104, 112, 119, 150, 167, 182, 184.
Tessin, C. G., 179—180.
Thegner, J., Vice-President, 99.
Tilaesius, H., 57, 163.
Torcy, J. B. Colbert, marquis de, 126, 175.
Trubetskoy, I., Jarnevitj, Russian prince, 167.
Törling, S., rector, 54.
Ulrika Eleonora, princess, 1, 2, 38, 57, 85, 87—88, 90, 121, 122, 129, 131, 143—151, 153—167, 169—172, 175—176, 178, 180, 186, 194, 197, 199.
Wachtmeister, H., Councillor of the Realm, 13—15, 19—21, 23—25, 49—50, 52, 99, 176.
Valle, de la, Colonel Lieutenant, 147.
Vellingk, M., Governor General, 2—3, 25, 29—30, 39, 45—46, 52, 62, 70—93, 119, 121—123, 126, 136, 151, 161, 168, 197.
Whitworth, Ch., English diplomat, 33, 60—61.